© REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko

After the last reactor at Chernobyl was shut down in 2000, Ukraine was left with four nuclear power plants (NPPs) with a total of 15 pressurized water reactors. But the political and economic uncertainty in the country is having an extremely negative effect on nuclear security. According to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate, there were 30 malfunctions at Ukrainian NPPs in 2017 alone. This is a problem that the international community needs to deal with—a major accident in Ukraine would have consequences far beyond the country’s borders.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian NPPs have only been repaired in the most urgent cases. Nor are the facilities being modernized, which shows how little attention Ukraine pays to nuclear and radiation security. Even when upgrades do take place, there are some components in nuclear reactors that cannot be replaced and that degrade over time, such as the high pressure vessel. Thirteen of Ukraine’s 15 reactors have exhausted or nearly exhausted their performance potential. Nevertheless, Ukraine has decided in these unsafe conditions to extend the lifespan of several nuclear power plants for eight to ten years—without the consent of the Russian state corporation for nuclear energy, Rosatom, which built the Ukrainian plants.

In 2016 alone, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recorded ten accidents at Ukrainian NPPs. For example, an emergency situation occurred in the first unit of the Khmelnytskyi nuclear power plant on July 16, 2016, when there was a pressure build-up in the steam generating unit and the first power unit was disconnected from the electricity mains for repairs. The Ukrainian Government assured citizens that no radioactive material was released into the environment. But Andrey Artemenko, a Ukrainian MP, claims that the government concealed the serious nature of the accident. Officials failed to report that depressurization of the nuclear fuel cartridges also took place during the accident.

Since 2014, at Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, various power units have been shut down more than ten times. A loss of power in November 2015 was especially troubling: all soldiers and officers were given special equipment for protection from radiation and chemicals. In the same year, journalists revealed that more than 3000 spent nuclear fuel rods were being stored under an open sky, protected only by metal barrels. There is more to worry about than the weather. The plant is situated near the contested Donetsk region and is therefore exposed to combat operations. Currently only four out of six units work at the most powerful nuclear power plant in Ukraine.

Poor Maintenance and a Bigger Load

Even critical security updates, like the ones identified during stress tests performed after the Fukushima disaster, are running years behind schedule in Ukraine. The South Ukraine NPP is just one of the vulnerable stations. The wear and tear on some elements in the reactor vessel already exceeds the permissible levels tenfold. Every year, emergency shutdowns occur at all power units of this station.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the load on nuclear power plants is increasing, due to a lack of coal and a number of combined heat and power stations going offline. From 2013 to 2017, the share of nuclear power in Ukraine increased from 47 to 60 percent, despite the many violations of IAEA norms and safety measures at nuclear plants. Nuclear power in Ukraine is carrying a bigger load just as it becomes less safe—not coincidentally.

Geopolitical tensions have also made things more dangerous. In 2005, Ukrainian NPPs began switching to US-made nuclear fuel, primarily for political reasons. That is one reason why Russia, which built the power plants, is no longer ready to guarantee their security. In fact, the US fuel is not intended for Russian reactors. Its use still leads to failures and malfunctions, despite constant improvements For example, in June 2017, the third power unit of the South Ukraine NPP was shut down because of a loss of pressure. After the incident, a group of employees at the South Ukraine NPP appealed to the prime minister of Ukraine, demanding they be allowed to immediately stop using Westinghouse nuclear fuel at the NPP due to the high risk of safety violations. However, political leaders are not planning to end cooperation with the American company, and new uses of Westinghouse fuel have been approved.

Nuclear and Unprotected

In early 2014, as Ukraine entered political chaos, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry sent official letters to NATO, to the United States and the EU asking for help providing security. Ukraine got some help: the USA took part in exercises to protect the critical infrastructure at the Zaporizhia NPP in October 2017, and Ukraine was included in the NATO Center of Excellence for Energy Security.

But on the whole, Ukrainian nuclear and radiological infrastructure facilities are protected badly. In March 2017, the Aidar battalion, a volunteer unit formed to fight Russian forces, occupied the premises of the Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Issues of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Neither the state security service officers nor the Ministry of Internal Affairs was able to prevent this from happening. Then in September 2017, charges were brought against men who had been illegally digging at a radioactive waste disposal site in Kropyvnytskyi to find metal for sale. Meanwhile, the chemical factory at Pridniprowski is unprotected by armed guards. It could be the target of a terrorist attack.

Cybersecurity is often not provided either. One issue is that, under Ukrainian law, it is the owner of a facility who is legally responsible for its safety, rather than the state. This means that some facilities are unprotected. “In Ukraine, the protection of important infrastructure facilities from cyberattacks has seven points on a scale from one to ten,” said Dmitry Dubov, head of the Information Security and Information Society Development Department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies.

According to regulations, the work of nuclear facilities is supposed to be monitored by an independent nuclear regulatory agency, the SNRIU. But in fact the heads of departments at the NPPs are being appointed by the state corporation Energoatom, meaning that the regulators are subordinate to the business they are meant to be regulating. On top of this, many top positions in the Ukrainian state regulator remain unfilled. For example, the position of Chief State Inspector for Nuclear and Radiation Safety has been vacant for three years.

Who Gets the Contracts?

In this muddled regulatory situation, there is no pressure on Energoatom to stick to international standards. The state corporation has been signing contracts with unqualified, inexperienced firms to provide technical reports on its facilities. For example, Ukrainian security authorities discovered in 2017 that a private firm’s report was full of mistakes. The emergency diesel generators, meant to cool the reactors if the power went out, were in fact not functioning properly. There are also indications that Energoatom employees are being hired and fired based on their political views.

The journal Energy Research & Social Science emphasizes that “most of the crashes and incidents in the Ukrainian energy sector have not been included in the reports in the past few years, although state media confirm that they happened.” And although the sector is underfinanced, people have still been finding ways to steal money: the general director of the Chernobyl NPP was recently accused of embezzling $690,000.

