© REUTERS/Kacper Pempel

As it grapples with Brexit, the European Union faces another challenge in its east: two member states that are not leaving, but are increasingly unwilling to play by the rules. These are Hungary and Poland, with Viktor Orbán and Jarosław Kaczyński at the helm. These two men are rolling back the gains of the countries’ paths to democracy after 1989, steadily undermining pluralism, checks and balances, and the rule of law. Orbán’s attack on the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest this spring is the latest embodiment of this tendency. This jars with the EU’s founding values, listed in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which include democracy as well as respect for human rights and rule of law. European officials are getting fed up; Budapest and Warsaw want EU money, but not its values, some of them say. Yet they are not sure how to proceed.

The parallels between Hungary and Poland are not accidental. In recent years, the hard right in both countries has embraced the legend of a historical Polish-Hungarian friendship. Hungarian nationalists attend the annual Polish Independence Day march in Warsaw; Polish nationalists have made pilgrimages to Hungary. Poland’s Law and Justice party (PiS), which has been in power since late 2015, has long admired Orbán for his ability to win elections and get things done. When PiS previously lost the parliamentary elections in 2011, Kaczyński told supporters that he was “deeply convinced that the day will come when we will have Budapest on the Vistula,” the river running through Warsaw.

The problem is not new. Orbán and his Fidesz party have been eroding democracy in Hungary since he became prime minister in 2010. Upon coming back to power, Kaczyński’s PiS set out to emulate his changes. Critics were quick to spot signs of Orbánization in Poland.

Breakneck Speed

PiS’s first targets – the constitutional tribunal and the public media – seemed to be straight from Orbán’s rule book, implemented at breakneck speed. The tribunal, which is supposed to strike down unconstitutional laws, was paralyzed. The public television broadcaster became a mouthpiece for the government. In Hungary, the pluralism of the private media has suffered too. Poland still has a vibrant, though highly polarized, media landscape, but liberal publications fear that PiS will try to suffocate them economically, citing Hungary as an example.

Hungarian and Polish leaders also share suspicion of NGOs, especially ones linked to George Soros, the Hungarian-American philanthropist. Orbán, himself a CEU graduate, has waged a long campaign against foreign-funded NGOs, accusing staff of harboring “paid political activists who are trying to help foreign interests here.” The Polish government has been working on plans to introduce a National Center for the Development of Civil Society, which would allocate state funds for NGOs. Organizations working on women’s and LGBT rights fear that it would help PiS redirect funds to conservative ones.

The result is that Budapest and Warsaw have emerged as an illiberal front within the EU, to use Orbán’s own phrase. PiS, which shares his hostility toward refugees and appetite for one-party rule, has done nothing to dissociate itself from these associations. One PiS minister told me that after “socialist democracy” in his youth followed by “liberal democracy,” he simply wants “democracy without adjectives.” More recently, one of his colleagues explained that there are different “flavors” of democracy across the EU, contrasting the one in, say, the Netherlands to that embodied by PiS.

Orbán and Kaczyński have gone so far as to call for a “cultural counter revolution” in the EU. Despite the difference in age and language, their joint appearance at a forum in the Polish mountain resort of Krynica last autumn looked like it had been rehearsed beforehand.  “There is a saying in Hungary that if you trust somebody, ‘you can steal horses together,’” said Orbán. At that, Kaczyński retorted that there is a “particularly large [stable] called the EU, where we can steal horses with Hungarians.”

The EU’s Dilemma

The growing illiberalism in Hungary and Poland has not gone unnoticed abroad. International human rights and press freedom defenders have sounded alarm bells. Freedom House, the American watchdog, entitled its 2017 report on democracy in the former Eastern Bloc “The False Promise of Populism,” singling out the situation in Hungary and Poland. Their example is a reminder that democratization is reversible, even in countries that are now members of the EU. Some observers fear that Orbán and Kaczyński will spur on populists in the region and beyond. In an interview with Polish daily Rzeczpospolita in the run-up to the French election, Marine Le Pen indicated that she views the duo as allies. “If I am president tomorrow, I will start a debate with Orbán on what seems impermissible in the EU,” she said. Kaczyński would receive the same offer, she added.

EU officials have been watching, too, unsure how best to respond. Brussels has long lost the leverage it had in the 1990s, when Budapest and Warsaw were prepping for membership. These days, it can fall back on the rule of law framework adopted by the European Commission in March 2014, in response to developments in Hungary and elsewhere. If dialog with the member state fails, there is the last resort Article 7 procedure, which can be activated if there is a “clear risk of a serious breach” of rule of law. At its most severe, it suspends a member state’s voting rights.

The past year has shown that the Commission is still learning to wield its new tool. The procedure was launched in January 2016 in response to PiS’s actions toward the constitutional tribunal. Since then, Warsaw and Brussels have been engaged in an awkward dance, adapting their steps as they go along. The Commission has trod carefully, fearful of provoking an anti-EU backlash in Poland. The Polish government has responded with more defiance, pushing on with its revolution at home, with no sign of slowing down.  Sovereignty is the mot du jour. In a speech in parliament after the Commission issued a negative opinion on the tribunal last May, Prime Minister Beata Szydło used the word 20 times in 23 minutes. Overall, Brussels’ hesitation has emboldened the leadership in Warsaw and Budapest, as the latest incident with CEU shows.

Orbán is in a better position than Poland’s leaders, though. For all his talk, he is well connected in Europe. His party is a member of the European People’s Party (EPP), along with Donald Tusk, Jean-Claude Juncker, and Angela Merkel. PiS, which is in the smaller European Conservatives and Reformists Party, cannot tap into this broad European network. PiS party chief  Kaczyński – he holds no office in the government – may be a skilled politician, but that stops at Poland’s borders. He rarely travels abroad and lacks Orbán’s charm. This difference was apparent as the European Parliament debated the situation in Hungary on April 26, 2017. Orbán, who had traveled to Strasbourg, defended his position articulately. It is difficult to imagine Kaczyński defending PiS’s actions like that.

Reluctance to Rock the Boat

In the Hungarian case, the EPP probably has the most clout. Stripped of its place in this mainstream political club, Fidesz would be significantly more vulnerable. There have been calls for the big European players in the EPP to put pressure on Orbán through credible threats. So far, though, they have appeared reluctant to rock the boat.

Meanwhile, as it focuses on Brexit, the EU may end up leaving the Polish government to its own devices. Warsaw and Brussels are playing a longer-term game. Some observers suggest that, rather than punish PiS, the Commission should simply wait for PiS to lose in elections, perhaps even in late 2019, when the next ones are scheduled to take place. This carries risks of its own, though. Even if the opposition wins then, PiS may have caused lasting damage to Poland’s institutions, which will take years to repair. Credibility may be difficult to rebuild, too, even with a new team in charge. Moreover, Warsaw’s growing isolation within Europe may have taken its own toll.

The past few weeks have highlighted cracks in the Polish-Hungarian friendship, which PiS banked on in the past. Its foundations were always shaky; the two countries differ on Russia, with Warsaw uncomfortable with Orbán’s chumminess with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Now the myth has been shattered by the debacle over Donald Tusk’s reappointment as president of the European Council in March. When the Polish government attempted to block it, Orbán sided with the other member states, unwilling to lose face himself.

Even if commissioners hold their breath on Poland, Europe will not. In the run-up to Brexit, EU leaders are mulling the bloc’s future. This may involve a version of the two-speed Europe, long feared by Poland, which, like Hungary, remains outside the eurozone. If PiS sulks, integration could continue without it. Polls in Poland since the Tusk debacle show the centrist Civic Platform (PO), his former party, catching up with PiS. This suggests that voters are realizing how badly PiS could damage Poland’s position in Europe and want to prevent it while they can.

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© REUTERS/Pavel Golovkin/Pool

Mr. Voigt, is Germany’s view of Russia special? Well, every relationship between one nation and another is special; many countries claim to have a special relationship with the United States, the British do and so do we. Naturally, in light of our history, we do have a special relationship with Russia – but so do others, including the Poles. They have a very negative one! In the Russian mind, the German-Russian relationship has always been important but not always negative. At the Congress of Vienna – or later the Congress of Berlin – Russia, the Habsburg monarchy, Britain, France, and Prussia were all part of a concert of European powers. Some want to return to this constellation. I’ve had Russian counterparts tell me that we need to revive this concept of a concert of big powers – a kind of a new Yalta conference, but this time with Germany, not about Germany. This is the exact opposite of what most German politicians think. It would also be unacceptable to the German public and run counter to our national interests. In our relationship with Russia in particular, we have to consider the interests of our neighbors in Eastern Europe, especially if they are part of NATO and the EU. Our allegiance to them and the EU is fundamental.

The Kremlin seems to be trying to drive wedges between EU member countries. I first visited Russia in the 1970s, and there’s always been a misunderstanding about the substance and character of European integration. But this is not a problem exclusive to Russia – the US president is also struggling with it.

