Southern Neighborhood – Berlin Policy Journal – Blog

Ring of Instability

Gabor Iklody — Wed, 06 Jul 2016 11:33:31 +0000

Brexit aside, Europe faces crises to the south and east, with instability threatening to spill over into all EU member states. Addressing these trouble spots will require long-term planning and sustained commitment.

Stabilizing the southern neighborhood is imperative for the EU. The Arab Spring, a regional power vacuum, and international intervention – particularly in Iraq and Libya – have all contributed to the emergence of a ring of instability, a zone of failed states reaching from Libya to Iraq and from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. Now this instability is fueling crises within Europe: the arrival of massive waves of refugees, the horrors of domestic terrorism, and growing radicalization within Europe’s population are all putting Europe’s unity and ability to shape its environment to the test.

What can we do about it? Long-term, durable solutions can only be found if we address the problems at their roots and build local capacities that are sustainable. This requires us first and foremost to tackle the region’s key security and economic problems comprehensively. Here there are no easy fixes: progress will require clarity of purpose, the concentration of resources, and, clearly, time. And any steps taken must be taken with full political buy-in from the regional states; we cannot simply impose change.

First, we have to revisit our approach to economic development. Last year the EU spent €80 billion on development assistance. For that assistance to be truly effective, it is essential to continue monitoring how it is spent, making sure it is used in a way that builds sustainable local capacities in critical areas, reinforces governance, creates knowledge and jobs, and helps align our development objectives more closely with our security needs, including those related to migration control.

Second, we need to concentrate more on how to make countries and their societies more resilient to threats posed by terrorist groups and radical ideologies. The EU is unlikely to wage war against the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria or Iraq itself; it is not the right instrument for that. But it has a wide toolbox to help contain the spread of the plague that ISIS represents by stabilizing the adjoining neighborhood and helping countries like Lebanon and Jordan become more resilient. And when territory is liberated from ISIS in countries like Iraq, we need to provide assistance and help build local capacities so that the local population can take care of its own security and improve its own economic situation. Instability and bad governance create fertile ground for radical groups and terrorism.

Third, we need to support regional initiatives aimed at addressing key security concerns. This is what we are trying to do, for instance, in the Sahel. The Sahel-G5 countries’ initiative, which creates a framework for Mauritius, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad to start working together more on common threats – including terrorism, radicalization, and organized crime – is something we need to support.

And fourth, we have to make sure that we are using all the tools available within the EU toolbox, which among other things include development assistance, humanitarian assistance, trade, and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The EU’s unique strength lies in what we call the “comprehensive approach” – a great concept, but one yet to be fully implemented. Working collaboratively to minimize the presence of “silos” and remove the walls that separate these instruments requires a true change of mindset, which, as experience shows, is no easy task.

Security and Development

A concrete case in point is the nexus between security and development. It is a bond that everybody agrees exists: a state cannot function properly if it cannot provide security to its citizens. A lack of core capacities in defense may also put our investments in other sectors in jeopardy, including education, health care, and infrastructure, as the state itself may collapse. Despite this obvious link, defense capacity-building projects are currently not eligible to receive support from the European budget – even if they are limited in scope to civilian or dual-use equipment, such as boots, tents, radios, and generators. Keeping our security and development goals entirely independent of one another as if they belonged to completely different universes is hardly sustainable and does not help us achieve our overall objectives. To implement the nexus between security and development and to make real headway in what the German government used to call “enable and enhance” requires a change not merely on the European level, but on the national level as well.

There are a number of things still to be thought through. If we do not want to put boots on the ground to combat ISIS, we have to work through partners in the region. But how can this be done effectively? Or take migration and the need to work with countries of origin and transit: For them, stemming migration flows is not a priority – but it is for us. How can we convince the governments concerned to tackle this problem?

An example of the first dilemma is Jordan, which is willing to play a bigger role in the war against ISIS but has quite serious problems of its own – sheltering 1.8 million refugees, servicing a considerable foreign debt, and so on. One way the EU could help is through infrastructural investments and debt relief to enable the Jordanian government to redirect its resources to mobilize moderate groups and step up its efforts to fight ISIS more aggressively – which would serve both regional and EU interests.

This will require substantial funds (though it is worth mentioning that the Valletta Fund, the EU’s emergency trust fund to tackle the root causes of irregular migration in Africa set up last November, is worth €1.8 billion by itself), yet we lack the capacity to spend that money in a way that really changes the reality on the ground. That feeds into a general problem of European politics: How can we move away from our reactive mindset, which is geared more toward putting out fires after they have started rather than getting rid of kindling beforehand? How can we plan ahead more, and thus shape the environment proactively before crises develop?