In 2001, Ukraine ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management, which states that all nuclear waste should be stored on the responsible country’s national territory. All contracts with Russia regarding nuclear fuel reprocessing contain the clause that in 2018, Ukraine should start getting back the products of its fuel processing. If not, international sanctions will be applied.

Storing Waste in the Chernobyl Zone

With this deadline in mind, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency had in fact approved a feasibility study in 2013 for the construction of a centralized repository to store Ukraine’s nuclear waste; it was to be located in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. However, there are some problems with the new construction: First of all, the tender for a contractor was neither transparent nor open. Secondly, the American company Holtec International, the winner of the tender in 2015, lacks the necessary experience and technological tools to handle this type of construction. Thirdly, the issue of waste burial is managed only by the Ukrainian side without international support. It is unclear how the facility will be protected from terrorists and intruders.

Since 2015, the cost of the project has increased from 126 to 300 million dollars. The construction has been postponed several times because the state regulator refused to include the necessary expenses in the Energoatom costing.

Additionally, problems have arisen with the distribution of land in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. In October 2016, the Cabinet of Ministers allocated 45.2 hectares in the exclusion zone to the the depository. The land was in the Kiev district, not far from the capital of Ukraine and the country’s main river, the Dnepr. Normally, such nuclear waste storage facilities would be placed far from large cities and rivers to prevent radioactive contamination.

Dangerous Money Problems

The average monthly salary for an expert working in a Ukrainian repository for spent radiation sources is about $220. However, salaries at the state corporation Energoatom are way higher, which obviously makes it difficult to attract highly qualified personnel to do the dirty work with nuclear waste. The low paychecks affect the workplace culture. In June 2017, smoke spread throughout the old Chernobyl nuclear power plant after a worker left a cigarette butt on the floor.

The infrastructure of the Ukrainian state corporation Radon, whose special integrated plants temporarily store spent ionizing radiation sources, has long been funded only out of leftover funds. Consequently, the Kiev Special Integrated Plant finds itself in critical condition, as shown by a spate of localized radiation accidents. The problem can only be solved by getting rid of the old repositories, but that requires resources that Ukraine does not have. The authorities do not even have enough money to buy petrol for transporting waste from obsolete special plants, or to immediately transport all radioactive waste into the exclusion zone. What money there is comes from foreign institutions. Money is so tight that the Minister of Natural Resources has offered to rent out part of the premises in Chernobyl.

The NPPs themselves are also suffering from financing issues. According to recent research, 60 percent of surveyed Ukrainian experts consider the depreciation of equipment to be the key challenge for nuclear industry in Ukraine. Estimates say it would cost a billion dollars to prolong the lifespan of all 15 power units. Since Energoatom doesn’t have that money, €600 million were taken from Euroatom and the EBRD on credit in 2014. There was hope of support from Westinghouse, but in 2017 the US company (owned, at the time, by Japan’s Toshiba) declared bankruptcy. This means Westinghouse will hardly be able to sponsor the upgrade of Ukrainian nuclear power plants. So the nuclear security of Europe depends on the Ukrainian government ability to find other foreign investors.

It’s Even Worse in the East

The security situation is worst in areas where the Ukrainian government does not have control. In Eastern Ukraine there are numerous nuclear facilities unable to regulated and controlled. Among them are 1200 sources of ionizing radiation, 65 facilities using ionizing radiation sources, and a repository for radioactive waste and ionizing radiation sources near the Donetsk chemical plant.

There is no up-to-date information on these facilities, but it is clear that they are increasingly unsafe. In July 2015, the National Security Agency found that rebels in Luhansk had sold a number of ionizing radiation sources from occupied coal mines in the area. In March 2016, the National Security Agency intercepted three ionizing radiation sources in Zaporizhia, which allegedly had been transported into Ukraine through uncontrolled areas on the Ukrainian-Russian border.

Military actions in the east of Ukraine have a direct impact on nuclear safety. For example in 2015, the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant was forced to conduct an emergency shutdown due to the disruption of electricity supply to the Crimea. That same year, an explosion of ammunition near the Donetsk chemical plant threatened a repository for radiation sources nearby.

The combination of all these risk factors means that Ukraine presents a serious threat of nuclear accidents and huge radioactive contamination not only to itself but to all of Europe. The international community urgently needs to check where Ukraine is violating international nuclear safety standards. If any violations are found, Ukraine nuclear facilities must be suspended or shut down.

It is also necessary to establish a special international commission under the aegis of the IAEA to monitor Kiev’s steps in the field of radioactive waste management and its conformity with key treaties like the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

At the moment, the Ukrainian national regulatory authorities cannot guarantee the necessary control of nuclear safety in all areas of the country. The world should help them.

The post Atomic Mess appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Yuri Kochetkov/Pool

Nuclear arms control has been a central feature of the relationship between Washington and Moscow for some 50 years, but the nuclear arms control regime appears increasingly fragile. Several factors are placing the regime under stress, and there are currently no discussions underway that might bolster it. US-Russian relations have fallen to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, beset by problems including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, differences over Syria, and Moscow’s interference in the US presidential election. Should the nuclear arms control regime unravel—a prospect that is unfortunately very real—the world would become a more uncertain and dangerous place.

US and Soviet officials began nuclear arms control negotiations in the late 1960s. Over the next four decades, they produced agreements like SALT, INF, and START. Thanks to those agreements and other unilateral decisions, the United States and Russia currently maintain nuclear arsenals that are large but only a fraction of their respective Cold War sizes.