But within your own party, the Social Democrats (SPD), there has been an ongoing debate about taking a softer tone with Moscow. Nostalgia for Ostpolitik seems to play a role, often seen as the good times … You have to remember that the “good times” started at a very low point – after the building of the Berlin Wall. There was a need for change. And that’s how the SPD started its détente strategy, with the assumption that the character of the Cold War could change over time. The SPD has always believed in a policy of cooperation and dialogue – something that has often been misunderstood as being too soft. That is a misreading of détente policy. Today the SPD leadership is very realistic about how Moscow’s policy has changed. Be it for internal or external reasons, Russia no longer wants to develop a Western-style democracy, and Moscow’s behavior toward Ukraine was totally unacceptable. The SPD therefore supported sanctions. Beyond that, we have to realistically assume that Russian policy has taken a negative turn over a long period of time, so it might take years before its policy takes a turn for the better again. That means in the foreseeable future, we have to test whether there are areas for useful cooperation in spite of these negative trends.
The annexation of Crimea did indeed spark internal discussions in the SPD, for example with Egon Bahr, the architect of Ostpolitik who died in 2015. But because of the changes in Russia’s policy, I myself – like former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and MP Gernot Erler, the government’s coordinator for relations with Russia – adjusted my position on Moscow accordingly.
Generally, those who sympathize with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his policies are often members of the older generation. Some are Social Democrats, but there are also people like Horst Teltschik, foreign policy adviser to former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and others from Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU party. For them, “east of us” is still dominated by the memory of the Soviet Union. Today, Russia is still a major player east of the EU and NATO. But it is not more important than our relationships inside the EU and NATO, including ties with our smaller and medium-sized eastern neighbors. The younger generations have grown up with independent Baltic states and Ukraine. The older generation has difficulties grappling with the changed geopolitical situation. For the young, it is unthinkable to support someone who rules in an authoritarian way or who cracks down on homosexuality. Therefore they wouldn’t trust Putin.

Do you think it’s problematic that Putin’s Russia is often seen as a normal country, when in fact it is a kleptocratic system? We also find that in a lot of other countries. In Ukraine, political oligarchs are even more numerous than in Russia, so the problem is not unique to Russia. Regrettably, you find it in Romania and Bulgaria as well, both members of the EU.

You mean we have to live with it? No, we stand for our values. These values and principles were formulated in the Paris Charter, which the Soviet Union signed. Russia has not withdrawn its signature – but it is violating the agreement. That doesn’t mean that the values of the Paris Charter are rendered invalid! They are still valid, but we cannot change Russia from outside; we can only help when it wants to change. The same is true for Ukraine.

The Kremlin thinks it can make a difference in Western elections … Yes but that’s actually nothing new, either. When I was leader of the SPD youth wing in the 1970s, there were constant attempts to influence certain elements within our party. Today those attempts have taken on a different character. Moscow is no longer defending Marxism-Leninism, and the ideological component has become less important. It has changed but not disappeared. The geostrategic conditions are very different now. The SPD leadership knows that very well.

How powerful is Russia today? On one side it is the most powerful nuclear state, together with the US. Russia’s sheer size gives it a lot of weight not only in Europe but also in large parts of Asia and the Middle East. In that sense, it’s a world power. In other areas, though, it is a regional power, and economically, it is limited. The Russians are looking to regain their old status and that shouldn’t come as a surprise. But to be strong militarily and weak economically is in the long run not a stable foundation for a country aspiring to be a world power. Obviously, Putin thinks that he can separate technical modernization from societal modernization, but that is not likely to work. I deeply regret that Russia is stagnating; its society is deadlocked, even though they think they’re moving forward. This is bad for Russia and also for us. Russia is the biggest potential challenge and partner east of the EU, while for the US, China is the biggest challenge and partner. What many Russians have interpreted as America’s deliberate attempts to limit Moscow’s influence were in reality a lack of interest in Russia.

Moscow certainly has made some waves in the US of late. Yes, they have regained the attention of the US, but in a negative context. Whether the presidency of Donald Trump is a success for them, well, I have my doubts.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – May/June 2017 issue.

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© REUTERS/Sam Mircovich

President Donald Trump’s approach to US climate and energy policy represents a stark departure from his predecessors. While the details of implementation remain uncertain, his actions indicate that at least five major changes are underway in Washington in the energy and climate realm.

First, Trump is fulfilling his campaign promise to roll back regulations across the federal government by requiring executive departments and agencies to cut two regulations for every new one proposed. Second, he promised to “lift the restrictions on the production of American energy” and revive the US coal industry (although substantial job growth is unlikely even if production increases), remove moratoriums on energy production on US federal lands, and undo policies that restrict new drilling technologies. Third, the President’s Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request would slash a quarter of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) budget—a proposal underscored by the selection of Scott Pruitt, a noted climate change denier, to head the EPA. Fourth, on March 28, Trump signed the “Energy Independence” Executive Order calling on Pruitt to dismantle the Obama-era Clean Power Plan (CPP), which addresses a significant part of the emissions reductions commitments promised by the US nationally determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement. Finally, Trump has pledged to “cancel the Paris Climate Agreement and stop all payments of US tax dollars to UN global warming programs.” Although Trump’s administration has not (yet) abandoned the Paris Agreement, his team will limit the US leadership role and end funding for the UN Green Climate Fund.

These changes have implications for European and US policy-makers, and suggest that countries looking to the US for climate leadership, funding, policy, and action, should not look to the federal government, but to states, cities, and other sub-national actors.

Federal Policy Under Fire

Domestically, the outlook for federal climate policy under Trump is grim. The president has tasked Pruitt to essentially “redo” the CPP, something possible only because it is an executive-issued rule rather than a law passed by Congress. The Trump Administration’s “skinny budget” request would also eliminate funding for the CPP, along with climate-related funding across the US government. While the actual budget usually differs from the president’s request, it is clear that US climate funding will be dramatically reduced, if not eliminated entirely.

Moreover, any final rule promulgated by the Trump Administration to replace the CPP will almost certainly be challenged in court, further delaying federal climate action. The uncertainty created by this situation impedes planning, sends mixed messages to states, utilities, and grid operators about compliance, and delays critical transmission planning processes, which can take between five and ten years.

While there may be agreement within the Trump camp on halting the CPP and relaxing other federal requirements, such as the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, there is less agreement on how to handle international climate commitments. Two prominent members of Trump’s team – US Secretary of State and former ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson and White House Chief Strategist and former executive of the right-wing Breitbart news network Steven Bannon – do not agree on US international climate engagement.

While Bannon has said little on climate change, Breitbart calls climate change believers “alarmists” and alleged that the Paris Agreement is against US interests and an attack on US sovereignty. Tillerson accepts the reality of climate change, but he believes there are far more pressing global priorities. When asked specifically about the Paris Agreement, Tillerson said, “I think it’s important that the United States maintain its seat at the table in the conversation on how to address threats of climate change.” These mixed messages have left foreign policymakers unsure which path the US intends to follow.
Should the US remain in the accord, Trump’s team could weaken the US pledge by revising its NDC – or simply ignore the accord, as compliance is largely voluntary. Another (potentially more) attractive option would be for the Trump Administration to assert that the Paris Agreement is a treaty requiring Senate ratification. This would put the onus on the Senate, absolving the administration of responsibility and undoubtedly signaling the end of US commitments under the accord.

At the end of the day, Tillerson might be the best hope for US participation in the Paris Agreement, although the amount of political capital he is willing to spend on climate change amid other major issues on his growing agenda remains to be seen. Trump’s daughter Ivanka and son-in-law Jared Kushner are reportedly strong advocates of the Paris Agreement – and some say helped keep the potential withdraw of the accord out of Trump’s “Energy Independence” Executive Order.

The Case for State Engagement

Although US federal policy is uncertain at best, transatlantic climate engagement is no less necessary under the Trump Administration, even if meaningful dialogue is more likely to occur outside Washington. At the state level, a diverse array of policy frameworks and resource profiles provide fifty opportunities for dialogue and engagement, revealing shared visions and challenges that are not encompassed in national US policy. For example, how are traditionally coal-dependent states planning for an energy transition? How are states with less expertise and resources moving forward, and how will their decisions affect a broader transition? These conversations must continue despite the shadow cast by Trump.

Three states illustrate the diversity of sub-national policy frameworks that have formed in the absence of coherent federal policy. California provides leadership that the nation’s capital is unlikely to demonstrate, setting ambitious climate goals while maintaining its standing as the sixth largest economy in the world. Texas presents an example of how the economics of the energy transition can trump political allegiances. New Mexico reveals that even in a location with abundant renewable resources, the obstacles in a transition away from coal can be difficult to overcome.

California: Climate Pioneer

California has long been a pioneer in setting and implementing a strong vision for combating climate change. California’s key legislation – including the Global Warming Solutions Act (A.B. 32) and the Pavley Clean Car Standards (A.B. 1492) – have set the state on a path to meet its near-term target to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. Continuing this momentum, the California Legislature passed S.B. 32 (companion bill A.B. 197) in late 2016, which extends A.B. 32 and sets a new interim GHG target of 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030. The newly established goal represents the most aggressive GHG target in North America and is based on key climate change strategy “pillars” including reducing petroleum use by half, generating half the state’s electricity from renewable resources, and doubling energy efficiency savings in existing buildings.

The cornerstone of the state’s ambitious strategy, the California Cap-and-Trade Program, is successfully linked with Québec’s Cap-and-Trade Program, and future linkage with Ontario is under consideration. The California Air Resources Board is working to amend the Cap-and-Trade regulation to extend major provisions of the program beyond 2020 and broaden the program through linkage with Ontario. Simultaneously, California is updating the A.B. 32 Climate Change Scoping Plan to outline the proposed statewide strategy for meeting its 2030 goals while ensuring sustained and cost-effective economic growth.

California understands that international and domestic partnerships are key to its long-term climate strategy. Following a signing ceremony at COP 22 in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Under 2 Coalition – formed in 2015 by the states of California and Baden-Württemberg – added 29 new supporters to the growing list of over 160 sub-national actors committed to the 2˚C target.

Texas: Renewable Friendly

While known for its oil and gas riches rather than renewable resource policies, Texas has emerged as a surprising wind energy leader. With over 20 GW of installed capacity, Texas has more wind resources than the next three US states combined. Many cities in Texas also see promise and potential investment opportunity in renewables expansion. Georgetown, a suburb north of the capital Austin, is one of the first US cities to rely completely on renewable energy, while Dallas, Austin, and San Antonio have pledged to follow suit.

