© REUTERS/Thomas Peter

One year into the presidency of Donald Trump, international affairs are in flux—not in the perennial sense that “a lot is going on across the world,” but in the more fundamental sense that things are changing structurally with an unknown outcome.

Trump has accelerated a central, structural change in international affairs that was already happening prior to his arrival in the White House: a noticeable decline in the United States’ political desire as well as capacity to lead on the international stage. Under its most recent four presidents, the US has gone from declaring itself indispensable to international diplomacy, to regretting its period of unilateral hubris, to trying to lead from behind, to not leading at all.

Today, Trump’s determination to take the US out of the leadership game is forcing America’s allies and opponents to adjust and challenging them to take greater responsibility for their future security as well as prosperity. The world is at the beginning of an uneasy new normal, where leaders across the world are driven to adopt more proactive foreign policies in order to compensate for the loss of US leadership.

The Receding Tide of US Leadership

Many people’s worst fears of a Trump presidency have not come to pass. US troops remain forward-deployed in Eastern Europe, and US-Russia relations are frozen in an uneasy stand-off of mutual suspicion. The president has appointed national security cabinet members who understand the value of NATO, and he has grudgingly committed his administration to uphold Article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance. He has re-engaged with traditional allies in the Middle East. He has not imposed the swingeing unilateral trade measures against China that he promised during his campaign.

Even in those areas where the president has taken radical steps–on climate change, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program, or Jerusalem – his dramatic public announcements disguise a near-term continuity and leave room for maneuvering. His choice of method for withdrawing the US from the Paris agreement on climate change extends US adherence to the end of his presidential term. His “non-certification” of the Iran deal transfers responsibility for deciding whether to abandon the agreement to an already overloaded US Congress. His statement recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and embassy move will not occur for another three years–also around the end of his first presidential term.

On the other hand, these ambiguities cannot disguise the fact that the Trump administration has accelerated the shift from the US being a committed, if imperfect world leader to being a more explicitly self-interested superpower. His mantra of “America First” is a declaration that the US will relinquish its core role of leading the world by example.

The Trump administration’s approach to regulation (or de-regulation), whether on the environment, financial supervision or corporate transparency in developing countries, appears designed to create market advantage for US firms versus their international competitors. This has meant the US relinquishing its role as the driver of a new wave of international liberalization of trade and investment–specifically through the Obama administration’s proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. They would have generated a common rise in standards on issues such as public procurement, intellectual property protection, labor standards and internet governance across two of the largest regional marketplaces in the world.

Similarly, Trump has removed the US from its role as a promoter of better domestic governance and democracy. His most successful visits have been with authoritarian leaders who offer the best opportunities to secure economic benefit for the US. Trump’s references in his first speech to the UN General Assembly in September about the primacy of strong sovereign nations with different values and different dreams being able to “coexist … on the basis of mutual respect” could easily have been delivered by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Trump supporters would counter that his administration is now simply playing the same hard ball as everyone else, and that far from all Americans benefited from the liberal, open market approach of his predecessors. This may be true, but under his leadership, America is returning to the role it played in the mid-1930s, when its beggar-thy-neighbor domestic policies contributed to the rise of authoritarian governments around the world—and ultimately to a second world war.

Ripple Effects

History may rhyme, but it rarely repeats itself, as the saying goes. So how are other countries reacting to the return of a brutally realist outlook in the White House? There are three groups to consider.

First, this has been an especially difficult year for US allies in Europe who see themselves as America’s traditional partners in upholding the liberal international order. Some European leaders, most notably German Chancellor Angela Merkel and, to a certain extent, French President Emmanuel Macron, have sought to pick up the baton of liberal leadership. A majority, including the British, are trying to look beyond the personality of the occupant of the White House and focus on sustaining the many other channels of transatlantic cooperation, including with the US Congress. Some European leaders, mostly but not all in political opposition, even welcome Trump’s ascendancy.

Wherever one stands on this spectrum, it is possible to argue that Trump has had a positive effect on Europe. Concerns over the US becoming a security insurance policy of last resort and Britain’s imminent withdrawal from the EU have forced serious steps towards higher defense spending and deeper EU defense integration. Europeans are also being drawn into a more serious debate about Iran’s destabilizing effects across the Middle East, rather than just focusing on the importance of protecting the JCPOA and hoping for the best after the plan’s expiry. They are ramping up their security relationships and presence in the Sahel, a region that matters greatly to Europe and less to the US. And the EU has completed its Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan and is seeking a mandate to begin free trade negotiations with Australia and New Zealand.

