© REUTERS/Francois Lenoir

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is contributing to the collapse of international cooperation, which in turn is pushing the attempts to end the wars in Afghanistan and Syria into the background. However, the European Union could play a pivotal role in supporting a UN-led peace process in both countries.

In Afghanistan, the February 2020 peace deal between the United States and the Taliban was a remarkable event meant to end 19 years of war. A UN Security Council Resolution in March said the deal presented “significant steps toward ending the war” and offered “sustained support” to achieve peace. However, the proposed peace process does not hold the Taliban accountable, and risks the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan. In Syria, Russia’s diplomatic and military gains stand on bilateral relations with Damascus, lacking appropriate American and EU cooperation.

A threat-based security narrative during the Obama administration failed to separate legitimate threats from the constructive roles Russia and China could play in ending the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria. The Trump administration has experienced growing tensions with both China and Russia as well as fracturing relations with the EU, which has further undermined the development of a global approach toward ending these deadly conflicts.

The War in Afghanistan

For the US and NATO, the war in Afghanistan originated as a military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001. For the Afghans and the region at large, the root cause of the conflict was Moscow’s and Washington’s regime-change approach during the Cold War, resulting in the collapse of the Afghan state, the rise of the Taliban, and the establishment of al-Qaeda.

Regime change as an ideological principle in US foreign policy during the 1980s prevented Washington from supporting the formation of a national unity government in Afghanistan. During the Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations, the investment in war overwhelmed any possibilities for conflict resolution. Washington justified its support for Pakistan-led Afghan rebel groups with its policy of bringing about regime change in Kabul, even after Mikhail Gorbachev ordered the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the US signed the 1988 Geneva Accord. This action prolonged the war and produced militant leaders including Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden, Ibn al-Khateb, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abubaker al Baghdadi. Had the US response to Gorbachev’s actions been different, it might have prevented the collapse of the state, improved regional stability, and spared itself 19 years of war.

Now, Washington and Brussels are looking for a quick end to the prolonged and costly intervention, but entangled regional concerns, particularly from Pakistan, halt progress. In addition, the current US peace deal with the Taliban is limited and contradicts Washington’s Joint Declaration with the Afghan government. A UN-led program within a cooperative regional mechanism could clarify the way forward.

The War in Syria

The US and EU’s lack of a viable political strategy toward Syria was evident from the start of the political unrest. For the US, the objective of Operation “Timber Sycamore” (from approximately 2012) was clear: regime change in Syria by forcing Bashar al-Assad from power. Like in 1980s Afghanistan, the injection of financial and military resources via Timber Sycamore soon caused a growing Islamization of the anti-government resistance forces. Washington’s lack of political strategy dragged regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel deeper into the conflict, opening political and military spaces for Iranian and Russian influence. By mid-2015, Moscow ordered the deployment of troops to avert a US-backed regime change. The preservation of the al-Assad regime was integrated into Russia’s stabilization program, regardless of the brutalities it committed against the Syrian people.

The presence of the US-led military coalition against ISIS alongside the Russian military offered both countries the opportunity to transform a tactical military collaboration into diplomatic cooperation toward ending the conflict. Yet instead, the US insisted on the removal of the al-Assad regime as a prerequisite toward ending the war, further extending the conflict.

Meanwhile, with US assistance, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) became a formidable popular force that drove out the ISIS fighters from strategic areas and brought a physical end of the Islamic State in Syria in October 2017. By December, the SDF controlled around 30 percent of the Syrian territory, including important oil fields and a large population. The success of the SDF offered Washington the needed leverage to press Moscow into supporting the Transition Plan for Syria, which was originally sponsored by the UN in October 2015 and supported by 17 nations, including Russia and Iran. Instead, on January 13, 2018, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis announced the US intention to transfer 30,000 Kurdish-led SDF fighters into border forces in northern Syria. Two days later, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned the US move. This unintended Turkish response forced the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to immediately reverse that decision. Ankara capitalized on American backtracking, portraying it as US willingness to throw the Kurdish forces under the bus.