As for migration, let us take the example of Niger, a major transit country for migrants making their way to Europe. We know that migrants are coming in large numbers from western Sahara and that there is a major trafficking group at work. Human smuggling generated a revenue of €4 billion last year. Why would Niger be willing to tighten controls on migrants crossing its territory and heading north when the migrant stream has become part of the nation’s business model? And why would the authorities stop the flow, which would entail keeping more migrants in the country instead of simply letting them pass through as quickly as possible? The question is how to change the business model, how to come up with offers that are more attractive – and at the same time ensure tighter control of the flow.

First, we need to listen to what the needs of the countries in question are, then put together packages that include both robust incentives in areas that are important for them and measures that are important for us. Such packages, with clear conditions for support, would have a better chance of producing the desired effects.

Broad Strategies

We need broad regional strategies, coupled with country-specific implementation. If we treat the region as a monolith, we will not arrive at the right solutions; implementation should always be tailored to the specifics of each country. But it is just as important to have strategies that take into account the larger regional context – the Middle East and North Africa cannot be understood without taking into account the complex network of interests, various proxy wars, and the roles played by key regional leaders, like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Unless we look at the wider region and understand its dynamics, we cannot get the answers right.

Diagnosis is one step, and treatment is another. A core question is: How can the EU help establish better governance at the local level? The EU is probably best placed among international actors to build democratically accountable institutions and ensure that there are proper mechanisms in place linking these institutions with the wider public – this is, after all, the EU’s bread and butter.

Of course, this is easier said than done. Take Somalia, which splintered into entities that have acted more or less autonomously. There is a federal structure and a federal government that the international community supports, but it lacks real power. So the big question is: How do we help build proper government structures that will function at the local level and cooperate at the federal level? How do we incentivize the traditional Somali clan structures and clan-based militias to work toward empowering federal structures? How do we ensure that the development of the Somali National Army and Police reinforces multi-clan arrangements and not a clan-based separation? The key is to understand what the local capacities and needs are and provide assistance in a way that builds on local ownership, promotes the strengthening of federal structures, and takes into account a multitude of other bilateral and multilateral support programs. This presents a daunting challenge.

However, we should avoid raising the bar too high when we discuss governance. Any improvement will be incremental, requiring patience and the acceptance that deeply rooted traditions may not change overnight. This does not mean abandoning European values, but it does mean calibrating our expectations.

We need patience, a resource in short supply after so many missed opportunities. During the Arab Spring, many thought that democratic change would unfold quickly across the entire region, comparing it to the wave of revolutions that swept across Eastern Europe. Today, the picture is different. However, though our high hopes have not been fulfilled, we should not turn away – we simply need to adjust our strategies.

And we should not forget: We in Europe have also committed mistakes in the south, from which we should learn. Iraq and Libya are cases in point. There are and there will be situations when, after all other options having been exhausted, the use of military force against hostile regimes becomes inevitable. But if we go down that road, we must stay the course, investing in rebuilding societies and states that can properly function afterwards. It is not enough to use force to remove a regime that we find threatening and then turn around and leave without giving much thought to what is left behind. It is not enough to achieve military victory, disband local security forces – and only then consider the repercussions of failing states, large ungoverned spaces, and the emergence of radical, armed groups. The brunt of the job comes after the military intervention.

Long-Term Commitment

Engagement in security and defense almost always requires long-term commitment. Take the example of the security sector reform the EU is increasingly engaged in, both on the civilian and the military side. Such reforms cannot be completed within two or three years. Once we make a decision to commit, we cannot simply turn away; we must stay and ensure that the reforms indeed get implemented. The often-heard argument that, despite advice given and heavy investment made, actual implementation does not follow and there is no proper local ownership in the process is simply not convincing. Local ownership is something that in most places we have to work for and not take as a given. Ukraine is one example.

There is a great deal of talk of the EU being under heavy pressure today, with some speaking of an existential crisis for the union itself. I prefer to look at the current situation optimistically: this pressure may also be seen as an opportunity, an opportunity to lean in and, after a great deal of hesitation, finally commit to doing the right thing, as in so many other instances in the history of the European integration process. If we wait much longer, we may soon be overwhelmed with our present and future problems. We need clear leadership in Europe, and the countries that have acted as the engines of European integration have a special responsibility to take the European process forward.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2016 issue.

The post Ring of Instability appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

“Democracy and Islam Go Together”

Sayida Ounissi — Wed, 06 Jul 2016 11:30:56 +0000

The Islamic Ennahda party has 69 members in Tunisia’s 217 seat parliament, among them SAYIDA OUNISSI and NAFOUEL EJAMMALI. After spending decades underground, their party helped contribute to the democratic transition.