These initiatives will continue to face obstacles and expose the distinct priorities and sometimes divergent interests of EU member states. Many would prefer simply to turn inwards and focus on fixing themselves after the trials and tribulations of the European financial crisis. The White House’s nationalist discourse, actively promoted across Europe by its ideological champions and financial backers among the “alt-right” movement, could exacerbate those differences. But there is no doubt that Trump is having a catalyzing effect on efforts to create a more autonomous Europe in international affairs.

Stepping In: China and Russia

A second group to consider are America’s main challengers for leadership around the world: most prominently China and Russia. In many ways, they are the main beneficiaries at this stage of America’s withdrawal from global leadership.

President Xi has been quick to step into the leadership vacuum, from his pro-globalization speech a year ago in Davos to hosting a major international conference last May on the Belt and Road Initiative. With US domestic politics in turmoil following Trump’s election, and the same in Britain following the Brexit decision, China’s soft power among its neighbors and the wider world is rising by default. The Chinese are looking for ways to exploit their new-found influence, whether in UN bodies or on international debates such as over regulating the internet.

In the absence of a US strategy for the Middle East, Vladimir Putin has doubled down on his military intervention in Syria and is now deepening relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He can also stir up European popular discontent in order to weaken the EU with no fear of US retaliation. And he takes every opportunity to demonstrate equivalence between Russia’s amorally self-interested approach to international affairs and that of the United States under Trump.

At the same time, however, America’s more selective engagement in regional conflicts will lessen the options for low-cost Russian interference. The case of Syria shows that if Russia wants to play a more active role in the Middle East, it will have to bear the financial, security, and reputational costs itself. The same can be said for China’s growing military presence in the South China Sea and its broader neighborhood. If China is now seen as Asia’s regional hegemon, this will create opportunities for the US to play the role of counter-weight, much as China has done while the US has been in the dominant position.

An Inevitable Adjustment

The third group of countries are those that lack the protection of a strong regional institution and that still depend individually on the United States for their security. They include countries that are part of the broader democratic “West,” like Japan and South Korea, as well as some non-democratic countries now experimenting with more representative forms of governance and more inclusive models of economic growth, like Saudi Arabia. They are the most vulnerable in this more barren international landscape, where US protection from dangerous neighbors is increasingly conditional as well as unpredictable.

Like the Europeans, these US allies are being forced to build up their defense capabilities and rely more on their own diplomatic agility, including by triangulating their foreign policy beyond the US to the world’s other major powers. This is a less safe geopolitical space for these countries to inhabit; the fate of their economic and physical security is tied as much to their leaders’ personal chemistry, or lack thereof, with President Trump as to America’s formal security commitments, whose credibility had already come into question during the Obama administration.

It was inevitable that this adjustment from a period of US global leadership would happen at some point, and it seems unlikely that there will be a return to the status quo. The net result is that no country in the world has the luxury any more to free-ride on what has become a decaying American hegemony.

Hinge points in 2018

When all is said and done, it will be healthy for allies to escape their over-dependency on the United States. Although poll numbers continue to fluctuate, much of America’s population has become at best more ambivalent and at worst increasingly resentful of playing such a costly leadership role on the international stage.

But if other countries must take greater responsibility for their futures, this will pose new challenges, some of which will come to bear in 2018.

First, negotiations over Britain’s departure from the EU must not fall into a “cliff-edge” Brexit, with no clear sense of what the country’s future relationship will be with the EU. This should be economically and geopolitically self-evident for the British, although it might not seem so by the quality of the domestic British debate. But nor can the EU afford to lose the UK into a “splendid isolation” off the edge of the European continent, while grappling at the same time with a more anti-EU United States. Finding a resolution to its relations with the UK is largely in the EU’s gift, whereas this is not the case with the US.

If the two sides can arrive at a compromise, the EU may evolve into the UK’s second special relationship. And the prospects for a more strategically autonomous Europe could improve, with the UK committed to the security of its European neighbors through NATO and more comfortable with its post-Brexit security relationship with the EU, and with its EU neighbors more willing to integrate their security capabilities through EU institutions without British obstructionism.

Learn To Do Without US Leadership

This will also be the year where other nations need to demonstrate that coalitions of the willing can drive positive change on issues of global importance, even without US leadership. The successful follow-on summit to the Paris climate change agreement that President Macron held in Paris in December 2017 has shown that leading governments, working in tandem with major multinational corporations and international NGOs, can on occasion mobilize political and public action towards shared goals in the absence of US leadership.

On a more negative note, there is a high risk that US efforts to re-negotiate aspects of its key trading relationships, whether with Canada and Mexico in NAFTA or with China, will fail in 2018. With Congressional mid-term elections due in November, President Trump will be tempted to take unilateral action to demonstrate to his political base the seriousness of his intent to re-draw America’s terms of trade with some of its major partners. The EU, Japan, China, and others will have to work hard either to avoid this outcome or demonstrate that they can hold meaningful plurilateral and bilateral trade negotiations without US engagement.

