Cover artwork: © Mitch Blunt

Dear Mr. or Ms. Chancellor,

Your new government is likely to have considerable political clout in the Ukraine conflict. While US foreign policy remains in relative disarray and France is led by an inexperienced president, Berlin could assume a leading role in the diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis. Under Chancellor Angela Merkel (know her?), Berlin was already in a strong position. But your government should step up the pressure to find a solution both the government in Kiev and the Kremlin can live with. Here are a few pointers:

Stick to the Minsk Agreement.  Yes, it has proven tricky to implement, but it is the only agreement currently in existence. Any attempt to renege or replace it risks a dangerous hiatus and would give both sides incentives to act irresponsibly.

Step up the pressure on both Kiev and Moscow to implement said agreement. The longer non-implementation lasts, the higher the risk of frustrated players calling for a military solution.
Keep the United States involved. This won’t be easy given the Trump administration’s erratic foreign policy record. Make it clear to Washington that arms deliveries to Ukraine will only make matters worse.
Be honest about NATO. The possibility of Ukraine joining the US-led alliance was a key motivation for Moscow to annex Crimea and destabilize the Donbass. Now the Ukrainian public deserves to know that the West is not ready to embrace a new NATO member facing the real threat of a Russian invasion. Georgia is a point in case.

Do not ease sanctions against Russia unless there is substantial progress. In fact be prepared to introduce new sanctions. Moscow is responsible for igniting the conflict and keeps adding fuel to the fire, be it by sending arms and fighters or by spreading anti-Ukrainian sentiment via state TV. The international community (read: the West) must signal that it does not tolerate the violation of borders and meddling in sovereign states’ internal affairs.

Do more to explain the sanctions policies to domestic audiences and EU partners. Economic sanctions can be extremely powerful because the West, if it stands united, is far stronger than Russia. President Vladimir Putin clearly understands this, unlike some in the West.

Keep up the pressure on Kiev to carry out reforms and root out corruption. This is not only necessary to honor the agreements with the EU, but also a crucial part of any solution to the conflict with Russia.

Ukraine is undoubtedly the victim of Russian aggression, but it nevertheless bears some responsibility for the ease with which Moscow won control over Crimea and parts of Donbass. Ukrainian officials like to claim that people will side with Kiev as soon as they stop watching Russian TV, but this is by no means a given. Only a prosperous and stable Ukraine can become an attractive alternative to Russia’s “Russky Mir” Soviet nostalgia.

Don’t let the West be held hostage to Ukrainian demands. An effective peacekeeping force would require vast resources, while free elections in the Donbass are impossible as long as the pro-Russian military dictatorships disguised as “people’s republics” are in place.

Develop new recipes against Moscow’s ongoing propaganda campaign. While talk of “hybrid war” is often vastly exaggerated, Russian state media continues to poison the hearts and minds of audiences in Russia and (eastern) Ukraine.  Foreign news outlets and recently created fact-checking and anti-fake news websites tend not to reach those audiences. Foreign governments would do better supporting home-grown critical media outlets like Russia’s Dozhd TV or Ukraine’s Novosti Donbassa.

The post What Germany Needs to Do Next … On Ukraine appeared first on Berlin Policy Journal - Blog.

© REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko

It has become almost cliché in foreign policy circles to call the Minsk agreements dead ends. And not without good reason: the diplomatic deal went into effect more than a year ago and not even the very first item on the list – the ceasefire – has been implemented. Both the Ukrainian military and pro-Russian separatists accuse each other of frequent violations, and the recent Normandy summit in Berlin failed to bring any tangible breakthrough.

But we can’t ignore Minsk II’s most important achievement: hundreds, possibly even thousands of lives have been saved because of this document. The intensity of fighting has dropped off dramatically, effectively freezing the conflict. That’s not the only reason Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed these dual agreements. Both sides have their eyes set on another aspect, one that goes beyond humanitarian concerns and gives Minsk II a glimmer of hope.

Battle over Sanctions

For Poroshenko, Minsk II is a way to cement alliances with Western powers capable of influencing Moscow. Direct negotiations with the Kremlin are difficult for Kiev, and not just because of Russia’s traditional lack of respect for Ukrainian sovereignty. Putin believes he is waging a war against the West, and he sees Ukraine as a battleground.

For the Ukrainian government, sanctions are the best tool that Western powers can wield. And maintaining these sanctions is especially important for Kiev now that it’s willing to accept political compromises that would otherwise be unacceptable. Ukraine’s strategy rests on two basic principles: show your willingness to achieve peace, and show your counterpart’s unwillingness to adhere to Minsk II – therefore reinforcing the need to maintain sanctions.

Nevertheless, it’s hard to believe that Kiev will really implement the part of the agreement calling for constitutional reform and elections in the separatist-controlled parts of Donbass. The political risks there are simply far too high: It would be awkward for Kiev to legitimize the separatists after calling them terrorists, and there would be outrage if the government changed laws to suit Russian demands, a step many Ukrainians would consider capitulation.

So rather than undermine Minsk II to appease Ukrainians’ patriotism or implement the deal to appease Moscow, Poroshenko has gone a third route – playing for time as long as sanctions are on the table. Russia’s atrocities in Syria will keep this strategy alive through the next Normandy summit, but if it doesn’t pay off soon, there is a significant chance that Poroshenko will quit Minsk II altogether. There would be no incentive for the Ukrainian president to symbolically adhere to an agreement that has never exerted any real pressure on Putin.

This doesn’t mean that Kiev will immediately initiate an offensive in eastern Ukraine – it lacks the resources to succeed, and the human and financial cost would be far too great for Ukrainians to accept. But it would likely designate Donbass “occupied territory,” as it did with Crimea, and that would finally snuff out the Minsk agreement. It was, after all, written on the premise that there is no Russian military presence in Ukraine, and that the separatists are acting entirely on their own initiative.

Escalation on Demand

Sanctions also give Russia a reason to adhere to Minsk II. Moscow will not implement its security pledges as long as Kiev refuses to fulfill its political promises, but then it doesn’t need to – Putin’s main goal is to show Ukraine’s lack of willingness to implement Minsk II, and thus the absurdity of leveling sanctions against Moscow.

The Kremlin has no more faith in the agreement than Kiev. Putin sees the separatist enclaves as a powerful tool allowing him to ratchet up tensions whenever necessary. A real peace agreement would leave the Kremlin without a significant source of leverage on a country it sees as a legitimate geopolitical interest. As long as Kiev and its Western allies refuse to grant Russia uncontested domination of Ukraine, it will not let Donbass return to the country under Poroshenko’s conditions.

Minsk II lets Moscow keep its soldiers on the ground without further sanctions – there’s even the possibility that existing sanctions will be lifted. If these agreements were to collapse entirely, there is a risk that Putin could again utilize separatist attacks as leverage on Kiev or Western powers. It seems likely that the Kremlin will refrain from any large-scale offensive until the Normandy leaders decide that the agreement has to be enforced “unconditionally.”

A Frozen Peace

For the brokers of the deal, the situation isn’t ideal but it is acceptable. It won’t pave the way to the restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity, which is supposed to be the ultimate goal of Minsk II. But by “freezing” the conflict, François Hollande and Angela Merkel have been able to dial down the intensity dramatically, saving lives and buying time to address some of the damage the crisis has done.

Minsk II will not lead Russia to relinquish its post-imperial claims on Ukraine, nor lead Ukrainians to accept them – the core conflict will remain. But as long as sanctions are in place, the agreement helps Western leaders stabilize the situation and create a foundation for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the future.

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