The latest agreement, New START, requires the United States and Russia to each reduce to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on no more than 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. Those limits go into full effect in February 2018, and both countries appear on track to meet the limits. Following the conclusion of New START, then-President Barack Obama proposed a new round of arms reduction negotiations that would include non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed strategic weapons—meaning that for the first time, Washington and Moscow would negotiate on all nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Russian officials balked, citing concerns such as missile defense and conventional strike systems. They also called for the next negotiation to be multilateral, although the United States and Russia each maintain a nuclear arsenal that is more than ten times the size of that of any third country.

Over the remainder of the Obama administration, the two countries were unable to find a formula that would allow new negotiations. US and Russian officials have conducted one round of strategic stability talks since President Donald Trump took office, but those appear to have produced little more than agreement that there would be a second round.

The Eroding INF Treaty

The fate of the INF Treaty poses the most pressing challenge to the nuclear arms control regime. Signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1987, the treaty banned all US and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. By mid-1991, the two countries had destroyed some 2,700 missiles.

In 2014, the Obama administration charged that Russia had violated the treaty by testing a prohibited ground-launched cruise missile of intermediate range. Then, in 2017, US officials said that Russia had begun deploying the missile, which bears the Russian designator 9M729 and which the United States calls the SSC-8. Russian officials deny that they have violated the treaty, and instead charge the United States with three violations. Two are without merit, but Moscow’s claim that the launcher system for “Aegis Ashore,” the SM-3 missile interceptor site in Romania (and soon Poland as well), represents a violation appears to have some substance. Ashore’s vertical launch system, when on US Navy warships, can launch cruise missiles and other weapons as well as the SM-3, and the Russians say Aegis Ashore could hold ground-launched cruise missiles banned by the INF Treaty.

With more political will in Moscow and Washington, these problems could be addressed. The Russians, however, have thus far refused to even acknowledge any question about their compliance. For their part, Obama administration officials privately said that they would be willing to address Russian concerns if Moscow took the US charge regarding the Russian ground-launched cruise missile seriously.

Silent Allies

Since taking office, the Trump administration has conducted a review of the situation, while Republicans in Congress have added language to the National Defense Authorization Act that would authorize the Pentagon to develop a US ground-launched cruise missile. US officials have also consulted with NATO allies on the Russian violation.

On December 8, 2017—the 30th anniversary of the signing of the INF Treaty—the Trump administration announced that it remained committed to the treaty and would pursue an integrated strategy to bring Russia back into compliance. Under this strategy, the United States will (1) continue its pursuit of a diplomatic settlement, including through the Special Consultative Commission established by the treaty to discuss, among other things, compliance issues; (2) commence research and development of options for US intermediate-range ground-launched missiles (which would not per se violate the INF Treaty, though any flight test would); and (3) apply economic sanctions on Russian entities that developed and produced the SSC-8.

Meanwhile, US allies in Europe and Asia have said virtually nothing in public about the Russian violation, a missile designed to strike targets in their neighborhood rather than in the United States. This silence sends the wrong message to Moscow: for the Kremlin, this violation is just one part of an already troubled relationship with Washington, rather than a major political problem with the country’s neighbors. Moreover, if leaders in Berlin, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Tokyo, among other capitals, do not vigorously protest the Russian violation, their desire to maintain the treaty may not carry much weight with the Trump administration.

Trump and New START

If the INF Treaty collapses, it would increase the pressure on New START. New START expires by design in 2021, though it can be extended by up to five years. One would expect some quarters in Washington to oppose extending New START if the INF Treaty breaks down or Russia remains in violation; indeed, some Republicans on Capitol Hill have already sought to block funds for New START’s extension if Russia does not comply with the INF Treaty. Administration officials say that the question of extending New START will be considered after they see what happens in February 2018 and have a chance to complete a nuclear posture review.

US military leaders would most likely favor extension. They have testified to Congress that New START is in the American interest, emphasizing in particular the transparency regarding Russian strategic forces that is provided by the treaty’s data exchanges, notifications, and inspections.

Whether President Trump shares that view is an open question, in part because he seems to have a limited understanding of strategic nuclear issues. When President Vladimir Putin raised the possible extension of New START in an early 2017 phone conversation, President Trump was reportedly unclear what New START was, but denounced it as a bad Obama deal.

A World Without Arms Control Limits

On its current course, it is difficult to see the INF Treaty surviving much longer. While the US administration remains nominally committed to the treaty, pressure will grow to withdraw if the Russian violation is not addressed. (That said, it had better be able to present compelling evidence of a Russian violation, or the United States will get blamed for the treaty’s demise.) If the INF Treaty is terminated or doubts about Russian compliance remain unresolved, it would make extension of New START beyond 2021 less likely.

Thus 2021 could see the end of negotiated limits on US and Russian nuclear forces, at a time when Russia is completing its nuclear modernization program and the United States is beginning to accelerate its planned modernization of its strategic delivery systems. Without these limits, the Russian military can be expected to openly deploy its intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile. Might Moscow also decide to complement these by developing and deploying an intermediate-range ballistic missile?

Given budget limitations, it could be that neither Russia nor the United States would dramatically expand its strategic nuclear force numbers beyond the levels permitted by New START. Neither side, however, would be constrained by treaty limits. The Russian military hopes to field a large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) called the Sarmat. New START would likely require that that missile be deployed with fewer warheads than it is capable of carrying—but would the Russian military forgo deploying the maximum number of warheads absent New START? On the American side, the US Navy deploys an average of four to five warheads on its Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which can carry eight warheads apiece. Absent New START, would the Pentagon be tempted to deploy a larger number of warheads on its SLBMs?