Texas has a history of proactive policy measures to improve its electricity market and enable renewable integration. The Texas legislature passed S.B. 7 in 1999, deregulating the electricity market and establishing a renewable portfolio standard (RPS), later increased in 2005 by S.B. 20. S.B. 20 also established the Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ) initiative, which identified zones of remote renewable resource production and planned transmission capacity accordingly, resulting in over 3,500 miles of new transmission lines. CREZ enabled dramatic increases in wind production, allowing Texas to easily meet its RPS goals, and is an example of successful transmission planning to accommodate renewables that could be a useful model for Germany.

Texas still lags far behind in solar, however, boasting less than 300 MW in installed capacity despite high solar irradiation and solar’s potential to help meet peak demand on hot summer afternoons. While CREZ increased capacity for renewable transmission, the ability to export excess renewable power could be needed, particularly if Texas is to add more solar capacity. Indeed, the very characteristic that enabled Texas’s success in grid expansion for renewables – a stand-alone intra-state system managed by ERCOT – could impede regional progress and preclude the potential to leverage additional renewable resources to reduce emissions. This challenge could be a topic of shared discussion between state officials and German policymakers struggling with the issue of excess renewable capacity, limited transmission capacity, and the potential for more regional cooperation with neighbors.

New Mexico: Possibility Without a Plan

While rich in solar, wind, and even geothermal resources, New Mexico’s coal, oil, gas, and uranium reserves have served as the backbone of the state’s energy economy. Although the state has given its renewable energy resources a nod with a modest RPS (20 percent by 2020), its fossil fuel roots continue to inform its future. Coal-fired power dominates the state’s resource portfolio, even as the economics of those plants and neighboring mines reveal that that they are beyond economic hope. The state’s largest utility is focusing on natural gas rather than recognizing the much greater potential for renewable generation.

Much like in Texas, a fundamental question arises: how and why a state like New Mexico failed to seize its sizeable renewable solar energy potential, while a country like Germany has managed to become a leader in installed solar resources despite much lower resource potential? New Mexico does not lack the resources; rather, it lacks the leadership and an effective plan for the transition away from fossil fuels. Conversations with Germany about how to achieve greater acceptance and support for a broader scale energy transition would give New Mexico a new perspective into how best to move forward.

Ensuring a Just Energy Transition

A global energy transition will require fundamental changes in the way energy is used and produced, the impacts of which will be felt by all economic sectors, socio-economic groups, and regions. How policymakers address this transition and mitigate its negative socio-economic impacts will be the key to success or failure. In the states described above, there are both opportunities and challenges to achieving an energy transition, and lessons to be learned both for and from Germany.

If the new US administration proves unwilling to cooperate on climate change, German and US policy-makers should capitalize on potential partnerships with state and non-state actors to further climate action at the sub-national level. The global energy transition will not be defined by one single global story; rather, it will be defined by a variety of desires, policies, and ambitions.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – May/June 2017 issue.

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Artwork: Arnaud Dechiron

Welcome to you both. When we look back at the Brexit campaign, it seems that the “leave” camp in the United Kingdom didn’t necessarily have the more rational arguments, but they had passion on their side. Do you think this applies to the whole of Europe, and if so, how do you get people more passionate about Europe?
Stelios Voulgaris: It’s a very complex phenomenon. We should not underestimate the fact that the financial crisis, poverty, and the extreme challenge of taking in so many refugees created uncertainty and fear. Of course, some politicians take advantage of these feelings and if we try to explain this passion, I’m not sure it is the passion for Brexit or for these politics itself – I think it is a more instinctive reaction to the fear they feel, to the easy promises they’re hearing. It is a movement against a system that does not seem to function as it once did; it cannot fulfill the promises it has given. And we should also talk about why the existing system – at least in the Western world – does not function anymore for people.

Could it also simply be that the fearmongers are louder, their voices drown out the others?
Sébastien Vannier: I think it depends on how you look at the question. I do not completely agree with you when you say there is no passion on the pro-European side. There is passion, as we see in Germany with the new candidate from the Social Democrats, Martin Schulz. He is Mr. Europe, he is pro-Europe, and we saw a lot of passion now when he announced his candidacy. It is the same with Emmanuel Macron in France; there is also a movement behind him and I think we can use the term passion when it comes to his pro-European message. Last example: the recent “Pulse of Europe” demonstrations show that those willing to defend European values are now turning to the streets to show their engagement. But it is true that in a political campaign, it is much easier to score with anti-Europe arguments. Europe is very complex; the EU has positive and negative aspects, and it is always very difficult to generate passion for it. The real problem is that there is little dialogue between the two sides. Both are living in what we call filter bubbles. Pro-European people work, discuss, and live among themselves, and the anti-European side does the same.

Isn’t it also the fact that the anti-Europeans, the populists, are so much better in using new forms of communication? And would you copy their strategies in a way, would that help get around the problem of all of us living in filter bubbles, as you called them? How do you overcome this Catch-22?
Vannier: I think it is too easy to say anti-European populists – it is far more complex. There are valid criticisms of Europe. Many people on both sides are critical of Europe. I am critical of Europe too, but I don’t think I’m a populist because of it.

But you don’t want to leave the EU, do you?
Vannier: No. And it is important to be allowed to say: No, I don’t want to leave the EU, but yes, there are some aspects that have to be changed.

To be clear, we don’t mean to say that the EU should never be criticized. When we talk about populists, maybe it’s better to say those who would rather like to see the EU fall apart, or at least a strong re-nationalization. These people are very sophisticated in creating filter bubbles. How can you break through them? How can you communicate into these bubbles?
Voulgaris: Studying or trying to understand the populist methods is very important and, as Sébastien said, the bubbles on both sides have not allowed themselves to really understand one another yet. In Greece the anti-European movement has been politically expressed through extreme parties. I had the chance to live for a few years in a refugee neighborhood in Athens where the far-right Golden Dawn was actually very active. So I had the chance to witness up close and personal what they are doing, to learn their methodologies. I think some of the things they are doing are remarkable: Golden Dawn organizes in a very local, very decentralized way, with local offices everywhere. They understand local needs. They have an excellent mapping system of who needs what and how they can offer it in order to network on a very small-scale base. There are aspects of their methodology that I admire and I wish the existing political system could also employ such tactics. I understand why people, at least in my neighborhood, felt that this party was closer to their needs and was present when they needed help. Secondly, though I obviously don’t agree at all with the content of their propaganda, the way they speak is clear. People understand their message, even though you might not agree with it. Still, their official policies are not very clear: Populists usually talk about destroying something but often do not offer a real alternative for policy-making or what the system should be the next day.
Vannier: I think that last point is very interesting – it is always easier to say, “Everything is bad and what the government before me did was bad and all of what Europe is doing is bad,” but they have no realistic program to replace it. That is how the populists work, and of course it is easier to be destructive than constructive. You asked the question: Should we adopt the populists’ methods? It’s a very hard time for journalists to defend their position, and what we are trying to do is guarantee quality of information. It’s the first answer that we can deliver as journalists.

But returning to the million-dollar question: How do you burst the filter bubble? How do you get beyond your usual readers? How do you leave your own comfort zone and get into territory where you really have to argue and make your point?
Vannier: My answer is still: quality of information and to go out and report firsthand. I hope that people are attracted to and excited by quality of information. And what we are trying to do at cafebabel.com is, we try to understand and explain the lives of young Europeans in every country from Belarus to Spain, from Serbia to Ireland. I think, I hope, it is interesting for everyone, even beyond our own filter bubbles. Over the last few years there has been a gap between institutions and the daily lives of Europeans, and we hope we can reach everyone again by focusing on the latter.

Mr. Voulgaris, you have experience dealing with very different groups in Greece, so how do you reach out to them?
Voulgaris: In Greece, as you all know well, the existing social, financial, and public systems have collapsed completely, and that has created a huge gap that spurred people to participate in different ways. The people who go for the populist messages are still people who leave their houses to be active, hoping to somehow have a social impact, even if I don’t agree with their orientation. At the same time there is also a vibrant civic society in Athens. People are very much motivated to do something; they have the need to participate in things. I think we should try to create more spaces and platforms for people’s participation and collaboration. There should be a way that people can bring their input into policy-making. They want to feel that they have an impact in social life and if the official mechanisms could offer more possibilities for people actually to collaborate, create new solutions, and come up with new methodologies, people would feel they are actually participating in shaping society. If people feel they are heard by their community, their government, the EU, they don’t need to seek more extreme solutions to take their fate, the fate of their family, their city, and their country into their own hands.

And what needs to be done to engage young Europeans better?
Vannier: Young people are getting engaged, but not in the political system – they are not voting for the traditional political parties anymore, as we see in France. I think it’s a question of trust in both sides. I spoke with a lot of friends in France and Germany who don’t trust the political system anymore. In Germany, you could say that there is no point in voting anymore as you will end up with the same grand coalition [of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats]. The issue of democratic engagement is an interesting question, and just to blame them for not voting is not the right answer. In France it’s the same, even if Emmanuel Macron styles himself as a newcomer and outsider. We have a lot of young people who won’t have voted. Maybe we have to rethink how we go about political engagement.
Voulgaris: My observation is that younger people have the need to participate more actively. Older people are used to voting as a means to participate in the system, but younger people need to be involved in the everyday implementing of policy, shaping policy. And media and technology allow us to create a more energetic and active participation. Young people are ready to participate – it is not enough for them to go vote every four or five years.