The sudden withdrawal of US forces in October 2019 opened the door once again to the Turkish military and its allied Islamist militant fighters to attack Kurdish forces in the northeastern region of Syria. This chaotic situation forced the SDF to reach out to Russia and the al-Assad government to protect the border towns. The Syrian and Russian military forces entered key towns ahead of the Turkish military. Turkey reached an agreement with Russia to force the SDF to withdraw from a 120-kilometer-long border region. As a result, the US lost the narrative of regime change, and caused escalating regional hostility that opened cleavages for a reemerging ISIS, and continued Russian and Iranian military presence in Syria.

Throughout the Syrian conflict, Washington, Brussels, and Moscow have all neglected the regional ties and interests. Deconstructing these regional interests requires collective regional cooperation so as to allow pragmatic forces to reconstruct a narrative that fits within a new regional order.

Why Rejuvenate a UN Role?

US peace efforts in Afghanistan and the Russians’ gains in Syria reveal the limits of bilateral approaches toward ending deadly conflicts. In contrast, a UN-led diplomatic framework—with reference to the 1988 Geneva Accord and the 2015 Vienna Peace Talks—could ensure the success of the US-Taliban peace deal and allow the Syrian people a dignified and just peace, while recognizing the shared strategic interests of relevant member states. Now China, with its $23-billion-commitment to the Arab region and hundreds of billions of dollars to Southwest and Central Asia, and its recently expressed strong support for the US-Taliban peace deal, could incentivize stability in both regions. The EU’s commitment to the UN global role and multilateralism is also advantageous for peace, but the absence of active EU-led regional cooperation and fractious relationships between the US, the EU, Russia, and China is the grim reality, which has global consequences.

Given this reality, a UN-led diplomatic effort to capitalize on the peace deal with the Taliban and stabilize efforts in Syria is would be welcome. With a growing level of collaboration among Security Council members, a constructive UN role should allow for comprehensive conflict transformation in Afghanistan and Syria and reignite post-COVID-19 multilateral cooperation.

EU support for a UN-led framework could draw on established relationships with Russia, China, and the US. The EU has ample opportunity to spearhead the construction of this framework; it has been central to the UN-led peace mediations in the Levant and Middle East and the UN mission in Afghanistan. A strong sentiment regarding not leaving the Middle East to “the global power far from [the] region,” expressed last year by the then President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, adds some important energy toward effective peace-building.

EU-supported, UN-led mediation efforts in Afghanistan and Syria should receive bipartisan support from the US Congress, which should encourage the Trump administration to support the efforts as well. A multilateral approach toward key critical regional and global issues would also allow the EU to redefine its leadership role within a global order that will emerge once the COVID-19 pandemic begins to wane.

The Way Forward

Afghanistan and Syria have both emerged as epicenters for terrorism, threatening regional stability with global consequences; therefore, ending hostility is far beyond the ability of the governments in power. To start, two key challenges must be addressed:

Overcoming Deep Mistrust: The lack of trust between the warring factions, regional stakeholders, and the countries’ populations demands an effective impartial mediating body, such as a UN-led mediation effort. In Afghanistan, the US peace deal with the Taliban suffers from significant credibility gaps but can still be seen as a positive step forward to be incorporated into a regionally oriented, UN-led mediation program. Unlike with the 1988 Geneva Accord, this time the Taliban is party to the negotiation and a signatory to its implementation. The biggest hurdle in the process is an agreement between the Afghan and Pakistani governments to honor the peace deal. This can happen only if Islamabad sees a peaceful Afghanistan as a geo-economic gain in terms of its relations with China and Central Asia rather than as the instrument of hostility against India.

In Syria, there have been extended mediation efforts by the UN, the Arab League, and inter-state programs including the Astana Process, yet these have so far failed to end the war. Like Afghanistan, the Syrian conflict also has complex regional and international characteristics that means it is beyond the ability of the al-Assad government or any armed opposition groups to end it. The key strategic issue preventing any mediation from succeeding up to now is the question of how the war in Syria should end, something that has allowed Syria’s neighbors to support armed political oppositions on the basis of their assumed self-interest. As a result, a new regional trust-building mechanism is needed; a UN-led mediation program would serve as the only impartial, but effective arbiter if it is genuinely backed and resourced by the UN Security Council.