Bad governance has commonly been regarded as a source of discontent in the Arab world. After the Arab Spring, Tunisia seems to have found a path to
a more stable, inclusive way of governing. What went right?
Sayida Ounissi: We have come to understand that democratic stability is a necessary condition for the efficient organization of the state. When the political landscape is fragile and fragmented and when there are no clear goals, programs, and coalitions, it is very difficult for the state to do its job. Ennahda is a coalition partner in the current government. We know only too well what we are talking about. Good governance is of particular importance for a country with a large public sector like Tunisia. Of a population of roughly 10 million people, 450,000 are employed by the state. Good governance is not only important for the development of our country, it is equally important for Tunisia’s reputation abroad as we are negotiating economic reform programs with our partners in the EU as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

What are the lessons Ennahda draws from the Muslim Brotherhood’s experience in government in Egypt?
Ounissi: It is difficult to compare the situations in Egypt and Tunisia. One of the biggest mistakes of the Morsi government was to keep other stakeholders and parties from taking responsibility. The Muslim Brotherhood did not understand that these actors also have a right to participate in the political process. We avoided this mistake. Right from the beginning, it was never Ennahda’s aim to rule the country alone. This attitude might be the result of our past experience, when we fought against the government in Tunis and worked together with leftist and secular opposition groups. This experience also helped us form a coalition government after winning the election in 2011. We are convinced that striking deals through political negotiation is the way to go. We have also understood that a genuine transformation process is only possible when more than one or two stakeholders are involved.

Nafouel Ejammali: Let me clarify something on the relationship between Egypt and Tunisia. There are large rivalries among Arab countries. It is often assumed that all things good – whether it concerns politics, culture, or literature – come from the East. However, this time it’s different, as Tunisia is leading the way. Ennahda and other Islamic movements are very different from the Muslim Brotherhood. We were involved in writing the constitution and continue to prove that democracy and Islam go together.

How and why does Ennahda benefit from a coalition government?
Ounissi: The coalition government is quite a big challenge for us. However, I am convinced that we have benefited a lot in the past one-and-a-half years of its existence. Our party has been strengthened and we are improving our reputation as a major national political force. We are cooperating with a range of partners: Nidaa Tounes is a loose alliance of a very diverse set of actors from the previous government, trade unions, NGOs, and old family clans. In the beginning, its members were mainly united by their opposition to Ennahda rather than a common agenda. Afek Tounes is another important player in the coalition. Its members appear to be competent, liberal, and modern; many of them used to live abroad before they returned to contribute to Tunisia’s restoration. Slim Riahi’s UPL is a populist party that received a lot of votes from young people and those who are not really interested in politics.

As to our role: Ennahda is a relatively established political party with a long tradition. We are well organized, disciplined, and have a strong hierarchy. We have learned that it is possible to work together with very different individuals as long as there is an agreement on common goals and policies. While being a part of government, Ennahda now has the opportunity to establish itself as a legal party firmly rooted within the political system. From the beginning we were a prosecuted political movement operating underground. The state prohibited any kind of religious activities; even praying in the mosque could lead to arrest. The oppression of Ennahda’s members only amplified the feeling of not belonging to Tunisian society. The democratic transition process can only function with us becoming a genuine part of the political landscape.

How is the collaboration with your other coalition partners coming along?
Ounissi: We are ready to work with everyone, and we have already proven that we fully accept democratic rules. We respect the constitution and the new laws, which, among other things, also regulate the financing of political parties. However, we are encountering problems when it comes to economic and social questions for which we have a clear vision. It is difficult to implement these ideas when other parties pursue their own agendas.

Ejammali: We are not really in the position to teach others lessons on how to behave in a coalition government since this is a relatively new phenomenon in Tunisia. Nonetheless, we are willing to accept compromises. For example, although Ennahda has 69 MPs, the second largest group in parliament, we only have one minister. This was our concession to ensure the government would function.

While it is certainly important to be open to compromise, establishing your own profile is equally necessary. What are the issues that are non-negotiable for you?
Ejammali: Our priority is the integrity of the constitution. It is the most important pillar of the Second Republic and it guarantees democratic development. And secondly, it is important for us to find a responsible way of dealing with the past.

Would you also recommend to other fragile states to draft a constitution as soon as possible?
Ounissi: We were not that fast; after all it took us three years. However, it was a good process in which everybody who was willing could participate. Now all actors can identify with the text. To us, dealing with the violent past was an important issue, while other parties considered this more of a “luxury problem.” They argued that the Islamists were mostly keen on financial compensation. We are convinced that dealing with such issues is important to avoid frustration, which, in return, could jeopardize the whole transition process.

This still requires much more discussion. For example, when we spoke against some of the proposals of the opposition when we were discussing the constitutional court organic law, we were accused of trying to undermine the independence of judges. Such constitutional questions will continue to occupy us for a long time since this is also about the identity of the state itself.