The Danger of Proliferation

Both sides would also lose the information provided by New START. Under the treaty, the sides exchange detailed data on their strategic forces every six months, and an average of 2,000 notifications every year regarding changes to their strategic forces. The treaty also allows each side to conduct up to 18 inspections per year of the other side’s deployed and non-deployed strategic forces. These provisions yield a huge amount of information, including the numbers of warheads on individual ICBMs and SLBMs at bases or submarine ports that are inspected. It would be difficult and expensive to develop other means of acquiring such information; without it, both sides would face greater uncertainty and be more likely to make worst-case assumptions about the size and composition of the other’s strategic forces. That would inevitably mean more costly decisions about how each side would equip and operate its own strategic forces.

Potential third country reactions also merit consideration. If the United States and Russia abandon nuclear arms limits, what would that mean for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and efforts to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapons states? If the two nuclear superpowers do not limit their arsenals, can they credibly ask other countries not to acquire nuclear weapons?

China has built up its nuclear forces at a modest pace, in part because Beijing has operated in a context in which there were limits on US and Russian nuclear forces. The country certainly has the economic capacity to expand its nuclear forces at a much more rapid rate. Without any international limits, would it be tempted to do so in an attempt to narrow the gap between its nuclear forces and those of the United States and Russia?

Maintaining the Regime

Washington and Moscow can still avoid the breakdown of the nuclear arms control regime. They could have a forthright dialogue on how to preserve the INF Treaty, using the Special Verification Commission to work out ways to address compliance concerns.

For example, the sides could agree that Russia would exhibit its SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile and provide a briefing on its characteristics to US experts. With more information, those experts might conclude that the missile does not violate the treaty. Of course, if it really has a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, the missiles would have to be eliminated.
Meanwhile, the US side could address Russia concerns on Aegis Ashore by introducing observable differences—functionally-related observable differences, if possible—to distinguish those SM-3 interceptor launchers from launchers on US warships. The sides might also set procedures under which Russian inspectors could periodically visit the SM-3 interceptor sites in Romania and Poland to confirm that the launch systems contained SM-3 interceptors, not cruise missiles.

Washington and Moscow could also agree to extend New START until 2026. That would preserve the treaty’s benefits and allow time for negotiation of a possible follow-on agreement. Of course, resolution of compliance concerns regarding the INF Treaty would create a much more positive atmosphere for consideration of New START’s extension.

Unilateral Commitments

Furthermore, US and Russian officials could use the strategic stability talks to explore the possibility of new negotiations on reducing nuclear arms, ideally including non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed strategic warheads. To get to that point, Washington would almost certainly have to agree to some discussion of missile defense. It is difficult to see the Senate consenting to ratification of a treaty that limits missile defense, but a number of steps short of a treaty—an executive agreement on missile defense transparency, a NATO announcement of a self-imposed limit on the number of SM-3 interceptors in Europe, and/or a NATO decision to complete the SM-3 site in Poland but not deploy interceptors there—might interest Moscow.

As for third-country nuclear forces, the disparity in numbers between US and Russian nuclear weapons levels and the nuclear weapons levels of third countries makes it hard to conceive of a workable multilateral agreement, particularly if third countries insisted on equal limits. However, in the context of a US-Russian agreement that further reduced their nuclear arms levels below New START limits, it might be possible to get third countries, or at least Britain, France, and China, to commit unilaterally to not increase their total numbers of nuclear weapons.

An end to the nuclear arms control regime would be fraught with negative consequences for the United States, Russia, and the world, and the US and Russia should carefully consider how they proceed regarding the INF and New START treaties. With political will, the nuclear arms control regime can be maintained and perhaps strengthened, but doing so will require wise decisions in Washington and Moscow—ideally with appropriate encouragement from US allies and others in Europe and Asia, who will see their security diminished if the INF and New START treaties lapse.

The post Arms and the Men appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi

At the height of the conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, as tensions with Europe bubbled dangerously close to the surface, a major energy crisis emerged: Ukraine and other parts of Europe are very much dependent upon Russia for oil and gas, and there were serious concerns over disruptions to that energy supply.

Moscow’s gas and oil exporting firms jockeyed for the spotlight in an expanding political drama. But the state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, took the opportunity to reassure the world market it steers clear of politics.

“Nuclear should be out of all political discussions, all temporary disagreements, because it is a very sensitive area and first and foremost it is all about safety,” Kirill Komarov, the deputy director general, told Reuters news agency.

The company has long touted its reputation as a neutral player. Executives point to Rosatom’s global customer base and expanding network of “memoranda of understanding” – primarily symbolic agreements the state can use to preserve its place within an emerging energy market and reinforce the perception of Russia as a global power.

Yet these professions of non-partisanship have begun to ring hollow. Western policymakers and experts continue to underappreciate and underestimate the role of nuclear energy in the Russian foreign policy toolkit. Rosatom is increasingly asserting its economic clout in pursuit of the Kremlin’s geopolitical interests – both in hard and soft power.

Calculated Responses

In late 2007, Russia and Iran were locked in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. By shipping fuel to Iran’s Bushehr power plant, Moscow sought to halt enrichment of uranium and bolster its image as a responsible international player ready to shoulder its share of the global governance burden. The Kremlin would benefit by succeeding where the United States had failed.

Yet diplomatic efforts broke down and Tehran refused to provide assurances that enrichment would be halted, so Rosatom suspended its deliveries. The official explanation – widely dismissed by Russia watchers – was that Iranian authorities had failed to pay. In reality, such indiscretions were relatively common, making the timing of Moscow’s drastic move somewhat suspicious.

Almost a decade later, the same situation arose in Ukraine – twice. Following the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, the Kremlin  announced an embargo on the transit of fuel through Ukraine, citing the “unstable situation” as an unacceptable level of risk. With its reactors running dry, the Ukrainian government was faced with disaster on a colossal scale. Rosatom’s chief, Sergei Kiriyenko, ostensibly refused to comply with the Kremlin’s wishes, yet two years later, Rosatom’s subsidiary responsible for the fuel cycle, TVEL, announced it would no longer import spent fuel rods from Ukraine due to non-payment. Lacking appropriate disposal methods, the fuel rods were stored in precarious makeshift shelters.