But “older people” have also been very politically engaged, gone out onto the streets, demonstrated against nuclear re-armament. And we don’t see too many young people doing that these days…
Vannier: Well, there were some demonstrations in France last year called Nuit debout to protest labor reforms, and there were a lot of young people out there, trying to find new solutions for the system. I think we see in France why people don’t trust traditional politics anymore – take what happened with the scandal around presidential candidate François Fillon. There were many people who decided not to vote or, even more problematically, to vote for Front National. Some of the political elites in France still do not understand that things have to change now. The question of course is how do we change it.

Which role does social media have in this? How can it influence political communication in our societies and how can it be influenced from the outside? Or do we need to venture out more and get in direct contact with the people?
Voulgaris: I was just thinking of those reality TV shows where people get to choose which singer they want, and you have a very clear question and a very easy way for people to just grab their phones and vote, and they feel they have an impact on what is happening. The example is very simple but in Greece, there is a lot of will to participate. People want to be involved, even in something that simple. And technology and media actually give us fantastic solutions. Younger people are very much used to using this. If we think about it, the methods of participation in our countries have essentially not changed over the last fifty, even hundred years – technology is still not really part of helping and supporting people’s participation.

Referenda are often equated with direct participation, but people then often cast their votes with other motives in mind than addressing the questions. Should we still have more referenda – on smaller questions that make a difference in people’s daily lives?
Voulgaris: I’m from a country that has a lot of experience with referenda. It’s not a very complete form of participation. The way the question is phrased and the reasons behind it are always decided at the top. A real referendum for me is a vote where you get people to participate to create the question and then to decide on an answer. Formulating questions in a very specific way, especially in crucial and tense moments, isn’t a way to get people to participate in policy-making. I believe it is a way to manipulate people.
Vannier: Social media offers tools, but in itself is not the solution. It’s a tool that we can use very well, and we can abuse it, too. But it’s just a tool. I think it’s very important to get back out on the ground and see politics as something from the bottom up and not from Paris or from Berlin. I completely agree with Stelios on the matter of referenda, too, because you can also abuse a referendum. I don’t want a choice between “Yes” and “Yes.” I want an open question, but, very importantly too, I want an open democratic process.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – May/June 2017 issue.

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Artwork: Dominik Herrmann

On an early May morning, amid increasing tensions between the European Union and the United Kingdom, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier found himself facing a jostling crowd of hungry journalists.

They wanted answers, and for good reason: Reports had emerged of a particularly frosty dinner between British Prime Minister Theresa May and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker where Barnier was also present. In an account that might have been leaked by Juncker himself, the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung (FAS) described the Downing Street dinner as an unmitigated disaster. The British prime minister was, according to the story, completely delusional about what was possible in a Brexit divorce and ill-prepared for negotiations. The incident quickly made headlines across Europe.

Under pressure from reporters, however, Barnier appeared unflustered. He insisted that he found May perfectly charming.

“On a personal basis I had the opportunity to discuss a shared passion I have with her, which is rambling and hiking in the mountains,” he said with a smile. “If you like walking in the mountains you have to learn some rules. You have to put one foot in front of the other, because sometimes it is a steep and rocky path. You also have to look for what accidents might befall you. You have to keep your breath, and you have to keep looking at the summit.”

You can take the man out of the mountains, but you cannot take the mountains out of the man. Barnier’s comments were a clear reference to his home region of Savoy in the French Alps. Nicknamed “Mr. Smooth” and “the Silver Fox,” Barnier still carries the confident charm of his native Alpine upbringing: He is tall and attractive, always well-dressed with not a hair out of place. And ever since he was appointed chief Brexit negotiator by Juncker six months ago, Barnier’s personal traits have taken on new significance.

His many years of service – he was France’s Foreign Minister and EU Commissioner with responsibility for the Single Market – have earned him a reputation for civility and businesslike deal-making; he stands in stark contrast to the rather hot-headed Juncker.

In fact, many in Brussels believe Barnier was embarrassed by the leak of May’s tense dinner, as it doesn’t match his reputation for courtesy and decorum. A good cop-bad cop dynamic is developing between Juncker and Barnier – but that may very well be by design.

The Scourge of the City

Barnier’s image in Brussels is a far cry from the picture British media painted last summer, shortly after he was named Brexit negotiator. Tom Newton Dunn from The Sun called the appointment a “declaration of war.” The Daily Telegraph repeated its 2010 characterization of Barnier as “the most dangerous man in Europe.” The Daily Mail called him “inflexible” and his assignment “an act of petty aggression” by the EU. He was said to be hostile to the Anglo-Saxon brand of capitalism and to bear grudges against both London and Washington.

Barnier is used to such hostility. He has spent most of his career negotiating difficult compromises at sensitive times. He is no stranger in Brussels – in fact, this is his third stint in the EU capital. He served as EU Commissioner for Regional Policy between 1999 and 2004 and, most memorably, as Commissioner for the Internal Markets and Services – the EU’s finance chief – from 2010 to 2014. When not in Brussels, he was in Paris serving as a minister in various center-right governments.

It was during his second term with the Commission that he made an impression in London, Europe’s foremost financial hub. When Barnier became the EU’s finance chief, it fell to him to clean up the mess of the 2008 debt crisis and prevent it from being repeated. But his efforts to regulate banks, markets, and hedge funds ran into fierce opposition. When he took the train to London and crossed the channel, he knew he was entering the lion’s den. Deemed the “scourge of the City,” he spent countless late nights there negotiating financial services reform.

Many were initially distrustful, not least because France’s leader at the time, President Nicolas Sarkozy, had called Barnier’s appointment a “defeat for Anglo-Saxon capitalism.” But Barnier proved to be far less an ideologue than Sarkozy projected. Former colleagues remember him as a fair dealer and a good listener. His central concern was to work for the best interests of Europe, and that did not involve dealing grievous injury to the bloc’s most important financial center.

Arlene McCarthy, a former MEP from the British Labor party who worked closely with Barnier on financial services reform, says the reaction she saw to Barnier’s appointment last year sounded familiar. “I’ve known him for twenty years, first as regional policy commissioner,” she said. “When he was appointed for financial services in 2009 people in the UK said this was the worst thing ever, because he’s a French commissioner, but I don’t think any of that was true.”

“People are saying these things because they don’t actually know him,” she added. “Yes, he’s charming, but he’s also formidable, and very focused. I think he’s a fair negotiator. You’ll never ever find him raising his voice; he’s always very calm. But he’s not a pushover.”

Kay Swinburne, a British Conservative member of the European Parliament’s economics committee, also worked closely with Barnier during the contentious financial negotiations. “He was a charming and honest broker,” she remarked. “He was always willing to get into the substance of an issue and understand different perspectives so as to rise above political differences to get the best outcome.”
In the end Barnier made plenty of concessions to the City of London. He promoted the right of London-based hedge funds to operate across the EU and gave the UK an exemption to the EU’s proposed bank ring-fencing rules.

Spare Me the Details

People who worked with Barnier describe a seasoned operator who loves politics but not the nuts and bolts. He contradicted the British cliché of the nerdy, detail-obsessed Eurocrat. One Commission official recalls that he would have his staff draw up a list of the key briefing points on small, laminated card to keep in his pocket for meetings.

Mark MacGann, one of Brussels’ most high-profile lobbyists, recalls working with Barnier when he was head of government affairs for the New York Stock Exchange/Euronext. They were trying to get the Commission’s green light for a merger with Deutsche Börse. It was politically unpopular, due in part to Europeans’ lack of trust in the American NYSE. In the end the Commission voted it down. But Barnier was the one voice of dissent in the 27-member college of commissioners, and such opposition is uncommon.

“The guy really believes in sticking his neck out for European interests,” said MacGann. “Right up to the end, he wanted recorded in the meeting that he opposed this decision, that it was the wrong decision for European interests. This was an era when people were beating up the banks. Barnier believed in the merger when it was not the popular view and maybe not the politically expedient thing to do.”

MacGann says that he expects Barnier to conduct Brexit negotiations with the same tact and level-headedness that he displayed during his work as a commissioner. “I think he will want to make sure that negotiations are managed in a courteous, respectful, diligent manner,” he said. “He’s used to working with the French civil service, which is very structured. It’s not the Rasputin approach – you don’t embarrass people in public, you do things behind closed doors.”

A Nationalist Beginning

Following the news of Barnier’s appointment last year, Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan, one of the driving forces of the Brexit vote, called him “an old-style Euro-integrationist.” But this flies in the face of Barnier’s political origins.

The chief Brexit negotiator says he is guided by a pan-European interest now, but he was not always a champion of international consensus. He started out as a young Gaullist – a strongly patriotic movement inspired by former French president Charles de Gaulle that sees France as the center of the universe and national sovereignty as paramount.

Barnier first gained national renown when he won the town of Albertville’s bid to host the Winter Olympics in 1992, serving as co-president of the Olympic Committee during the games. But it was during this time that his commitment to Gaullism seemed to wane. He became more of an internationalist, and more interested in pan-European politics.

After serving two years as environment minister in the waning years of François Mitterrand, he then joined President Jacques Chirac’s administration as Minister for European Affairs. In 1999 Chirac sent him to be France’s European commissioner – and the rest was history.

There is no doubt that Barnier believes in the European project: He has photos of de Gaulle and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on his desk, after all. But to call him an arch-federalist, as some in the UK media have done, would be a mischaracterization. Those who have worked with him know him as a results-oriented consensus-builder, not a Europe-obsessed fanatic.

McCarthy believes that by alienating Barnier, the British may be losing the “good cop” on the other side of the table. “It doesn’t help to demonize him, because he’s the person they’re going to have to deal with.”

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – May/June 2017 issue.