Ennahda is a religious party. How is it special, what makes it different from other parties?
Ejammali: We have had a lot of discussion on the identity of our party. I believe this is not unusual in the aftermath of a revolution. We need to follow our path, convince the people of our ideas and demonstrate that the Islamic movement in Tunisia is different from others. We have to show that democracy is indeed possible in Arab countries.

What does your party propose? Citing the tenets of the Enlightenment and secular democracy, we in the West claim to have successfully banned religion from public life. But this is not the case. We have, more importantly, banned absolute truth from the political system, instead. Is Ennahda ready to accept this?
Ejammali: Religion is a matter of perspective for us. Just as left-wing and socialist parties refer to the writings of Marx, we have the Koran. However, we do not approach issues such as public services, health care, and social security with reference to the Holy Book, but through political negotiation. In the past, the relationship between state and religion was very problematic, because the state did not accept how Tunisians practice their religion. That’s why our party, together with NGOs and civil society associations, tried to stand up against the state authorities. Today’s situation is very different. We have an open, democratic society and every Tunisian is free to practice his or her religion the way they want.

This means there is an open, pluralistic dialogue on identity and all those participating in it can contribute their ideas?
Ounissi: Islam is a pluralistic religion in which there is more than just one correct answer to a question. However, some states are spending a lot of money to try and convince people that their understanding of Islam is the only appropriate one. This is a relatively new phenomenon. Islamic universities interpret the Koran in a way that matches their respective societies. The Ez-Zitouna University in Tunis — the oldest in the Arab world and the alma mater of our party leader Rashid al-Ghannouchi — has the reputation of advocating the compatibility of Islam and the modern world.

We are convinced that only free people can practice their religion the way they deem it right — thus, the state does not dictate how to go about it. Only then can they truly be held to account by God. Tunisia has never been a secular state. It always had an official religion, even under Habib Bourguiba, who ruled Tunesia from 1956 to 1987 and, despite not being religious himself, controlled Islam. It was under his rule that the Ez-Zitouna University became an instrument in the hands of the authoritarian rulers, just as Al-Azhar University in Egypt is today. However, Tunisia’s constitution today includes an article that is unique in the Arab world. Article 6 says that the state has to guarantee both the security and the freedom of worship.

You mentioned the strict hierarchy within your party. What kind of positions are held by women and young members?
Ounissi: Politics is generally not an easy field for women. This is nothing new, and it also applies to Tunisia. Ennahda has committees for women and young members. However, this is a double-edged sword as these members cannot contribute in other important areas. When I assumed my mandate in parliament, I deliberately decided to join the Financial Committee. The rights of women and young people are certainly important but I’d rather advocate their rights where financial decisions are being taken.

If you want to change something, you need to be where the money is.
Ounissi: Correct! Currently, only three of the Financial Committee’s 22 members are women. We are working toward increasing the share of women in high-profile committees. Unfortunately, I sometimes have the impression that some positions are only being filled with women to rebut the party’s conservative image. This is not what we are aiming for, even if the number of women is growing. We are currently developing a strategy which focuses on increasing the share of women in the party’s executive committee.

What are your expectations of Germany and the European Union?
Ejammali: We want to plant the idea that Tunisia is just as close to, say, Germany as Ukraine is. Problems south of the Mediterranean are also a threat to security in Europe. We can only combat terrorism and security issues by strengthening our security system. And this is, first of all, an economic challenge. Tunisia is currently negotiating a new trade deal with the EU. The EU prefers to negotiate these agreements individually with each partner in the region. That’s why these negotiations are really tough for us, they feel like the struggle between David and Goliath. If the results end in a bad treaty with the EU from our point of view, this would lead to more poverty, which would in turn play into the hands of terrorists, allowing them to recruit even more young people. Security problems are not just an issue for our police forces and the army, they are also a matter of economic development. And the EU should finally give up its agricultural policies which are so disastrous for the countries of the South.

Tunisia is the only country that has followed the path of democracy after the Arab Spring. Yet, why are there so many young people joining ISIS?
Ejammali: I think there are two reasons. Those young people who are about 18 years old today were born at the time of the Ben Ali regime. They grew up with corruption and poor educational prospects and they experienced how the state oppressed Islam. The second reason, which is more important in my view, is the feeling of hopelessness. Those young people counted on the state, but the state did nothing against unemployment and poverty. It is mainly economic reasons that drive young people to go to Syria. I would say this is not a matter of religion.

Ounissi: The problem is really a lack of trust. The young people expected the state to protect their rights but were disappointed. There is no relationship between them and the state. Therefore we need to restore confidence in the state, particularly among the young people, and show them that the state protects their rights. One of the greatest challenges in the years to come is to give these young people opportunities and a place within society – so they will not have to take the extremely dangerous crossing over the Mediterranean.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2016 issue.

The post “Democracy and Islam Go Together” appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.