Achieving Regional Integration: The absence of a viable post-war policy for Afghanistan and Syria under the Trump administration opens the window for the EU to play a regionally oriented stabilizing role. To achieve this, the EU should task its Commission for Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue with gaining the needed support from the US Congress for a UN-led Transition Plan in Syria and an inclusive partnership in the Afghan peace process. A UN-led 7+1 (the US, China, Russia, the EU, Pakistan, India, Iran plus Afghanistan) cooperative platform could utilize the current international commitment to regional peacemaking and peace-building. Strong support exists for a US/EU strategic partnership among American legislators, as seen in the January 2019 celebration of the re-launch of the bipartisan Congressional European Union Caucus, co-chaired by Congressmen Gregory Meeks, a Democrat representing New York, and Joe Wilson, a Republican from South Carolina.

What makes the EU role more relevant is the geographical proximity, and the need for preventing new waves of migrants and thousands of battle-hardened Islamist militants from making their way to Europe. The EU Delegate to Afghanistan has been active in supporting the peace process; in July 2019, Germany and Qatar co-organized the Intra-Afghan Peace Conference in Doha. Later that year, the EU Special Envoy to Afghanistan offered a broader spectrum in support of a peace plan, strengthening democratic results gained over the last 19 years. The presence of the Russian military in Syria and Central Asia and Chinese influence in both regions are real. A proactive EU role can de-militarize the political and diplomatic spaces and end regime change as an instrument of foreign policy.

A pro-active EU role has already highlighted humanitarian and economic development programs possible in both Afghanistan and Syria. Active cooperation with Russia and China would enable Afghanistan to advance regional integration via economic development, trade and commerce, and Syrians to reconstruct their war-torn country and achieve a fair and just departure from war. This would then encourage millions of refugees from Europe and beyond to repatriate to their homes and rebuild their lives. A global role for the EU as the defender of liberal democracy should uplift the ability of an emerging multi-polar world order to de-militarize international relations, and could produce a blueprint for 21^st-century conflict reduction via regional cooperation. The post-COVID-19 pandemic world demands multinational recovery programs for demilitarizing international relations, boosting regional economic integration, and ending deadly conflicts.

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© REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch

Germany: Intervention Fatigue

Germany’s active role in international security has rendered its military more effective and increased European cohesion. After a series of engagements of dubious value, however – not least of which was the war in Afghanistan – Germans have grown tired of these operations.

Germany’s Bundeswehr has now amassed 20 years of foreign deployment experience, operating in theaters ranging from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Indian Ocean and, as part of NATO-led ISAF, playing a significant role in supporting the administration of Afghanistan. However, while the German public and elite once supported international operations, acceptance has given way to intervention fatigue. Critics see a seemingly endless parade of foreign assignments, many of which end in questionable results – in Afghanistan, for example, NATO successfully handed over responsibility to Afghan security forces, only to see the country return to violence due to a volatile mix of corruption, ethnic tension, and weak government institutions.

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The United States: Missed Opportunities

In the wake of the wars in Afghanistan (and Iraq), Washington’s appetite for state-building and counterinsurgency has drastically diminished. The United States should draw three main lessons: better integrate opponents into the political process; undermine insurgent sanctuaries in neighboring states; and focus on local state and sub-state actors.

The war in Afghanistan began somewhat auspiciously in 2001. Roughly 100 CIA officers, 350 Special Operations Force soldiers, and approximately 15,000 Afghans – running as many as 100 combat sorties per day – overthrew the Taliban regime in less than three months, suffering only a dozen US fatalities. Some argued that the operation revitalized the American way of war. Over the next decade and a half, however, US and other NATO forces became embroiled in a long, bitter, and costly war that elicited much-needed introspection.

One of the most egregious early missteps was the failure to co-opt the Taliban after the 2001 Bonn Conference. Instead, the United States rounded up key Taliban leaders and sent them to prisons in such locations as Bagram Airfield and Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. But the Taliban represented a faction of Afghan society that could not be indefinitely excluded from the country’s political, social, and economic life. Consequently, Taliban leaders, including several who were considering reconciling with the Afghan government, slipped across the border into Pakistan and began to plan their insurgency.

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The UK: Beware the Sofa Cabinet

British forces in Afghanistan suffered from a lack of strategic leadership in London – Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown took an ad-hoc approach, which impeded planning and communication. David Cameron has taken steps to reverse this.