The other wild card for 2018, of course, will remain North Korea. Here, there is no escaping the centrality of the US in any solution or, at least, the avoidance of a major escalation. But it would be far healthier in the future if the US administration could focus on critical questions of this sort, rather than having to apply its diplomatic time and capital simultaneously towards multiple other stand-offs where regional actors could play more constructive roles.

In the end, the rest of the world cannot and should not wait for the US to keep the world safe. Each country, each actor of scale–nationally, regionally, internationally–needs to step up to its own set of responsibilities as a beneficial stakeholder in the current system of international prosperity and relative stability that America has played such a central role in building.

The post A Dangerous New Normal appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

For decades, American leadership has been the most decisive force for the creation and maintenance of the liberal international order. After WW II, the US built an international system that worked to integrate individual states, in particular allies in Europe and Asia. Political and economic cooperation were supposed to replace the great power politics that had pushed the world to the brink of destruction. This postwar order is “liberal” in its very essence: It is based on the conviction that liberal democracy is the only legitimate and, in the long run, stable form of governance – grounded in individual self-determination, which it aspires to bring into a productive, constructive relationship with society. The liberal international order applies the same principle to states: Like individuals, states are seen as self-determined and equal stakeholders whose goals are protection of freedom and promotion of the common good.

At its core, this order depends upon America’s political will to use its immense power for the preservation and further development of the system. And while America has often violated the rules of that system, and its overwhelming power has at times undermined the self-determination it has sought to construct, its allies and partners have tacitly accepted this as the price for the US role as guarantor.

Turning against the Liberal Order

After 1989 it looked as if the liberal order would spread in a self-sustainable way – but the victory was only half complete. China and Russia have, to a large extent, integrated themselves into the US-led economic order, and the elites in both countries are dependent on economic interaction with Western liberal democracies. Yet politically, those same elites have successfully blocked the liberal model.

This puts them into a difficult position: As they oppose a globally accepted norm, they have to find other forms of legitimation. One method consists of control, coercion, and propaganda in an attempt to keep the ideas of liberal democracy at bay. The second approach is to generate prosperity. The Chinese elite has achieved this by betting on economic growth and integration into global value chains. The Russian elite had it easier, profiting from years of high oil and gas prices that supplied a steady income to redistribute, just as in wealthy oil states in the Middle East. A third strategy is aggressive foreign policy. Russian and Chinese leadership claim superiority not just over their own territory, but also over their regions. Both want to turn the concept of spheres of privileged influence into the cornerstone of a new multipolar order – an order in which a few superpowers control regional spaces and everyone else must accept their primacy. Both translate the principle of political order that applies in their states internally – autocracy – into the principle of an international order.

Despite having turned their countries into bulwarks against liberal order, they have failed to translate this rejection into a coherent, attractive alternative. Their growing aggression against neighbors has in many cases led not to the submission of other countries, but to these countries’ increased determination to resist. In both Russia and China’s neighborhoods, smaller, weaker countries have called on the US to provide security guarantees. The more Beijing has abandoned the strategy of “peaceful rise,” the more its neighbors have been alarmed and sought protection. And with the war in Ukraine, Russia has actually seen its influence wane. Resistance against Russia has strengthened Ukraine’s self-defense and given NATO a renewed purpose.

America First, the World Second

The liberal international order has survived until today because it has been supported by key states – and because the US has, since the end of the Cold War, decided to play the role of a guarantor. Yet the domestic arguments for such a far-reaching global role have lost strength over time. There is no clear and present danger to American security anymore. Neither China nor radical Islam has replaced the Soviet Union as a threat that would legitimize, in the eyes of American voters, America’s extensive and expensive commitment to global security.

Pressure on the American government to scale down global commitment has grown in recent years, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have only fed this groundswell of discontent.

And yet America has until now hesitated to abandon its role as a guarantor of the liberal international order. The US has enjoyed plenty of comparative advantages as this order’s architect and central force, and it is far from clear what will happen if Washington retreats significantly. Will this order implode, with disastrous consequences for regions that the US considers to be strategically important?

Such considerations made Obama – who swept into power on the promise of reducing America’s role abroad – hesitate. He was pulled back and forth between those in his team who wanted to maintain the expansive global engagement and those who wanted a break with the status quo.

Unlike Obama, President Trump has displayed no understanding of America’s role abroad. Instead, he seems keen to strengthen borders and to limit exchange and global engagement. For him, America must be protected against immigrants from Mexico, against economic competition from China, against terrorists from Syria. Allies and partners are a costly burden, international institutions mostly useless; what matters are transactional deals. “Americanism, not globalism, is our credo,” he has said during the campaign.