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© REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

Since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first term began in 1933, a president’s first hundred days in office has been a benchmark by which to assess their accomplishments, ideological outlook, and governing style. Admittedly, measuring any presidency by the first hundred days is somewhat arbitrary: Bill Clinton’s first hundred days were a time of chaotic mismanagement that ultimately led to massive White House shake-up. At day 100, George W. Bush had just passed a trillion-dollar tax cut and was casting himself as humble on the international stage with a foreign policy tilted toward the western hemisphere. September 11, 2001, the event that would ultimately define his presidency, only happened on day 234. Obama, still riding high on a 65 percent domestic approval rating and nearly universal international adoration, had passed a stimulus bill, bailed out the US automobile industry, and launched a series of foreign policy moon shots like eliminating nuclear weapons and closing Guantanamo.

But even as presidencies prove nonlinear and event-driven, the hundred-day stocktaking does have some predictive power. On US foreign policy and transatlantic relations in the Trump era, five realities – what Donald Rumsfeld might have called “known knowns” – have become clear.

First, Trump thrives on unpredictability. When Trump came into office, his administration quickly placed a lot of foreign policy fundaments back on the negotiating table. The US commitment to NAFTA, NATO, the EU, the One-China policy, the two-state solution policy, and the WTO were all up for review. Trump killed the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), the crown jewel of the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia and arguably the most effective geo-economic instrument to manage and constrain China’s rise.

Vice President Mike Pence, Defense Secretary James Mattis, National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. HR McMaster, and a cadre of acolytes of US Senator John McCain have worked to maintain US commitments in Europe, particularly in NATO. But the learning curve has been steep. The fact that there is a learning curve at all belies the fact that the Trump team never bothered to build the policy architecture necessary to govern.

Even if Trump’s careening rhetoric on NAFTA and NATO ultimately leads to very little policy change, they have damaged the credibility that the US would underwrite the international architecture it helped to build. As a result, allies and adversaries alike are repositioning themselves. Because Trump has asserted that the US might be a revisionist – rather than a status quo – power, all others must consider that they, too, must become revisionist powers to stabilize, reconstitute, or upend the international system in their favor.

Second, at both a popular and elite level, US standing in the world has taken a hit. Global US favorability fell by 12 percent in the aftermath of Trump’s election, its lowest level since George W. Bush was in office. A US News & World Report poll showed that 75 percent of non-Americans surveyed had lost some respect for US leadership following Trump’s win.

The Trump-led free fall of the US’s image globally started before Inauguration Day. In 2016 Iran’s state-run television aired the US presidential debates live to showcase the ugliness, bigotry, corruption, and hypocrisy of American democracy. It is worth noting that just eight years prior, Obama’s election helped to inspire Iran’s 2009 pro-democracy Green Revolution, as millions of Iranians poured into the streets chanting “Yes we can” to protest Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent reelection before being violently suppressed.

The first hundred days, however, have reaffirmed global biases. The post-Obama US image abroad made possible policy objectives like UN Security Council votes on Iran, Libya, reopening Cuba, and building global climate change deals. The absence of global goodwill could affect the ability of the new administration to get things done with Europe. That will make negotiations on tough issues like a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) deal, a renewal of the EU-US data protection agreement Privacy Shield, as well as unity on sanctions against Russia and NATO defense spending all the more difficult.

A Climate of Corruption

Third, the fleeting “drain the swamp” campaign rhetoric has given way to an endemic culture of administrative corruption. Whether it is Ivanka Trump’s business dealings with Azerbaijan’s government in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the president’s opaque tax history, his dubious investment and financing relationships with Chinese state banks and Kremlin-affiliated oligarchs, or a State Department announcement promoting Trump’s private Florida club Mar-a-Lago as the “winter White House” (fees at Trump’s exclusive resort have doubled since his 2016 election victory), it is clear that the Trump White House is flirting with as much of a de facto merger between the US government and the Trump organization as the courts and American public will allow.

This has two knock-on effects in Europe. The mission of cleansing the region of corruption – a top national security priority of the US in recent years in places like Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey – will be hampered by an administration whose leadership is adopting many of the same thinly veiled kleptocratic practices. In addition, the administration will be open to a loose ecosystem of graft that could affect policy. Practices once common only among corrupt authoritarians have become common fare. Even Chancellor Angela Merkel travelled to DC with a German business delegation – a practice normally reserved for China and Russia – and has shrewdly taken up the mentorship of Trump’s daughter.

Trump’s affinity for corruption cannot be disentangled from his attraction to authoritarian strongmen on the world stage. The bellwether here is still Russia. Despite the Syrian bombing, the State Department’s decision to maintain the Crimea and Minsk II-conditioned sanctions, and the disappearance of fawning Trump coverage on RT, Sputnik, NTV, and other Russian channels, Trump’s claim that the relationship has gotten worse since the darkest days of the Obama administration is not borne out by facts. The post-referendum congratulatory call to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is grimly consistent with Trump’s penchant for authoritarians. And the White House remains keen to strike some sort of big deal with Putin’s Russia.

Fourth, the administration has made it clear that it is most interested in “quick wins” that can be felt immediately and communicated easily. That means heavy reliance on executive action. Trump’s largest policy accomplishment has been the rollback of Obama-era executive orders and regulations. For Europe, this includes three important areas. One is the erasure of the Cardin-Lugar rule requiring publicly-listed oil, gas, and mining companies to officially disclose payments made to leadership figures of resource-rich, often corrupt countries. On climate change, the White House has gleefully erased rules on coal-fired power plants and reauthorized the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines, placing US commitments under the Paris climate change agreement in question. The administration is also rolling back net neutrality regulations, authorizing greater data processing by telecoms that potentially curtail data rights of European citizens.

Finally, on Europe’s anchor state, Germany, Trump’s rhetoric may be flamboyant – but on policy, he has demonstrated that there are no permanent presidents, only permanent interests. The two primary points of friction for US foreign policy toward Germany remain. Trump – like Obama – believes that at 1.2 percent, Germany’s defense expenditure is woefully low given the health of the German economy (and the NATO commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024, adopted at the 2014 Wales summit). The US resents the fact that Germany’s comparatively small defense budget (raised by eight percent this year) provides cover for smaller, less prosperous alliance members. If Germany does not spend more, how can Italy or Spain?  And Trump – like Obama – chafes at the US-German trade imbalance. At $65 billion, Germany currently enjoys an annual wealth transfer from the US worth more than the combined economies of Croatia and Estonia. The US looks jealously at Germany’s world-class manufacturing sector, whose cars and appliances compete directly with the politically vital American Midwest. Germany does, however, harbor a similar mix of admiration and resentment toward the US tech sector, the main corrective for the bilateral trade relationship that still favors Germany.

Other similarities abound. Trump is maintaining, and expanding, on “Buy America“ procurement provisions that became a mainstay of Obama’s 2009 stimulus package. The Trump administration also shares the Obama administration’s admiration for German vocational training. Obama made it a theme of his 2013 State of the Union address. In her first visit to Berlin, Ivanka Trump toured the Siemens Technik Akademie to learn about apprenticeships. And the rocky relationship around tech, data, and national security will continue to flare up – albeit without the Google-driven brain trust that staffed the Obama White House.

What does this mean as Europe plans for the remaining 1362 days of Trump’s first term? This fall, the National Security Council is slated to release a National Security Strategy (NSS), the closest approximation of a Trump doctrine. The intellectual architecture for Trump’s foreign policy must be built around the man’s personal capriciousness, desire for quick wins, inclination toward bombastic, tough-guy rhetoric, attentiveness to his political base, and clan-like loyalty to his family and business interests. These strands come together under the nebulous heading “America First”; for Germany, the EU, and the world, it is going to be a bumpy ride.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – May/June 2017 issue.

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© REUTERS/Eric Vidal

For me, Europe was always more than a political project to bring countries together – it was also one of the few things that made my family’s abnormal life and structure seem normal. In fact, my personal and professional life has been built on a rising tide of European integration and internationalism.

My mother was born in France in 1944 where her German Jewish mother was being hidden in a monastery. She grew up initially in Paris but returned to Germany in 1950 for her schooling. At the age of 16 she met my English father and at age 18, she got married and followed him to the United Kingdom. My father’s life was also influenced by European tragedies: His father was gassed in World War I, and he was sent away from home during World War II for 18 months, one of the most traumatic experiences of his life. He went on to become a Labor MP and voted for Britain to join the European Union in 1973.

It is impossible to bring three members of my family together without bringing three languages into the conversation.  But the European project has given my family’s life sense and structure. It is because of Europe that I am a member of the first generation in a century not to face war, extermination, or exile.

But in 2016 that tide of internationalism disappeared, forcing me to radically re-engage with my identity: who I am, what passport I hold, where I work, how we organize our family life, and more. I am not alone facing these changes; a whole generation is confronted with choices they never had to make before. A generation that grew up optimistically embracing change is worried the next shift will upend their lives.

But we also had to recognize that where we saw opportunity and security, many others experienced insecurity and vulnerability. And because of these experiences, the tide of internationalism is ebbing. The challenge is to take these lessons on board before it is too late – to try to rethink the European project so that it is more robust. Europe runs the risk of dying because it rejects change.

From Interdependence to Protection

The European Union is a political superstructure built on the foundations of national representative democracy. So it is no surprise that as many European states go through a profound process of political realignment, the European Union should see its foundations shaken as well.

It was possible to build the EU because of a permissive consensus among the mainstream parties. But today, the political space is fragmented. Parties of the center are being squeezed by new groups that have reframed the traditional left-right contest into one that pits the people against established elites. There are many reasons for this shift.