All this occurred, of course, as conflict raged in eastern Ukraine. Gazprom continued to offer relatively discounted prices to its Ukrainian customers, exercising what Adam Stulberg calls “strategic restraint” – and continuing a trend of relative leniency which made Rosatom’s assertiveness all the more puzzling.

Turkey has also found itself as the object of Rosatom’s displeasure, having downed a Russian SU-24M jet in disputed circumstances. Russia imposed an array of economic sanctions in retaliation, and Rosatom halted work on Akkuyu, Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. Akkuyu was not officially part of the sanctions package, but progress returned to normal after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan issued a formal apology for the incident.

Soft and Hard Power

Coercion aside, nuclear energy has also been an effective tool of Russian soft power. The corporation builds, owns, operates, and occasionally transports a power plant to clients, reducing initial costs significantly and giving it a uniquely broad potential market. In this sense, Rosatom is a highly efficacious vehicle for Russian global influence, making excellent use of Russia’s comparative advantage over the West in the nuclear sector.

The “memorandum of understanding” is the central tool in this soft-power push. Such documents are signed between Rosatom and governments, competitors, and state agencies alike. Despite lacking legal force, a memorandum provides a public roadmap for areas of future cooperation: education and training programs on nuclear energy are announced and joint working groups are founded. If memoranda agreements fail to yield results, Rosatom has nonetheless helped construct an image of Russia as a global power. Such agreements play well to the domestic audience, too.

There is another, more practical, reason for these documents. Nuclear technology is generally not cross-compatible: Russian models cannot use American or French fuel without an element of risk. By training local engineers to use its reactors, Rosatom will have created a degree of path dependency. If Sudan is to invest in nuclear energy in the future, for example, its previous experience with Russian technology will likely influence its choice of partner company. Unlike natural gas or oil, nuclear energy provides a guaranteed source of influence that cannot be blocked off like a pipeline. The construction of a nuclear power plant creates a deeply asymmetrical relationship. The Memorandum of Understanding can also be a cost-efficient way of securing future deals.

The Paradox of Rosatom

The Kremlin has shown it does not respond well to perceived disrespect. By announcing that nuclear enrichment would not stop, Tehran undermined the work and status of Russian diplomats, for example. In Moscow’s view, the overthrow of President Yanukovych in Ukraine represented an unacceptable incursion by Western forces into the Russian sphere of influence.

And yet, Russia’s foreign policy establishment prides itself on its pragmatism. A realist world view dictates that perceptions of respect should not hold sway in the decision-making processes. Therein lies the paradox of Rosatom: the corporation is co-opted for geopolitical gain when Russia’s great power status is disrespected. This nebulous concept is difficult to reconcile with the realpolitik that often drives Russian policy.

The combination of pragmatism and idealism is a well-trodden path for Russian actors in international affairs. Just like Gazprom, Rosatom has shown an ability both to cooperate and coerce. By combining tangible goals with the soft-power offensive led by the memoranda of understanding, the corporation has demonstrated three of the most pertinent concepts to have characterized Russia’s international engagement in the last decade: pragmatism, speed of response, and zero-sum thinking.

The weaponization of Rosatom also allowed the Kremlin to avoid other, riskier methods of retaliation: another gas crisis in Ukraine would have angered Russia’s downstream energy customers, while open military conflict with Turkish forces would have trod dangerously close towards NATO’s Article V commitments. At the same time, Rosatom itself appears to be deployed in a restrained manner. The Akkuyu nuclear plant was not cancelled, but suspended; the corporation’s chief refused to suspend deliveries of fuel to Ukraine. It appears Moscow is unwilling to exceed the boundaries.

One thing seems to be clear: any component of the Russian state may be co-opted for political reasons. Even a corporation which argues fervently that it does not pursue political aims may be obliged to do so. If Russia views state-controlled assets as a potential weapon, it holds a vast array of policy tools at its disposal – and Rosatom may be the tip of the iceberg.

The post The Nuclear Option appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Leonhard Foeger

Much remains uncertain about President-elect Donald Trump’s foreign policy. But the future of the multilateral nuclear accord with Iran is in grave doubt given his campaign rhetoric and the enthusiasm of his first appointees for regime change in Tehran. It might now be up to the co-signatories – China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom – to take action to save it.

The agreement has been a success so far. More than a year after going into force, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated between Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany, and the UK, plus China, Russia, and the United States) has effectively and verifiably blocked all potential pathways for Tehran to race toward nuclear weapons. In return, it has opened the door to the country’s international and economic rehabilitation, even if the pace of recovery in the aftermath of sanctions relief has been more sluggish than anticipated. All the E3+3 members are highly satisfied with the agreement’s implementation so far, and have no appetite for re-designating Iran as a threat to international peace and security.

As will be argued below, they have several mechanisms to shape the incoming US administration’s thinking, and should prepare contingency plans for the worst if the US pulls out.

Unambiguous Condemnation

The newly elected US president has been unambiguous in his condemnation of the JCPOA as fundamentally flawed. Opposition to the JCPOA appears to stem less from its implementation record than from its narrow nature: an arms-control agreement that allows an arch-adversary to come in from the cold without altering its policies more broadly. For such critics, the question of whether derailing the accord would actually strengthen the US’s ability to press for such policy changes appears to be merely an afterthought.

As president, Trump will have a number of options to scuttle the JCPOA. At the extreme, he can repudiate it as a whole or reject key parts of it, like the waivers that suspend nuclear-related US sanctions on Iran. The agreement is designed in a way that allows one party to unilaterally snapback the UN sanctions, notwithstanding the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism.