The consequences of Trump’s rhetoric are still unclear: How much of it will translate into policy? How strong are the counterbalancing forces – in his own government, in Congress? In any case, by electing a president with an anti-internationalist agenda, American voters have given another indication that they feel increasingly uneasy about their role in the world. They refused a candidate, Hillary Clinton, who stood for continuity, and that includes America’s role as the guarantor of the liberal international order.

If Not America, Who?

The question of what follows the American-led order is becoming ever more pressing. If the US abandons its role as guarantor, is the current order going to disintegrate? Or are there other actors who could at least partially take over?

It has become increasingly clear that neither Russia nor China is a candidate for such a role. Quite the opposite: Ruling elites in both countries are hostile to key parts of the liberal international order because it threatens to undermine their autocratic power at home. Moscow and Beijing share a concept of international order that is based on dominance and submission, a multipolar world with a few great powers that divide and rule according to their needs. Both have an interest in keeping the international economic order at least partly intact, but both are hostile to the overall character of an order based on freedom, equality and rule of law.

Instead, the B team must step in: Those liberal democracies that have an existential interest in maintaining the liberal order and are able, given their economic power, to play in the top league, must rise to the challenge. There are quite a few candidates for such a role. Among the world’s economically strongest 15 countries, there are no less than twelve other liberal democracies besides the US – Japan, Germany, Britain, France, India, Italy, Brazil, Canada, Korea, Australia, Spain, and Mexico (in order of GDP, according to IMF, October 2016).

All twelve are allies and partners of the US, and all have profited massively from the US-guaranteed international order. Together they have a GDP of $25,739 trillion, more than the US ($18,561) and more than China ($11,391) and Russia ($1,267) combined ($12,658). Five of them are European: Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and Spain (a combined GDP of $11,735); four are Pacific countries: Japan, India, Korea, Australia ($9,640); two are Latin American: Brazil and Mexico ($2,832); and one is North American: Canada ($1,532).

In order to transform themselves collectively into guardians of the liberal international order, the twelve would have to do at least five things:

First, they would have to pursue far more active foreign policies, based on a self-understanding as an important global force. The twelve would have to see themselves as guarantors of the institutional framework and the material infrastructure of globalization. This would also have a military dimension. They should be able to largely guarantee their own security and to provide protection to smaller countries. To achieve these goals, existing alliances could serve as platforms.

Next, they would have to recognize that their interest does not lie in the multipolar order that Russia and China are trying to advance, and they would have to be ready to confront Russia and China whenever they threaten the liberal international order.

The twelve would also have to build more interconnectivity and networks; they should be able to pursue goals without Washington when needed. They should conclude true strategic partnerships among themselves, oriented toward joint regional and global strategies. An annual summit could provide one such format.

The twelve should also aim to provide more leadership in their respective regions and bring smaller, like-minded liberal democracies on board to stabilize the liberal international order as a way to gain more weight and critical mass. Regional organizations such as the EU or ASEAN could serve as vehicles.

Finally, the twelve would have to accept that their own long-term security, liberty, and prosperity depend on the fact that other countries are governed in a democratic way. The liberal international order is based on the preeminence of liberal democracy at the national level. Strengthening democracies and supporting countries in their transformation from autocracy to democracy are therefore key common interests of these twelve states; a liberal international order can only exist if there is a critical mass of powerful liberal democracies.

The US remains the “indispensable power” in many regards. But Washington might further retreat in the coming years from its role as a guarantor of the liberal international order. The countries that have in the past profited from this order are confronted with a tough choice: either engage massively on behalf of it and rise to the challenge as the B team, or accept its decline or implosion.

The post Enter the B Team appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Joe Skipper

When German Chancellor Angela Merkel decided in early 2013 to build a joint European front against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, she was aiming to defend what she saw as key political achievements of the 21st century. In a speech to the German parliament, she contrasted globalization with old-fashioned geopolitics that, in her view, drove Russian action. She pointed to major steps forward, including political integration, a culture of compromise, and peaceful reconciliation of interests. But she also lamented a „conflict over spheres of influence and territory, which we rather associate with the 19th or 20th century.” Russia, she concluded, valued “the right of the more powerful against the power of right.” And for the chancellor, that was unacceptable.

Merkel was determined to resist this assault against the liberal international order. Together with Washington and Paris, Berlin was the leading force in shaping the West’s response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Economic pressure and diplomacy, in tandem with Ukraine’s military defense, was able to halt the Russian military advance and granted Ukraine a window of opportunity to build a functioning state that could better resist Russian demands. A surprisingly united West managed to reassert some fundamental principles of the liberal international order: might does not make right; smaller states have an equal right to sovereignty; unprovoked use of force against other states and annexing their territory is not acceptable behavior.