Economies and societies are becoming more diverse and fractured. Digital technologies are facilitating the creation of echo chambers rather than a single national culture. And growing inequality has split society into winners and losers, turning politics into a contest for a growing share of a shrinking pie. This is one of the features that has made battles over identity so brutal.

Amid this growing polarization, the European Union has emerged as the ultimate elite. It has exacerbated the trends that have driven the rise of populism. In some countries, the EU has taken decision-making out of the realm of political debate, making it appear as if there is no alternative, and this has fortified nationalists’ cries to “take back control.” Secondly, the EU has changed the horizons of people’s aspirations. Rather than comparing their situations to their own past or that of their parents, they increasingly compare themselves to Europe’s wealthiest and most successful – which explains why so many young people in Poland are unhappy despite a healthy economy.

But most troublingly, the very things that made Europe flourish are now rendering it increasingly unpopular. The EU was based on a mechanical idea that interdependence would reduce conflict. By linking European means of production together – first through the European coal and steel community, and later through the common market and the euro – the EU hoped to bind states together so closely that war between them would no longer be an option. War in Europe indeed became mostly unthinkable as wealth was generated.

Today that interdependence is feeding a pervasive sense of powerlessness and vulnerability. We have become so good at pulling down walls and barriers between people, markets, and capital, that we have become oblivious to the fears that this frictionless world can engender.

To save the EU, European leaders now need to change their focus. Rather than looking for new areas to bind people together, they need to devote all their energy to making interdependence feel safe. That means redistributing some of the economic benefits of free movement to communities bearing the brunt of the burden; strengthening control of external borders and cooperation against terrorism; ensuring greater flexibility for eurozone integration and migration; and returning to the idea that EU institutions’ highest calling is to defend Europe’s nation states, not to develop their own power.

In order to restore a sense of control to Europeans, the EU will need more flexibility. We need to allow particular constellations of member states to work together and establish different models for cooperation, gradually building new political centers around shared issues.

One of the biggest dangers for established parties is to frame the debate as one that pits the forces of openness against those who want a closed world. This only serves to cement the divisions and drive people to double down on their opposition. The solution is rather to invent a new politics of togetherness that honors the fears of the downtrodden and finds ways of making interdependence feel safe for them. This must go beyond the left’s comfort zone and focus on the economic dislocation of those left behind. There must be recognition of the cultural and security fears and an attempt to mitigate them as well. The new dividing lines for politics should be between managed and unmanaged togetherness, rather than open and closed. The central question is not a new challenge but an old one: Who benefits from connectivity?

People like me have been very good at arguing for the things that drive people together. But unless we can have a new politics of togetherness, the counterrevolution could blow away the whole construct.

From Universalism to Exceptionalism

The EU needs to go through an even larger rethink of its international role. Given its enlightenment roots – and the fact that Europeans have been at the center of global politics through industry and empire for centuries – it is not surprising that the European Union was a universalist project from its outset.

The EU has pioneered a revolution in political organization within its own borders. The key element was a highly-developed system of mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs and security based on the rule of law, openness, and transparency. This new postmodern security system did not rely on a balance of power, nor did it emphasize sovereignty. It rejected the use of force as an instrument for settling conflicts and promoted increased mutual dependence between European states.

The postmodern European order was not interested in changing the borders of Europe, but rather the nature of borders themselves, to open them for capital, people, goods, and ideas. EU expansion has been its biggest success story. Europeans were aware of the distinctive nature of their order, but they were also convinced of its eventual universal nature.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea came as a rude awakening, making clear that the EU’s political model is unlikely to become universal or even spread to the immediate neighborhood. Moscow has outright rejected a unipolar European order centered around the EU and NATO. In fact, it came as a shock to many European policymakers that free countries making rational decisions would opt for a less perfect system than the EU.

Europe’s postmodern order evolved in a protective ecosystem, shielded from the more muscular, modern world where most people live. Today, Europeans need to spend more time thinking about how to defend their fragile system from internal implosion and external aggression rather than imagining how it will take over the rest of the world.

There will also need to be a much starker distinction between how Europeans deal with each other and how they can defend their interests with countries outside the EU club. Rather than looking at all states as potential members in need of reform, other countries will need to be seen as sovereign nations that the EU needs to engage.

For issues such as EU relations with Russia and Turkey (and these two countries’ relations with each other), member states need to agree on a policy that recognizes the interests of all, combining a tough defense of European interests with frameworks for collaborating with them. In addition to preventing an alliance between Moscow and Ankara, the EU should rethink its goals in its neighborhood.

Although the Balkan countries outside the EU will remain there for many years, they are in the European security space, and Europeans should be prepared to intervene militarily if outbreaks of violence recur. Moreover, EU leaders should pursue a broader definition of peace than the absence of war, including political and social stability and preventing radicalization in Bosnia and Kosovo.

For Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, the goal should be to promote stable and predictable governments. For the next few years, the EU should view them as independent buffer states rather than as member states-in-waiting. It will be particularly important not to draw red lines that the EU is not willing to defend.

In the troubled Middle East, the EU cannot hope to be the central actor, and member states cannot protect their populations from instability if they are only spectators. Particularly in Syria and Libya, the EU needs to play a more concerted role with regional powers – as well as with the US and Russia – to advance political processes that could help reduce violence, provide humanitarian aid, and stem the flow of refugees.

Liberal Orders 1.0 and 2.0

The biggest challenge will be rethinking transatlantic relations and the nature of the international system. It can be argued that there was not one but actually two superimposed liberal orders in place over the last seventy years – a very light one that rose from the ashes of the World War II (liberal order 1.0) and a far more ambitious one that emerged after the Cold War (liberal order 2.0).

The original liberal order, born in 1945, was about protecting states from subjugation and invasion by imperial powers. This order only went as far as the borders of sovereign states. After 1989 liberal order 2.0 arose, going beyond those borders to look at the rights of individuals living within them.

In the wake of the Iraq War, Lehman Brothers, and the euro’s woes, the utopian project of the liberal order 2.0 is collapsing. In its place will not be chaos but a return to liberal order 1.0 – with bilateral trade deals and little international cooperation. Under this account, Trump doesn’t even represent a big break with past US administrations. Very few of them actually believed in constraining American sovereignty – they were just better at faking it.

But there is a darker reading of our situation: the liberal order 2.0 was halted by the rise of powers like Russia and China after 2008. In this scenario, we are now seeing a rollback even of the basic liberal order 1.0 – driven not by revisionist external powers but by a political counterrevolution within the West itself.  The worry is that we will see a new kind of globalization that combines the technologies of the future with the enmities of the past.

The development of technology could spur a series of connectivity wars as trade, the Internet, and even migration are weaponized. In this bleak world, multilateral institutions and regimes could become battlegrounds. International conflict will be spurred on by domestic politics that increasingly revolve around identity politics, distrust of institutions, and nationalism. National media will come to an end and we will return to a world of unverified gossip and competing versions of the truth.

In this world, what should Europe do? Should we become stakeholders for the liberal order 2.0 or should we try to manage as well as we can in a postliberal world? It is too early to say for sure, but in reality, the EU must preserve the dream of a liberal order 2.0 internally while accepting a return to liberal order 1.0 in the rest of the world.

Europe’s Great Hope

If these changes are to work, Germany has a crucial role to play. Much has been written about Germany and Angela Merkel being the last guardians of the free world. These are exaggerated claims. But Germany can do a lot to guarantee the liberal order 2.0 survives within Europe and secure the liberal order 1.0 globally.

The good news is that Germany only needs to pursue a more interest-based policy. The bad news is that this behavior does not come naturally to Germany.

For decades, Germany has successfully leveraged its two most important relationships, with the US and within the EU. Measured against its economic power, Germany spends an astonishingly small sum on defense and security, and that has only been possible because of the transatlantic relationship and NATO. The EU gave Germany institutions to hide behind – the largest and economically most powerful state on the European continent didn’t need to play the power politics game. Germany does not have national interests, Germans like to say; European interests are German interests.

This system has worked well for several decades, but now Germany must change its actions and mindset. An exceptional Germany was key to European universalism. A more normal Germany will be key to safeguarding European exceptionalism.

Germans have started to understand their crucial role and have begun to change accordingly. The country has vouched to spend eight percent more on defense this year and to reach the two percent NATO spending goal by 2024. It has become much more active in European foreign policy.

But a change in mindset is more crucial. Germany does not so much need to be the paymaster but it needs to be more flexible, to care less about rules and order. It needs to be willing to work inside but also outside the institutions. Over the last few years, Germany behaved as if it had a monopoly on morals. This didn’t serve its interests well (during the debt crisis, it ended up paying a lot more because of it).

This process is already well under way. In its approach to the euro crisis, Germany has pioneered institutional innovations. In the Ukraine crisis, Germany was willing to work within the Normandy format to deescalate the situation around Ukraine. And in its deal with Turkey on the refugee crisis, Berlin broke free from the constrictions of the enlargement process to craft a new framework for European relations with Turkey.

Still, Germany is increasingly isolated today, courtesy of the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump. A liberal order cannot exist in one country alone; Germany will need allies. At the moment, there is no one relationship that can carry Europe. The Franco-German relationship has been marginalized; Italy is embroiled in its financial problems and faces a possible victory of the populist Five Star Movement. Ad-hoc coalitions of the willing are increasingly crucial.

Embracing Change

The process of rethinking European integration will be difficult. It involves disrupting a world and frameworks that we had grown accustomed to over the years. In a way, Europe as an organization is experiencing what many of us know on a personal level.

When I was 23 years old, I regarded all change as good. I celebrated disruptions that would sweep away old-fashioned hierarchies and open up space for new people and new ideas. Because I was not attached to the status quo, I was able to grasp some opportunities that older people saw as threats.