Entering Afghanistan in 2001, the British army had a quarter century of successes behind it. And as these operations were against overmatched enemies and incurred minimal casualties, they enjoyed wide support. Thus the war in Afghanistan – against enemies who rejected Western values and were prepared to stand, fight effectively, and die – came as a strategic shock. At the same time, participation in the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003 challenged both the British military’s logistical ability to sustain troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq and its government’s political ability to prevent the unpopularity of the Iraq war spilling over into public opinion on Afghanistan, a challenge to which it reacted too slowly.

When the UK became the lead nation in the Helmand Province, British forces met unexpected opposition and heavy fighting, bringing the initial plan for “ink spot” stabilization and development to a halt. Troop reinforcements were slow and dependant upon troop reductions in Iraq. While British forces could clear ground, they often lacked sufficient troops to “hold” it. Only in 2009, following complete British withdrawal from Iraq and the arrival of 20,000 US marines, was the UK able to execute counter-insurgency operations in Helmand.

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France: Forming Its Own Model

Defeat in Afghanistan has limited Europe’s ability to act in Central Asia, but not necessarily France’s willingness to intervene abroad. France is now crafting its own model for military engagement, one that enjoys substantially greater public support.

As anyone familiar with French defense policy since 1945 would expect, France’s commitment in Afghanistan was marked by a strong desire for autonomy and freedom to maneuver – a principle that would put some distance between France and the US very early in the strategic planning process. French contributions consisted of land combat missions as early as January 2002, culminating in 2011 with more than 4,000 personnel (making it the fourth-largest contributor at the time), 89 of whom were lost.

The main reason for French skepticism was a sense of growing US unilateralism mixed with an erratic decision-making process, characterized by a controversial conception of the Global War on Terror and a bellicose hubris. The Bush administration was delivering a fuzzy strategic narrative: a mix of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and democratization through regime change and nation-building. The muddled planning process offered little in the way of an exit strategy from a country known as the “graveyard of empires” – and in a matter of months, Iraq, according to Michael Clarke, had “sucked all the strategic air out of Afghanistan in the policy-making offices of Washington, London, Brussels and Mons”, permanently diverting the US from the Hindu Kush while rendering the transatlantic relationship toxic, especially at the Franco-US level.

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Read the complete article in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2015 issue.

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(c) REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon

Despite being technically neighbors, connected by a small, remote, and closed border, China has historically maintained a minimal relationship with Afghanistan. The only points at which Beijing has taken on an active role there are when it has been confronted by security threats, whether the Soviet presence in the 1980s or the presence of Uighur militant training camps in the late 1990s. Over the last decade, with the exception of some resource investments – which have yet to become productive – China sat out the conflict in Afghanistan. It wanted neither a Western victory that might entrench a US military presence in its backyard, nor a Taliban victory that would pose risks to Xinjiang and the wider region. As a result, its financial and political contributions to Afghanistan were at best tokenistic, the minimum necessary to avoid alienating anyone.

But following the US announcement of a drawdown of troops, China’s political calculus has shifted. Its anxieties about “encirclement” have been superseded by fears that Afghanistan will once again become a safe haven for East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) fighters; that proxy contests between Pakistan and India will escalate; and that the entirety of China’s western periphery will be destabilized.

The last three years have consequently seen a steadily increasing level of political engagement on China’s part, including the convening of an assortment of bilateral and trilateral meetings on Afghanistan in the region, senior-level visits to Kabul, closer coordination with the United States, and the signing of a bilateral partnership agreement with the Afghans. This culminated in China’s hosting of the “Heart of Asia” ministerial process in October 2014, the first multilateral gathering to take place since the new Afghan government took office. Aside from visiting Mecca for Umrah, China was the first overseas destination for Afghanistan’s new president, Ashraf Ghani.

China Taking “Ownership”

The Beijing meeting was notable as much for the political symbolism of China taking on “ownership” of the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan as for its substance. China was one of the few countries to increase its aid contribution significantly at just the moment when others were reducing their own. But there was another development of particular note: China formally offered its involvement in reconciliation talks with the Taliban. This was not just a notional suggestion – representatives of the Taliban were there in Beijing at the time, and followed up with a more widely-publicized visit by officials from its Qatar office in November 2014. While a Taliban spokesman disavowed any suggestion that a new reconciliation process was now underway, the initiative has nonetheless given momentum to debates over the extent of China’s dealings with the Taliban, and the prospect that Beijing might succeed where previous peace efforts have fallen short.