True, the West didn’t manage to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity, nor did it intervene militarily. The fear of escalation with Russia was too high. But European and transatlantic unity against Russian aggression appeared to confirm Merkel’s view that globalization had swept old-fashioned geopolitics aside. After all, China didn’t support Russia, and Belarus – considered to be part of Moscow’s sphere of influence, – was openly critical of the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine.

But the election of Donald Trump has put this worldview in serious danger. Judging by his campaign statements, America’s president-elect doesn’t seem to value the US-led liberal post-war order. It was a system constructed to prevent the kind of brutal power politics that led Europe into the abyss in the 1930s, when great powers – Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union – attacked peaceful neighbors and redrew maps at their wish.

For Trump, this liberal world order is a burden. He sees allies as countries that have outsourced defense to America without giving anything substantial in return. Trade agreements are not instruments to strengthen friends and weaken enemies; they are simply “bad deals” undercutting American workers. Trump looks at America’s relationship with the world from the perspective of a businessman, ignoring the context of history and politics. He fails to understand US global engagement as a long-term investment in regional and global order. For Trump, it’s a zero-sum game between domestic and foreign policy.“ Americanism, not globalism will be our credo,” he, said during the campaign.

Great Power Condominium

Meanwhile, Trump’s victory even inspired Henry Kissinger’s biographer, Niall Ferguson, to lay out a blueprint for a new world order. In an essay for the magazine American Interest, he recommended a “great power condominium” whereby China, Russia and the US divide the world into spheres of interest. Ferguson admitted that “the rest of the world would be the losers” of such an arrangement.

The Kremlin is probably delighted that Ferguson included Russia in his plan. Vladimir Putin’s aggressive foreign policy is partly aimed at catapulting Russia into the global top league. And Moscow has pursued that aim by trying to regain control over the post-Soviet neighborhood and grow influence in Central Europe and the Middle East. Kremlin-linked Russian experts and some Western “realists” have tried to portray Russia as a normal power, pursuing a realpolitik approach.

But classic realpolitik is based on rules and alliances, and it’s underpinned by economic strength. Russia under Putin has demonstrated disregard for international rules and institutions. And it lacks true allies that support Russian foreign policy. Moreover, Russia is currently ranked only 12th in the world (by GDP), just between Korea and Australia. Without economic or soft power, Moscow’s main foreign policy tools are its military and propaganda; it simply doesn’t have the right resources to play in the top league. In other words, Russia today is a Potemkin power. If it truly were a “realist” power, the Kremlin would prioritize building up the economy and forging lasting partnerships and alliances.

And yet a Trump administration may still fall for Russia’s invitation to create a new alliance. The reasons are many, from the significant personal bonds the Kremlin has developed with members of the Trump camp to the need to work with Russia in the Middle East, especially in Syria, in order to deliver on the campaign promise to fight radical Islam.

And Then There Were Three?

All this is underpinned by a broader, structural trend. Like Barack Obama, Trump is likely to try to reduce America’s global engagement. Both World War II and the Cold War forced the US to be the architect and guarantor of the West’s liberal order. And after 1989, that liberal order became the global order, with America again as the linchpin. But the incentive to stay engaged started to disappear, at least in the eyes of many Americans. Neither China nor radical Islam turned out to be an existential enemy warranting a strong American presence, at least not yet. Since the Cold War ended, the US has tried to shrink its global role without damaging global interests.

The Trump administration will face significant internal pressure to disengage. It may opt for a full-blown “realist” foreign policy, driven by great powers competing for influence. Trump may choose to focus mainly on China and Russia and ignore the interests of smaller allies and partners – not necessarily by design, but because dealing with the great powers appears to be much simpler, cheaper and less dangerous. This would create a closed club of global powers, similar to Niall Ferguson’s blueprint. Russia and China have both made clear they want the US and its allies to keep out of their neighborhoods and honor a sphere of privileged influences. A tri-polar order would emerge.

But such a world order would not be more peaceful. Russia, China, and potentially Iran would feel emboldened in their bid for regional dominance. Other regional powers would build up their own military strength and look for new alliances. There would be increasing competition over the weaker players. The possibilities for clashes and conflicts would multiply.

We would likely see more nuclear powers, an emphasis on military power in general, new and more fluid alliances, less stability, decreasing respect for international rules and distrust and aggression driving international affairs. And we would see more conflict, as great powers would fight over the delineation of their mutual spheres of influence, while medium-sized powers would try to resist a status of diminished sovereignty.

Globalization — a system of cooperation, integration and interdependence — would have no future in this order. States would impose stringent border controls, and economic integration and trade would decline, as would the exchange of information. No major global player and no alliance would feel responsible for upholding international rules or protecting the physical infrastructure of globalization, from waterways to internet cables.