Today, I find it far more challenging to embrace change. I have been around for the last two decades and many of my generation are in positions of power. In recent months, I have been trying to force myself to think like my 23-year-old self.

This made me realize that far too often we have been trying to defend the indefensible. The system we created for the EU internally has generated more conflict than cooperation. The system that we hoped to bring to the world has become enemy number one for Russia, Turkey, and the US under Trump. We need a new politics designed for this world – and Germany will have to play a crucial role in creating the necessary environment for this change.

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© Sputnik/Alexei Druzhinin/Kremlin via REUTERS

Years after the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia still was considered a second-tier power and a paradigm of inefficiency: corrupt, authoritarian, its economy dependent upon high energy prices. Until President Vladimir Putin, that is: he turned his country’s soft power deficit into strength.

At home, his government systematically clamped down on media and internet freedom, curtailed the work of NGOs, and unleashed security forces on protests. Abroad, the Kremlin used its foreign news outlets and social media to sow fear and unease by creating the impression that it could manipulate European societies. In doing so, Russia was bypassing EU leaders and directly addressing their people – a lesson learned from the West.

This is Putin’s real strength: He is not intimidated by the West’s economic or technological superiority. He shrewdly analyzes and learns from his opponents, just as he was taught to do as a Soviet intelligence agent. Unlike many of his peers in Europe, Putin sees the world as it is, not as he would like it to be (like many Western leaders do). He recognizes his own weaknesses and those of his opponent, and time and again he proved able to turn an apparent defeat into a victory.

His stubborn ability to surprise opponents and unscrupulously exploit their vulnerabilities has won him considerable gains. He has been able to push through significant projects, like the 2008 military reform, and to optimally use the limited resources of a corrupt, inefficient state. The military operations in Crimea and Syria also showed the Russian army’s astonishing progress in speed, communication, discipline, and equipment.

Behind the Bluster

These victories cast an image of a strong and powerful Russia. The reality, however is different. The country’s well-known shortcomings remain. As one of the largest producers of gas and oil in the world, Russia has steadily increased its reliance on commodities exports since Putin took office. Raw materials now account for up to 75 percent of exports and 40 percent of Russia’s revenues. Moscow depends heavily upon selling its goods but has little influence over the price.

When commodities markets dip, the country’s vulnerability is exposed and its economic sovereignty threatened. Though Russia was the world’s eighth largest producer of industrial goods in 2013, those goods were sold primarily on the domestic market due to weak competition internationally.

In terms of GDP, Russia ranked 12th among the world’s largest economies last year, ahead of South Korea. Still, according to the World Bank, Russian per capita income put the country on par with Latvia and Chile in 2015. Meanwhile, according to SIPRI, defense spending ballooned to 5.4 percent of GDP last year, significantly overstretching the economy. As a result, the government cut heavily on education, research, and health.

The country’s population has shrunk to around 143 million – some five million people fewer than in 1991, at the collapse of the Soviet Union. While unemployment is relatively low (just under six percent), that can also be attributed to a quickly aging society and a corresponding decline in the working population. And in many industries, the government’s generous subsidies are propping up jobs that would otherwise disappear.

Competitive, in Parts

And yet, Russia is internationally competitive in certain areas. Western sanctions over Moscow’s role in the Ukraine conflict have benefited some sectors (like agriculture) of the economy by sealing them off from foreign competition. It is one of the few countries in the world capable of generating the entire production chain of nuclear energy. With the exception of the US, no other country produces such a large range of weapon systems. And it is still the second largest weapons producer in the world, ahead of China. In nuclear weapons, Moscow is already at least on par with the US, having started to modernize the sector earlier than Washington; a strong nuclear stockpile is central to Russia’s self-ascribed great power status.

But the government has invested enormous sums in modernizing nuclear arms at a time of economic crisis. It is a risk that could backfire: Washington already spends eight times more on its military and equipment, and US President Donald Trump announced a further increase in military spending. In a high-stakes bidding war, Moscow cannot keep up.

Russia’s burgeoning software industry has been a relatively new bright spot. Between 2003 and 2014, its exports grew at a rate of thirty percent a year – more than any other segment of the economy. That success, however, is due in part to the Russian diaspora in innovation hubs across the world, from Israel to Silicon Valley. Creative entrepreneurs have been forced to seek opportunities abroad as the Kremlin tightens its grip on the internet, particularly after the mass anti-government demonstrations in 2011 and 2012.

Still, much has slipped through the Kremlin’s fist. At the end of March, demonstrators took to the streets across Russia to protest corruption after opposition leader Alexei Navalny released a video accusing Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev of large-scale corruption; before long, the video had generated more than twenty million clicks. The government has struggled to reach and influence the younger generation online. The recent terror attack on a subway station in St. Petersburg could be the opportunity President Putin needs to further curb freedom of the internet and other forms of communication.

Destroying the Spirit

By intervening in public life and restricting liberties, the government is simultaneously consolidating power around Putin’s circle and destroying the spirit of creativity and freedom that emerged in post-Soviet Russia.

Under Putin, the Kremlin has overhauled the country’s security apparatus, built the National Guard, and expanded the powers of the secret service (FSB) in the name of fighting terrorism. The president used the annexation of Crimea to restore his legitimacy at home. He plays up elements of the country’s history to evoke national pride and introduce Soviet-style propaganda, glorifying the Red Army’s victory in World War II and Josef Stalin’s rule. Putin indeed sees himself as the heir of that historic legacy. The October Revolution and the Bolsheviks, meanwhile, have been nearly forgotten. The centenary of the 1917 uprising was barely celebrated in Russia because it undermines Putin’s model of a stable state.

The idealization of Soviet power has revived the specter of Russia’s old foes as well; the US, NATO, and the West as a whole are seen as relentless enemies intent on keeping Russia weak. It is a ghost of the Soviet past that still haunts Russians today, but the West has also done little to allay their fears – and this may be Putin’s greatest success. Russia has now managed to project itself as a great power at home and abroad without having the requisite economic fundament.

At the same time, President Putin’s ascent to strongman status was only successful because the EU and US lost credibility as liberal democracies. The George W. Bush administration’s systematic disregard for international law in the fight against terror, the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and the West’s inability to uphold its own ethical standards have allowed authoritarian leaders like Putin to shine on the international stage. Global power and prestige have become key tools to secure approval at home and recognition among the international community. Ironically Putin – a man who has built his leadership on cronyism, corruption, and blatant disregard for his own citizens – has become a torchbearer for those who categorically reject the West, mainstream media, and “the establishment.”

Empty Threats

Meanwhile, Putin is using hard and soft power to exploit the values of pluralism and freedom that constitute the West’s strength as well as expose its shortcomings. The conflict in Ukraine is a prime example of this strategy: It was widely considered a wake-up call for the European Union, but there has been little action of any real consequence. Sanctions did not force Moscow’s hand; crucial economic and business ties have been mostly unaffected; a thriving middle class in Russia did not  inevitably lead to democracy.

Diplomacy hasn’t resolved the conflict either. In fact, Russia has abused its ties with Europe to improve its negotiating position. The Kremlin is aware of the limits of its ability to get candidates like Donald Trump or Marine Le Pen elected; instead, it seeks to undermine liberal democracies by supporting the forces that have threatened to destabilize the Western system.

The crucial question is: What is Russia is capable of and what do we believe Russia is capable of achieving? Ever since it became clear that Russia might have influenced the US election campaign, Russia’s power to manipulate has been exaggerated. Increasingly Putin and Russia are seen as synonymous. It is an image the Kremlin has worked hard to cultivate. According to polls, Putin’s approval ratings after the annexation of Crimea are upwards of eighty percent (an important figure ahead of next year’s elections). But Putin is not necessarily as popular as he would have us believe. The protests in March revealed how his regime has struggled to win over younger Russians, and it will be difficult to drive voters to the polls next year for an election where they have no real choice.

European leaders must learn to dial back their expectations of what is actually possible with Russia’s leadership. Apart from economic ties, the relationship with Moscow will not improve in the foreseeable future. Civil rights will be curtailed even more and corruption will remain entrenched. There may be small steps forward in trust-building and arms control, but a deal that would work in Europe’s interests is highly unlikely.

We cannot change Russia, we rather have to accept it as it is. Europe’s strength lies in its values and norms, and it must uphold them to remain credible in Russia and Eastern Europe. It was Otto von Bismarck, Germany’s first chancellor, who pointedly noted: Russia is never as strong or as weak as it seems.

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Artwork: © Dominik Herrmann

On April 17, just under a week before the first round of the French presidential elections, Emmanuel Macron faced a crowd of 20,000 supporters gathered at Bercy stadium in Paris.

“I want everyone – at some point in their life – to have a new chance,” he proclaimed. “We must be able to live, work, and learn en même temps.”

The candidate suddenly stopped, interrupting his own speech.

“Excuse me, you noticed that I used ‘en même temps,’” he said, as the crowd of supporters burst into chants of “En même temps! En même temps!”

This seemingly innocuous phrase could be translated literally as “at the same time,” but can be used to mean “however,” “nevertheless,” “on the other hand,” and a whole host of other useful linking words that acknowledge the existence of two or more conflicting ideas. Critics had picked up on the fact that Macron used it frequently and ridiculed him for it, claiming that it showed his inability to decide and masked a platform that was vague at best, intentionally opaque at worst. Macron is the man, after all, who supported a military intervention in Syria but en même temps doesn’t think Bashar al-Assad should step down immediately. He’s also the man who called colonization a “crime against humanity,” but en même temps highlights “the positive virtues of colonialism.”