For China, this is a burden that has been reluctantly assumed. Involvement in a reconciliation process exposes it to political risks in the region that it had previously been very careful to avoid. While Beijing has taken on an important role in negotiations with North Korea and North and South Sudan, and with insurgent groups in Myanmar, Afghanistan and the world of Islamic militancy is a much messier and more unfamiliar one. China has offered to take on this responsibility because it sees that it is perhaps the only external power that might be able to bridge some of the political divisions that exist between the parties to the conflict. Most importantly, it has longstanding ties with the Taliban leadership and a close relationship with the Taliban’s principal backer, Pakistan.

China’s dealings with the Taliban go back to the group’s period of rule in Afghanistan. Despite being sponsored by Beijing’s closest partner in the region, Pakistan, China was disquieted by the Taliban’s seizure of power and did not join the small list of countries to extend diplomatic recognition to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1997. Instead, it backed the UN Security Council’s comprehensive package of sanctions that followed the Al Qaeda bombings in East Africa. More of a concern than the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda, however, was the fact that it allowed Uighur militants to operate training camps in Afghanistan, which Beijing claimed were responsible for “scores” of terrorist attacks.

US Tomahawk Missiles For Sale

Yet Pakistan assured China that the Taliban leadership was open for negotiation on this front. As it grew ever more isolated, and ever more desperately in need of money and international legitimacy, China was one of the few places it could turn. An early opportunity for contacts was provided when the Taliban sold China one of the US Tomahawk missiles that landed in its territory during the strikes in 1998. More formal exchanges followed, with a Chinese diplomatic delegation flying to Kabul the following year, meetings with PLA representatives, and a consistent channel that was maintained through the Taliban’s embassy in Islamabad, its principal outpost for dealing with the rest of the world. The Taliban’s ambassador there described his Chinese counterpart as “the only one to maintain a good relationship with the embassy and with [Taliban-run] Afghanistan”.

Striking a lasting deal with the Taliban, however, would require direct contact with its emir, the reclusive Mullah Omar. The crucial meeting was undertaken by the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan, Lu Shulin, who became the first senior representative of a non-Muslim country to meet with the Taliban’s leader, after a preparatory trip by representatives of the Chinese intelligence services. In December 2000, Lu visited Kabul and Kandahar, where he was assured by Mullah Omar that the Taliban “would not allow any group to use its territory” to conduct operations against China. This was not consistently enforced, and largely resulted in Uighur militants joining camps run by other groups, but it did mean that these groups were no longer permitted to operate their own autonomous facilities. Mullah Omar was hoping that the Chinese, in turn, would be willing to oppose a new UN sanctions package – and while Beijing was unwilling to veto the resolution, it did abstain, and – more importantly – moved ahead with a set of commercial interactions that would mitigate the impact of sanctions. The subsequent period saw Chinese telecoms companies setting up in Afghanistan, work on dams and electrical grids, and plans for a more extensive set of economic and technical cooperation.

Many of these interactions would be derailed by 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, but this did not bring an end to contacts between the two sides. Beijing continued to see value in maintaining the basic parameters of the deal that was reached with the Taliban leadership. In exile, the Taliban would still not extend support to Uighur militant groups, and China would make a political distinction in the language it used to describe the Taliban and outright terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda. China also provided it with arms, including anti-aircraft missiles, landmines, rocket-propelled grenades, and armor-piercing ammunition, all of which showed up in sufficiently notable numbers to prompt diplomatic protests from the US and the UK governments. Chinese meetings with the Taliban largely took place in Pakistan, and Chinese officials claim to have been the only country other than Pakistan itself to maintain a continuous relationship with the Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s leadership council.

Intensifying Contacts

These contacts intensified considerably after 2011, however, when Beijing started to contemplate the realistic prospect of US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The rationale for dealing with a group that seemed set to become an even more important political force in the country was clear, and Chinese officials and quasi-governmental representatives met with Taliban officials with growing regularity, not only in Pakistan, but also in Doha and in China itself. Beijing also started divulging the existence of its previously secret meetings to Western governments, many of which had been pursuing Taliban contacts of their own. Chinese officials made tentative suggestions to their US counterparts that Beijing’s channel with the Taliban could prove useful.