But the next occupant of the White House could undermine the deal with a lighter touch, or even with no touch at all, since lackluster implementation would doom it as well. Sustaining the JCPOA requires Washington’s constant good-faith management: the president must grant licenses in a timely fashion to allow legitimate business with Iran, issue guidelines to clarify sanctions-relief ambiguities, and shield the accord from political pressures, particularly attempts by Congress to obstruct implementation.

It is entirely too early to predict the consequences of subverting the JCPOA through any of these means. Still, several observations can be made.

First, scuttling the agreement – while Iran complies with it – will almost certainly erode, if not unravel, the international coalition that was critical in enforcing the sanctions that provided leverage during years of negotiations. This implies that the US will be in a weaker, not stronger, position to renegotiate a more favorable deal and/or reshape Iran’s regional or domestic policies.

Second, in such a case, Iran would almost certainly retaliate by resuscitating its nuclear program. The Iranian parliament has mandated its government to rapidly ramp up its uranium enrichment and ratchet down its cooperation with UN inspectors should the US renege on its end of the bargain.

Third, exacerbating tensions could push Iran to double down on policies it presents as essential to its national security, including a ballistic missile program as conventional deterrence and its “forward defense policy” of bolstering regional partners and proxies beyond its borders in the Middle East, in Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and elsewhere.

By destabilizing the JCPOA, the incoming US administration could thus usher in what it purportedly seeks to prevent: greater Iranian assertiveness, more regional instability, and lower odds of resolving the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen – places where Iran is part of the problem and thus must be part of the solution.

Salvaging the Agreement

While the new Trump administration determines its eventual policy, the other E3+3 members have an opportunity to discourage and even deter it from undermining the JCPOA. They should also prepare contingency plans for salvaging the agreement if the E3+3 loses its first among equals.

The EU should go beyond expressing its strong support for the JCPOA and revive its so-called “Blocking Regulation” that forbids compliance with US extraterritorial sanctions that lack the consent of the JCPOA’s Joint Commission (comprising the seven negotiating parties and coordinated by the EU). The establishment of this pre-emptive measure would send a strong signal to Washington that if it walks away from the deal, it will do so alone.

China, Russia, France, Germany, and the UK should formally announce that new unilateral US sanctions they deem unjustified by Iran’s behavior and interfere with its full realization of the benefits of promised sanctions relief will be taken as cause to initiate disputes against the US at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international courts and institutions. In the late 1990s, the EU successfully challenged US sanctions with a similar approach. At the same time, these countries should continue to support Iran’s admission to the WTO.

The above initiatives should be conditioned on Iran continuing to honor its JCPOA obligations, as well as refraining from any non-nuclear provocations. Reinvigorating its nuclear activities and severing the International Atomic Energy Agency’s access in retaliation for Washington’s efforts at gutting the deal will make it difficult for others to stand up to the US. By the same token, a firm commitment by other world powers to stand by Iran as long as it upholds the deal could bolster those in Tehran who would advocate continuing to do so.

The E3+3 and Iran should convene another meeting of the Joint Commission before the US transition occurs to draw lessons from the deal’s implementation so far and clarify remaining ambiguities, especially in areas where the accord’s language is insufficient specific (for example, determining what forms of low-enriched uranium should or should not be counted towards the 300-kilogram cap).

The UN’s second report on the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA in 2015, provides a timely opportunity for the incoming UN secretary-general to reinforce the message to the US and the world that the agreement plays a key role in global peace and security by reinforcing international nonproliferation norms.

The same calculus that brought Iran and the E3+3 to compromise after thirteen years of standoff and two years of negotiations still holds: the alternatives to an agreement – a sanctions-versus-centrifuges race that could culminate in Iran obtaining the bomb or being bombed – would be much worse. Regardless of whether the incoming US administration arrives at this conclusion, the countries that negotiated the deal should do their utmost to preserve it.

The post Taking the Lead appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

REUTERS/USAF handout

Nuclear deterrence is back. After two decades of neglect, the concept is re-entering the security narrative of the West. Russia’s “nuclearized” rhetoric, along with its actual nuclear deployments, may have been the prime cause for the renaissance of nuclear deterrence, but the dangers of a nuclearized Middle East and a new arms race in Asia are hardly less worrisome. All these developments point in the same direction: the West will need to reaffirm nuclear deterrence as an important element of its broader security strategy.

Alas, restoring nuclear deterrence to its rightful place is easier said than done. Since the end of the Cold War, interest has waned. The focus shifted towards scenarios where nuclear deterrence did not matter: the fight against terrorism and military interventions in failing states. Consequently, the understanding of deterrence and the policies and instruments used to implement it has atrophied.

Worse, in trying to make the case for nuclear abolition, many analysts have sought to “debunk” nuclear deterrence as a “myth” over the past decade. These attempts to outsmart common sense never carried much intellectual weight, yet they managed to create a new “political correctness” that deters the successor generation from studying deterrence.

And study is urgently needed. As a basic principle of human interaction deterrence is easy to comprehend, yet its practical application in international relations is dependent on many factors that are often ignored. Above all, nuclear deterrence is not a panacea. It contains many paradoxes and pitfalls. Below are some elements that should be present in any “nuclear deterrence 101”.

It’s About Interests

Many people equate deterrence with military strength. But simply piling up military hardware will not do the trick: an aggressor may still attack based on a calculation of your interests and will rather than your capabilities. If it looks your interest in defending a certain objective (e.g. an ally) is low, your opponent will not be deterred. Yes, your nuclear weapons can obliterate theirs, but your opponent can be reasonably certain that you will not employ them except when vital interests are at stake.

In short, while the risk of things getting out of hand may induce a general sense of restraint in international affairs, in a crisis nuclear deterrence will only work at the “high end”. That’s why allies of nuclear powers constantly need to be reassured by their protector that it considers their security as truly vital. Or, as former British Defense Secretary Denis Healy aptly noted, during the Cold War it took only 5% credibility to deter the Soviet Union, but 95% to assure your own allies.