Without American protection, Europe might not be able to uphold its own liberal order. The EU has built a unique system of cooperation and integration, but this has been achieved under the condition that most questions of strategy and hard power have been dominated by Washington. If the US umbrella vanishes and power and competition fully return to Europe, the EU might disintegrate into parts. A post-American Europe would probably be open to divide-and-rule strategies devised in Moscow and Beijing.

It’s difficult to predict just what path the Trump administration might choose. Regardless, European governments need to do two things: One is to invest in their own strength, including military power, and to continue to cooperate more on foreign policy matters. The other is to reach out early and in a focused way to the Trump administration in order to familiarize him  with European views and interests. By becoming a strong, powerful partner to the US, Europe would increase the chances that the transatlantic partnership remains what it has been in the recent decades, namely the foundation of the liberal world order. It has made Europe free, safe, and rich.

The post Trump’s World appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

Turkey’s drift away from the West has not been one-sided, says commentator SINAN ÜLGEN – Europe and the United States share the blame. The aftermath of the recent coup attempt could be an opportunity to reconcile.

© REUTERS/Handout/Kayhan Ozer

After the failed coup, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is more unpopular than ever in the West – but reconciled with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Are we witnessing a Turkish strategic pivot? No, I do not read it as such; otherwise we would be in a very different world. Despite everything that has happened, Turkey remains anchored in the West – in political, security, and economic terms. The establishment of a strategic partnership with Russia is somewhat far-fetched. Realistically, there is little that Moscow could offer Turkey to replace its relationship with the West, whether economically or viewed from a security perspective. So there really is a limit as to how strong, how potent this message of rapprochement with Russia can be.
However, it is useful for Ankara to be able to demonstrate to the West that Turkey could potentially have other options ­– as at the recent St. Petersburg summit between Erdogan and Putin.
And it’s noteworthy for a different reason, too. Putin is the second head of state Erdogan met with after the failed coup; the first one was the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. This underlines the stark reality that there has been a total lack of sympathy and empathy in the West after the attempted coup in Turkey. The Erdogan-Putin meeting was mostly about pragmatic topics of bilateral cooperation, the lifting of Russian sanctions, tourism, and so on.

The tension between Russia and Turkey after a Russian fighter jet was shot down worried NATO greatly, and a rapprochement is to be welcomed in that sense. But you think the West should have done more to reassure Erdogan? It is not just about Erdogan. I think the West should do more to reassure Turkey that it is part of the Western camp. Itʼs one thing to assure Erdogan. But the more important message is to Turkey, because at the end of the day, Turkey is much bigger than Erdogan. This is where the gap is; even people who are not necessarily pro-government believe that the West has not done enough to demonstrate that Turkey has and should continue to have a Western orientation.

Indeed, there haven’t been that many Western visits to Ankara lately … US Vice President Joe Biden visited at the end of August. Before that there’s been one visit by a junior UK minister and one by the state secretary of the German Foreign Office, Markus Ederer – not quite the level expected by Ankara. I think the West would be in a more credible position had it not only supported the government, but also parliament. If European leaders do not want to be seen with Erdogan, at least they could have sent parliamentary delegations.

Is it too late for that now? No, not at all. Parliamentary delegations would go beyond the government and embrace parliament, which was bombed on the night of the coup. It shouldnʼt be too difficult to organize these trips in support of parliamentary democracy in Turkey. In fact, it would be politically relatively easy for Western politicians. And if the West wants to remain credible and retain the moral high ground in order to be able to criticize some of the governmentʼs post-coup measures, it can only do so if it also clearly takes a principled position and is critical of the coup attempt. If it does not do so, then the criticism will continue to fall on deaf ears because then the West will be – legitimately, I believe – considered hypocritical. If you don’t stand for a rightfully elected government, then whatever you say after that tends to be weakened.

NATO has sometimes been more able to cooperate with Turkey than the EU. Does this also apply in this post-failed coup situation? You are absolutely right: Turkey is in a different place in NATO by virtue of the fact that it is a NATO member. But the NATO relationship is quite difficult right now because of the souring of the relationship with the US. There is a widespread belief in Turkey, and that goes far beyond the government, that the US was behind the coup, or at least the US knew about it in advance and didnʼt tell the Turkish government. This has implications also for NATO. Then there is the fact that almost half of all Turkish generals have already been sacked, and some of these people had NATO positions. The head of the Third Army Corps, which is part of the NATO Rapid Response Corps, has been implicated in the coup. So obviously there is quite a bit of volatility around the NATO relationship today. What that means longterm is difficult to say right now.
The reluctance of the West to engage with Turkey right now of course has to do with the way Erdogan has been fighting the coup and the measures he has put in place in the aftermath. And there is skepticism regarding the alleged role of the Gülen movement; Ankara’s accusations sound a bit overdone to Western ears. You’re right. One of the difficulties today is this wide perception gap inside Turkey and outside about the role, the power, the influence of the Gülen movement. Today in Turkey many people believe that the Gülenists were behind the coup. Every day you have a former Gülenist appearing on TV, explaining to the Turkish public how he and his fellows infiltrated state institutions and military …