Nonetheless, China was reluctant to move forward with any initiative until Afghanistan’s election process was settled and there was a government in Kabul that could act as a serious counterpart. That would come in October 2014, when Beijing’s offer to act as a facilitator for reconciliation talks was formally extended. The track for talks also moved firmly and publicly to the Taliban’s Qatar office, which had been established as its channel for reconciliation meetings during the abortive process with the United States, first initiated by Germany. The Taliban confirmed that a delegation, headed by Qari Din Mohammad Hanif, a former planning minister, had visited China in November, and the Chinese foreign minister publicly stated during a visit to Pakistan in February 2015 that China would “support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions, including the Taliban.”

Expectations of immediate success are low. The Taliban is still expected to test the new Afghan government out during the spring fighting season rather than putting its political energies fully into reconciliation efforts. But China has several assets when it comes to helping to forge an elusive political settlement in Afghanistan.

It is the only country to have good working relations with every imaginable party to the conflict: the Afghan government, the Taliban, the former Northern Alliance forces, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, the Central Asian states, the West, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and virtually anyone else that might be included on a long list. The one partial exception is India, but many of Beijing’s diplomatic efforts in the last couple of years have focused on reassuring New Delhi that, whatever their differences, the two sides have important concerns in common in Afghanistan. China’s historically detached role vis-à-vis Afghanistan leaves it with little baggage, though it has been sufficiently engaged – whether during its support for the mujahideen in the 1980s or its interactions with the insurgency – for its intelligence services to have a level of familiarity with the conflict’s leading protagonists. China also has significant economic resources that it can readily deploy. In principle a functioning Aynak copper mine would be worth more to Afghanistan’s central government revenue than much of the aid it has received, and there are large investment projects that would provide benefit to other forces in Afghanistan if a settlement could be reached – a Chinese “peace dividend” of sorts. Economic matters have been a consistent subject of discussion between China and the Taliban.

The Most Intriguing Factor: Chinese-Pakistani Relations

But the most intriguing factor for many of the parties involved – including the Taliban itself – is China’s relationship to Pakistan. Historically, China had virtually outsourced elements of its Afghanistan policy to the Pakistanis, and Islamabad believed that it could conduct its policies there without much interference from its “all-weather friend”. That equation has now changed. China has started weighing in more actively on Afghanistan with its Pakistani counterparts, and expects them to take Chinese interests into account. These are not identical: Pakistan has been keener to see a level of consistent instability in Afghanistan than a settled government under Indian influence, whereas China prioritizes stability in the country far more highly. When talks between the Afghan government and leading figures in the Quetta Shura, such as Mullah Baradar, have seemed in danger of moving forward – especially without Pakistan’s involvement – Islamabad has put a block on the process. That will be far more difficult to do if China is steering it. For the Afghan government, the daylight between China and Pakistan gives some hope that Beijing could use its leverage to keep certain of these tendencies in check, and even the Taliban values the additional breathing room it may gain with its Pakistani backers. During Chinese president Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Pakistan, he made clear that the promises of a huge $46 billion investment package in a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor depended on the country being secure and at peace with its neighbors.

Unlike in past years, China is encouraging Pakistan down a path that it already appears tentatively willing to take. Islamabad’s relations with Kabul have improved dramatically since Ashraf Ghani assumed the presidency, and there is a far greater need to cooperate with the Afghan government since the Pakistani Taliban headquartered itself across the border: incidents such as the Peshawar school massacre now originate on Afghan soil. As a result, Pakistan’s army has signaled that it is leaning on the Afghan Taliban to enter peace talks. And there are indications from both the Taliban and the Afghan government that, if the process moves ahead, China may continue to play a role. Afghan officials have suggested Beijing as the venue for negotiations, and Taliban representatives have been quoted saying that they “trust China more than any other country.” This does not necessarily mean that it will be embroiled in the political complexities of navigating a deal. This is still a part of the world in which China lacks expertise, and its most important contribution is more likely to be in helping the talks to start and ensuring that potential spoilers do not undermine them. But given the huge difficulties there have been in getting even the basic preconditions for a reconciliation process in place, that would be no small accomplishment. Chinese officials are apprehensive about raising expectations, but the shift in the country’s status is a dramatic one. Within the space of a few years, China has moved from being a third tier actor in Afghanistan to being one of its greatest hopes for peace.

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