We’re Only Human

A stable deterrence regime requires all actors to adhere to a “rational” cost-benefit calculus. Thus, nuclear deterrence cannot work against actors that are “irrational” to begin with, e.g. fanatical martyrs. Deterrence may also fail when rationality evaporates in a crisis; certain ideologies or strains of nationalism, for example, may produce the kind of myopia that makes leaders adopt risky offensive strategies.

But the more important scenario in which rationality could disappear is essentially defensive. Since humans will always give priority to avoiding losses rather than to acquiring gains, the fear of losing something valuable will make leaders take far greater risks than the opportunity to change the status quo in their favor. Hence, as much as one would want to have the upper hand in a crisis, one should still avoid pushing a nuclear adversary into a corner.

Know Your Adversary’s Culture

Deterrence may be a universal concept, but its practical application may well be culture-specific. For example, a culture that attaches great value to sacrifice or even martyrdom will be much harder to deter with the specter of military punishment than a “post-heroic” society. This is not to say that certain states are “un-deterrable”, but their cost-benefit calculus might be so different as to render the defender’s deterrence messages ineffective. Hence, if you want your adversary to understand your deterrence message correctly, you need to have a fairly good grasp of their “strategic culture”: historical experiences, values, core beliefs, military traditions, and, last but not least, language. Despite your best efforts, you will never get it perfectly right – but you might not get it quite so wrong.

Try Seeing Yourself Through Your Opponent’s Eyes

The fundamental dilemma of nuclear deterrence is that it revolves around threats. Hence, what might look like a perfectly defensive deterrence posture to you may look like intimidation to others. Today’s Russia offers a perfect case study. Moscow’s current nuclear bluster may be a specific “Russian” way of upholding deterrence by making the country appear both powerful and fearless. However, as Russia’s neighbors are scared, they will revert to countermeasures that might well result in a net decrease of Russia’s security. To avoid such counterproductive outcomes, you must remain keenly aware that your political declarations, military exercises, and procurement decisions will be interpreted by your opponent in ways far more sinister than you might consider reasonable. Yes, you know that you are the good guy who would never do anything sinister, but your adversary thinks the same about themselves.

More May Not Always Be Better

Nuclear deterrence is a concept that has many built-in risks, but nevertheless makes inherent sense. That is why the majority of Western publics do not revolt against their respective nations’ security policies. However, the absence of large-scale public protest must never be mistaken for unshakeable support of nuclear deterrence. Alarmist rhetoric from an administration, loose talk from leaders, or the deployment of certain weapons systems can spark massive protests all the way to a major domestic crisis. That is why the military requirements for deterrence must be balanced with the need to reassure the public – and why, in some instances, not deploying potentially controversial military hardware may be the wiser choice. Always keep in mind that your deterrence message has at least two addressees: your opponent and your own population. The true art of deterrence is to impress the former without frightening the latter.

Talk Isn’t Cheap

Deterrence is not a substitute for dialogue with an adversary. Quite the contrary. Without communication between the antagonists, deterrence will not be the solution, but rather become the problem. To avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations a stable deterrence regime requires a degree of transparency and predictability. Put differently: deterrence requires rules and recognized “red lines”, however tacit. Herein lies the true value of arms control: while arms control talks have not delivered all that much “control”, it is the talks themselves that really mattered. They created a channel for a conversation on security matters of mutual concern that may have been far more important than the technical bean counting.

Deterrence Is About Buying Time

The return of nuclear deterrence is inevitable. In light of what appears like an increasing militarization of international relations, a Western soliloquy about global nuclear abolition looks increasingly out of touch with reality. Complacency, however, is something the West can ill-afford. With more countries obtaining nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, deterrence will become increasingly necessary, but also more difficult. A multi-stakeholder deterrence system is even more prone to failure than the Cold War nuclear bilateral standoff, which had its own share of near-misses.

For all these reasons, nuclear deterrence should be seen as a time-buying strategy. It may provide us with the time it takes to overcome the political antagonisms that make nuclear deterrence necessary in the first place.

Paradoxical? Yes, but such is life.

N.B. The views expressed are the author’s own.

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© REUTERS/RIA Novosti

“Today is a historical day,” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif said as the Islamic Republic and the P5+1 nations – the UN Security Council and Germany – agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015. Within an hour, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared: “God has listened to the prayers of the great Iranian nation!”

The triumphal tone of both men was understandable – after all, negotiating an agreement to govern the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program in exchange for an end to the international sanctions regime and improved economic prospects for the average Iranian was the election promise that paved their way to office.

However, while Rouhani and Zarif were busy celebrating their recent negotiating triumph, their opponents in Tehran, chief among them Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), were engaged in a fierce political struggle against the dynamic duo. The outcome will not only affect the political career of Rouhani and his team, but also the fate of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group, along with the future of the Islamic Republic after Khamenei.

With the nuclear agreement in hand, Khamenei no longer needs Rouhani or Zarif. While he shielded them from domestic criticism during their first two years in office, he is not likely to continue to do so; in fact, fearing their popularity, Khamenei may actively encourage the Revolutionary Guards to attack the president and his allies politically.

Not that the Revolutionary Guards need Khamenei’s active encouragement: as the engine of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and the most likely custodian of the bomb, the Revolutionary Guards would doubtlessly benefit most if Iran were to resume its pursuit of a nuclear bomb. This goes a long way towards explaining the Revolutionary Guards’ opposition to Rouhani’s nuclear diplomacy: Rouhani has attempted to politically marginalize the Revolutionary Guards, pushing them out of economic activities.