… which reminds one of the Stalinist show trials, when the accused had to declare that yes, they had been part of a huge conspiracy … Yes, but it is a fact that this is the atmosphere that Turkish people get exposed to every day in the media. It is also something that the government firmly believes, especially Erdogan. In that sense there is quite a gap between how Turkey views the Gülen movement and how the rest of the world views it. And this is already creating complications, in terms of Turkeyʼs relationship with the rest of the world, particularly the US where Gülen resides. Ankara has already started the process to have him extradited to Turkey. But it wonʼt stop there, because this movement is present, I think, in around 160 countries in the world, which means that Turkey will now have to make an effort to essentially press those governments to go after the Gülenistsʼ infrastructure in all of those countries, which includes schools, fundraising front organizations, and so on. This will be a long-term, complicated, and, in a way, unwelcome burden on Turkeyʼs foreign policy.

Gülen and Erdogan were very close allies once … That’s absolutely right. After the failed coup President Erdogan issued an apology for having failed to understand the true nature of this movement. But of course, in any normal country, this wouldn’t suffice to explain and justify a political alliance that lasted a decade. I doubt more will happen in the case of Turkey, but the apology was certainly a start.

How likely is it that the coup has basically been remote-controlled by the Gülen movement in the US? I think it is still quite likely, and I base this on the timing of the coup. Because the only explanation for the timing of the coup that makes sense is that most of the Gülenists in the military were going to be purged in August at the military council. Thatʼs the only explanation in terms of the timing of the coup. So I think it certainly was very much a Gülen-led coup.

What do you expect to happen next? Will Erdogan take this chance to establish himself as an autocratic ruler? Right now we are living through extraordinary times: a state of emergency has been declared, and therefore some of the measures the government is taking are not subject to the usual checks and balances. The government said it wants to end the state of emergency in three months, so that will be a critical test of how soon Turkey will normalize – if they are able to lift the state of emergency within three months, then that means that the checks and balances will return, which would work against further infringements of rights. So for the time being, I am reserving judgment as to how things will unfold.

How could the gap you describe be narrowed, especially with the EU? The Turkish government’s strong anti-Western rhetoric has become a real obstacle to its efforts to get its message across in the West at a time when this is urgently needed. I think the Turkish government is making legitimate arguments, for instance against the teaching of Gülenist thought in schools, but because of its past combative, non-cooperative rhetoric toward the West it has difficulty now convincing the West about the nature of its arguments. Now the government is trying to find a middle road to get this message across.

What has to happen on the Western side? The West should start with reassuring Turkey. Then it can build a moral platform to criticize some of the developments, but it has to start with reassurance.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – September/October 2016 issue.

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(c) REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov

Alfred Hitchcock used to call it a “MacGuffin”: a goal that serves as an impetus to action, yet does not possess any particular significance itself to the plot. When eminent political realists like Henry Kissinger were looking for a way to contain the global spread of nuclear weapons, they took their cues from the British master director and introduced a “MacGuffin” – the vision of a nuclear-free world – in order to trigger small, achievable steps. Whether the vision could ultimately be realized was of secondary importance. The key was to catalyze a process that would gradually reduce nuclear dangers.

Alas, many advocates of a nuclear-free world are not into Hitchcock movies. While a “MacGuffin” is meant to advance a story, ardent nuclear abolitionists are mistaking it for the actual plot. Accordingly, the tone of the Western nuclear debate is getting rougher. And the confusion that has characterized the nuclear discourse for quite some time continues to grow. Caught between abolitionist rhetoric and “realpolitik” deterrence considerations, the Western nuclear narrative appears to have lost its way.

More Distant Than Ever: Nuclear Abolition

Despite lofty rhetoric about a nuclear-free world, nuclear abolition looks far more distant today than ever. The latest blow was dealt by Russia’s breach of the 1994 Budapest memorandum, in which Russia committed to uphold Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine transferring former Soviet nuclear weapons back to Russia. Some Ukrainians are now wondering whether they should have kept the weapons they once inherited, rather than giving them away in exchange for a worthless promise. And there is more. Although not in the public limelight, Russia is also sending nuclear signals to the West by stepping up nuclear exercises, by having Russian bombers flying closer to NATO’s borders, and by boasting about the development of new nuclear weapons. In fall 2014 Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin even promised that Russia’s military modernization would contain a “nuclear surprise” for the country’s potential adversaries. All this reveals that Russia’s thinking, both politically and militarily, is far more “nuclearized” than most Western observers believed.