Rouhani, however, has no intention of surrendering to his enemies in Tehran, and is perhaps in a better position to defend himself than his “pragmatic” forerunners. Rouhani’s team is not a one-man operation that emerged from nowhere, but the product of the large “technocratic” and clerical network built by his mentor, former president Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

And Rouhani has been mobilizing the Iranian public to his cause. As demonstrated by the spontaneous street parties in Tehran and other major urban centers after the nuclear agreement was reached, there is significant public support for Rouhani’s nuclear diplomacy.

Rouhani has also come close to eliminating the international sanctions regime, providing brighter prospects for economic improvement for the average Iranian voter – who in turn may vote Rouhani’s allies into the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e Khobregan-e Rahbari), the eighty-six-member body that formally elects the next Supreme Leader, as well as the parliament on February 16, 2016, eventually re-electing Rouhani himself in presidential elections the following year.

That scenario, however, is optimistic.

Facing adversity, Rouhani, Rafsanjani, and the hapless Zarif may find themselves deserted by their network. In the past, Rafsanjani and Rouhani seldom reciprocated the loyalty of their protégés, and can therefore not expect their former allies’ support in return. They did not move to save their friends when opponents, which sometimes included Khamenei, began to attack Rafsanjani’s too-powerful network during his presidency in the 1990s. When Gholamhossein Karbaschi, a reformist mayor of Tehran and a Rafsanjani ally, was targeted by a politically-motivated judiciary in 1998, Rafsanjani and Rouhani, who then served as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, remained silent. If Khamenei unleashes the Revolutionary Guards against the president, Rouhani’s network of friends is vastly smaller and weaker than Rafsanjani’s was a decade earlier, and would likely scatter in the face of adversity.

At the street level, the nuclear deal remains immensely popular. But the Islamic Republic isn’t a democracy, and Khamenei fears competition from the Rouhani-Rafsanjani camp. He has successfully curtailed the political power of Rafsanjani before, occasionally even persecuting his children to remind the cleric of his place: in March 2015, Khamenei frustrated Rafsanjani’s bid for chairmanship of the Assembly of Experts, and Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani, the son of the former president, was summoned to Evin Prison shortly after Rafsanjani declared his intention to once again run for chairmanship of the Assembly.

Apart from weakening Rafsanjani, the Supreme Leader will likely ensure that the Guardian Council (Showra-ye Negahban), which approves candidates for public office, disqualifies candidates favored by the president and his allies. The purging of candidates would be done with the goal of keeping Rouhani’s supporters home and allowing anti-Rouhani forces to score huge electoral triumphs, checking the popular power of the executive branch.

Even in the unlikely event that Rouhani’s supporters pass through the filter of the Guardian Council, they will face the hurdle of rising expectations among the Iranian public: Rouhani’s critics are already fanning the flames of discontent with team Rouhani’s economic performance. Having lost the nationalist discourse over Iran’s nuclear program to Rouhani, they are shifting their attention to the gap between Rouhani’s pre-election promises and the grim economic realities of Iran today in an attempt to regain the political upper hand. This tactic resonates among the Iranian public, which chose to believe Rouhani’s pre-election explanation that the sanctions regime along with Ahmadinejad-era economic mismanagement caused their poverty. With both villains gone, the Iranian public understandably expects improvement in their living standards. Rouhani cannot possibly deliver this prior to the February 2016 parliamentary elections. Thus, the president’s diplomatic victory may turn into a resounding electoral defeat in the short term.

Even in the medium term there is no guarantee that Rouhani will be able to capitalize on sanctions relief to liberalize Iran’s economy and improve living standards for the average Iranian. To date, Rouhani has already repeatedly tried, and failed, to push the Revolutionary Guards out of the economy: Khatam al-Anbia Construction Base, which is the Revolutionary Guard Corps of Engineers, remains the largest contractor in Iran, operating as a “private” company, and is still awarded most major infrastructure development plans despite the government’s dissatisfaction with its performance. “We were no match for Khatam al-Anbia,” explained Akbar Torkan, presidential adviser.

The Revolutionary Guards probably received the tacit support of Khamenei, who cannot afford to lose his praetorians’ support – after all, it was the Revolutionary Guards that brutally suppressed the pro-democracy Green Movement in the wake of the fraudulent 2009 presidential elections. The money from sanctions relief is more likely to find its way to the companies owned by the IRGC and the semi-public foundations controlled by Khamenei than to state coffers and the ordinary citizen.

At the same time, ever more belligerent statements from Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards are beginning to drown out Rouhani and Zarif’s charm offensive towards the United States. “Our policy toward the arrogant US government won’t change at all,” Khamenei assured the Iranian pubic in his July 18, 2015 address marking the end of Ramadan, specifically mentioning the regime’s support of “the innocent nations of Palestine and Yemen, the nation and governments of Syria and Iraq, the innocent people of Bahrain, and the sincere holy warriors of The Resistance in Lebanon and Palestine, who will continuously enjoy our support.” Major General Mohammad-Ali (Aziz) Jafari, Revolutionary Guard chief commander, used his first commentary on the nuclear agreement to condemn the United Nations Security Council Resolution endorsing the deal: “Some elements in the draft are specifically contrary and opposed to the major red lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular concerning arms capabilities, and we will never accept it.”

The cumulative impact of these efforts could be disastrous for Rouhani and his team. Deserted by their network, possibly abandoned by the voters who – either out of frustrated expectations or because of the manipulations of the Guardian Council – choose to stay home rather than vote for the government, and facing the Revolutionary Guards, Rouhani may face a disaster: his own political career, the nuclear agreement, succession after Khamenei, and ultimately control over the Islamic Republic may be slipping from his hands.

In Washington and European capitals, the nuclear agreement is being sold in part as an effort to bolster Rouhani against more hard-line forces. The opposite, however, may well play out. The nuclear deal with Iran may in fact be an investment in a sinking ship.

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