Russia’s current nuclear activism is not entirely unique. Pakistan is just introducing tactical nuclear weapons into its arsenal. North Korea continues to conduct nuclear tests and to accumulate fissile material. The rise of China has prompted several countries in the Asia-Pacific region to seek shelter under the so-called “nuclear umbrella” of the United States. The rise of Iran is having the same effect on the Gulf States. And while Iran is not yet a nuclear power, there is no deal in sight that would reliably foreclose this possibility in the long term. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has publicly declared that if Iran goes nuclear, it will follow.

In short, the world is becoming more nuclear, not less. Globalization, technological progress, and a shift of geopolitical rivalries towards Asia have created a landscape that has little to do with the late 1960s, when the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature. Today, a large part of proliferation is proceeding outside the NPT-regime. Private enterprises have delivered centrifuges, warhead designs, and even scientists to countries with nuclear ambitions. As a result, these countries no longer require technical support by like-minded nuclear powers. The continuing interest in civilian nuclear energy will also mean that more and more countries will become “virtual” Nuclear Weapons States, i.e. states that could convert their civilian programs into military ones at short notice. All these developments proceed independently from Western policies.

Western attempts to re-gain the initiative have been disappointing: President Obama’s famous 2009 Prague speech did not produce a more favorable political climate for non-proliferation, and other attempts to draw attention to the urgency of safeguarding nuclear materials, such as the Nuclear Security Summits, have been overshadowed by real-life crises. For example, the 2014 Nuclear Summit in The Hague was completely eclipsed by the Crimea crisis. And Russia has announced that it will not participate in the preparations for the next Nuclear Summit.

What Went Wrong?

First, many in the West believed that the end of the Cold War also meant the obsolescence of nuclear deterrence. The role of nuclear weapons as tools of deterrence and war-prevention was pushed into the background, while stressing instead the dangers of nuclear possession. Despite warnings about the emergence of a “second nuclear age”, the intellectual curiosity to examine this new age and its implications was woefully missing. Hence, the frequently used term “nuclear renaissance” is actually a misnomer: nuclear weapons are not coming back. They had never gone away in the first place.

Second, since the end of the Cold War, and even more since the 9/11 attacks, there has been an obsession with non-state actors. The spectre of “nuclear terrorism” was a healthy reminder of the limits of nuclear deterrence when dealing with adversaries who are willing to die for their cause. It also helped to galvanize international attention on nuclear security, resulting in initiatives to secure fissile material. Yet it remains doubtful whether the threat is really that serious, particularly when compared to chemical or biological ones. Above all, the focus on “undeterrable” non-state actors further diverted attention away from classic inter-state conflict scenarios.

Third, the non-proliferation community has become increasingly intertwined with anti-nuclear activism. Since the end of the Cold War, non-proliferation has become the central refuge for ideological or religious activists and wayward “peace researchers”, who had failed to attract continued interest in their various causes after the demise of the Soviet Union. As a result, the community has grown larger, but certainly not better. A considerable part of today’s non-proliferation research amounts to little more than blaming nuclear proliferation on Western policies and advocating Western nuclear disarmament as the principal solution.

What Needs to be Done?

First, the West must fundamentally re-think means and ends: if international relations will continue to be shaped by nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence and reassurance must again be given their rightful place. Rather than dismissing such concepts as relics of a bygone era, or as obstacles to nuclear disarmament, they need to be appreciated – unapologetically – as important means to cope with a volatile security environment. This is particularly true for US extended deterrence.

Second, Western security policies should refrain from raising unrealistic expectations about global nuclear disarmament. Sweeping visions of a nuclear-free world have never gathered more than rhetorical support by other nuclear nations. Instead, the focus of Western policy should be on discussing the conditions for such a world. This means focussing on the disease rather than the symptoms. And it means overcoming antagonisms and security dilemmas through alliances, widespread security cooperation, arms control, and non-proliferation. There are no shortcuts.

Finally, the non-proliferation community, much like the nuclear strategy community, must get back to basics. The blurring of lines between serious research and anti-nuclear activism has contributed to a profound intellectual confusion about the relative importance of nuclear non-proliferation versus nuclear deterrence. Both concepts are valid instruments for safeguarding national security. Even if tension between them is inevitable, they must not be pitted against each other. In the multi-nuclear world of the 21st century, self-inflicted confusion is something the West can ill-afford.

NB. The author expresses solely his personal views.

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