“It’s a verbal tic,” Macron admitted to the crowd in the Bercy stands. But a helpful supporter rushed to his defense, shouting, “It’s not a problem!” And, indeed, Macron couldn’t agree more. “But I’m going to keep on using it,” he continued, “Because I choose growth and solidarity, liberty and equality, businesses and employees, the best of the right, the left, and the center.”

From Joke to Slogan

In later interviews, Macron continued to defend his use of the phrase as representative of his program. En même temps went from a joke to a slogan for Macron supporters, who saw their candidate’s penchant for embracing contradictions as an understanding that the world is complex, a rejection of reductionism (and thus an implicit criticism of his rival, far-right candidate Marine Le Pen).

However, there are a few more reasons this phrase became part of Macron’s rhetoric. Macron is a direct product of France’s meritocracy. He graduated from l’École Nationale d’Administration, or ENA, one of France’s most prestigious grand écoles and a training ground for the country’s political elites. Graduates of the ENA – called by the rather ungraceful nickname énarques – are actually famed for speaking in a way that erases conflict while presenting opposing sides. The French even have a name for the technique – it is called balancement circonspect (which loosely translates as “circumspect swaying,” a way to say one thing, its opposite, and, ultimately, nothing at all). Earlier this spring, Jérôme Guedj, spokesperson for Socialist presidential candidate Benoît Hamon, complained that Macron “says everything and then adds little bit of the opposite.”

Though this language is most often associated with elite French institutions (ENA is, first and foremost, a school of administration), Macron is far from the first to bring this style of reasoning to politics. Indeed, current French President François Hollande, also an énarque, has been accused of “balancement circonspect” by political rivals, including far-left presidential candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Centrist politician François Bayrou, who ran for president in 2007, also had a similar for-and-against way of looking at the world (though he is not an énarque). Bayrou finished third a decade ago, but the political context was different back then – the divide between the right and the left was sharper, and both sides were fielding strong candidates (Nicolas Sarkozy and Ségolène Royal).

Scooping Up the Center

In the 2017 elections, there was a niche for someone able to consider two ideas en même temps. François Fillon, the presidential candidate fielded by the Republicans, was farther to the right than a lot of his party members, while the Socialist candidate, Benoît Hamon, sat farther to the left – both were perhaps results of the fact that they were selected through open primaries, in which only the most die-hard party members usually turn up to vote. So when Macron used “en même temps” to embrace traditional left and right political ideals, he bridged the left-right divide and scooped up voters who might sit more to the center of the political spectrum. In fact, Macron’s most famous “en même temps” moment was perhaps when he proclaimed, “I’m from both the left and the right” – which clearly helped him in the first round of the election.

However, arguably the most significant support for Macron came from people who opposed his rival, Le Pen. Here en même temps was directly opposed to the rhetoric of Le Pen, who claimed to be neither right nor left. While Le Pen rejected, Macron embraced. She wanted to break with the European Union, stop using the euro, and halt most immigration. Macron, on the other hand, wanted to reconcile what might be seen as opposing ideas. A study by French polling company Ifop showed that optimistic, happy people tended to support Macron, while pessimists were more likely to vote Le Pen (though economic conditions could explain both these voters’ moods and their political preferences). Macron is pretty peppy – this is the politician, after all, who gave an entire speech telling his followers that “when everything seems sad, when everything seems lost or gloomy, you must think of spring,” a line so chipper it could come from a Disney musical with animated flowers and frolicking woodland creatures. Le Pen, on the other hand, tends to have a lot to say about the winter in which France currently finds itself.

Macron has made it clear that en même temps is more than just a phrase he repeats a lot – it’s a boiled down vision of the world as he sees it. The joyful irony for his camp is that they uncovered a simple, catchy slogan – perfect for memes, videos, and jokes with journalists – that highlighted the way that Macron embraces complexity. In an era of social media dominance, when having a slogan such as “Make America Great Again” can mobilize the masses, no centrist candidate yet has come up with such gold. When people joke about en même temps, Macron just smiles – because they are already talking on his terms.

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Around the time of the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Russia’s leadership came to a pivotal conclusion: They had the resources and opportunity to directly influence politics in the West. That spawned a campaign to support and create influential political organizations in Europe with financial and political aid from Moscow. The ultimate aim was to put the United States and the European Union under pressure, and to help elect European governments that would recognize the annexation of Crimea as legal – just as France’s right-wing populist candidate Marine Le Pen recently did in an interview with CNN. Legitimizing Russia’s move in Crimea would mean a step toward lifting sanctions, after all.

The Kremlin’s strategy swung into gear at the height of Europe’s migration crisis in 2015. Extremist and populist parties gained traction with anti-immigration messages, planting the seeds of skepticism and doubt concerning the EU – and Moscow stood behind them. It was opportunistic but successful. Nationalist movements that were once considered fringe groups made significant strides in some EU countries, threatening to undermine the European project.

Russia made no secret of its support for Donald Trump in the US elections either. President Vladimir Putin publicly heaped compliments upon Trump; before his brief time in office, National Security Adviser Michael Flynn was paid handsomely to speak at a 2015 RT (formerly Russia Today) dinner, where he was seated next to Putin; at the Russian Embassy in Washington, staffers reportedly met with members of Trump’s campaign team. The most brazen act, however, came when hackers linked to Russia’s secret service intercepted the Democratic National Committee’s email servers, targeting Hillary Clinton and campaign chairman John Podesta and flooding the media with compromising material.

Russia’s IT industry is hardly considered advanced, but these hackers were highly skilled. Using them is part of a larger strategy to build a powerful tool that allows the Kremlin to wield great influence and quash opposition. In a country where censorship is increasingly commonplace, social media and video blogs alone offer the opposition a platform to expose corruption and cronyism. It is no wonder, then, that Moscow is increasingly clamping down on Internet freedoms. The government has used a sweeping anti-terrorism law to massively expand the legal framework of what is allowed and curtail civil society and political engagement online. In June 2016 a new law was passed that forces mobile phone operators to store the calls and text messages of Russian citizens, and security authorities can request access to encrypted correspondence. The Kremlin also has an array of tools at its disposal to block dissident websites, all without judicial oversight.

Deepening Persecution

Meanwhile, the state’s persecution of its opponents has deepened. The Russian supervisory body for telecommunications, Roskomnadzor, has blocked several opposition sites, including the Internet newspaper Grani.ru and Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny’s blog on LiveJournal. Activists regularly face criminal charges for their own comments on social media, and even for reposting what others have shared. Some of the accused are sentenced to volunteer in the community; others end up behind bars.

The government wastes no chance to tighten its grip on social media. Pavel Durov, founder of Russia’s largest social networking site VKontakte, says he was fired, forced to cede his company to Putin’s close ally, Igor Sechin, and flee the country. Since then, state media have repeatedly published opposition activists’ private contact information from VKontakte in a bid to discredit them.
The chief ideologist behind the Kremlin’s online strategy is Putin’s Internet adviser, German Klimenko. He has argued in favor of banning foreign social media from Russia entirely and has threatened to block Telegram, Durov’s popular messenger service, because the company refused to move its servers to Russia.

It is important to remember that Russian leadership believes Washington controls the Internet. Putin was quoted in 2014 as saying: “The Internet started as a CIA project and continues to develop as one.” He has promised to invest more in Russian IT companies.

Russia’s obstruction of the Internet has hobbled the country’s IT industry; many of its brightest minds leave the country to find success abroad. Russian Internet companies are so strictly regulated that they struggle to keep up with international competitors. At the same time, a state-sponsored IT industry has emerged. The secret service is working to bring more IT specialists on board. Some are won over by money, while others are forced to work for the state or face criminal charges.

According to a study conducted by Zecurion Analytics, a company that analyzes the global role of cybersecurity in defense budgets, Russia is among the top five countries in cyber spending, along with the US, China, the UK, and South Korea. China’s “hacker army” costs Beijing around $1.5 billion a year and counts some 20,000 “cyber soldiers.” The UK employs 2000 people in cybersecurity and spends $450 million. South Korea invests $400 million in about 700 people, while Russia’s program cost $300 million and employs around a thousand people.

Opposition as Guinea Pigs

The very technology that has driven innovation in the West has been used to quell dissent in Russia, helping the Kremlin collect information on individuals and organizations, vilify independent politicians, and launch politically-motivated investigations against critics.

In 2011 and 2012, the Gmail accounts of both Navalny and his wife were hacked and years of private email correspondence went public. Navalny says around ninety percent of the emails were genuine while some ten percent were fabricated. It was the start of a large-scale campaign to undermine Navalny. State media networks featured daily programs picking apart Navalny’s emails to colleagues, employees, friends, and family, with Kremlin-friendly experts providing analysis. It was a brazen attempt to slander Russia’s best-known opposition politician.

The hacker attack behind Navalny’s email leak clearly violated his right to privacy, which is protected under the Russian constitution. But authorities argued Navalny was being investigated for his communications with an advisor, Nikita Belykh, governor of the western Kirov Oblast. Their communication caught the eye of investigators and led to trumped-up charges of embezzlement. Navalny was found guilty and lost his right to run for office. The European Court of Human Rights criticized the ruling as arbitrary, and it was later annulled.

The spokesman for the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation Vladimir Markin went so far as to admit that Navalny’s conviction was political: “Politics certainly play a role in these proceedings, and it has to do with the defendant. He is trying with all his might to attract attention and provoke the power of the state,” Markin said in an interview.

Andrey Pivovarov, an opposition leader in St. Petersburg, recently saw his account on VKontakte’s messenger service hacked. His emails, too, were analyzed in great detail on state TV, and his criticism of other opposition activists, expressed in private, were published shortly before a large demonstration. It was a bold-faced plot to divide Russia’s protest organizations and demoralize their supporters.

A Hybrid War

The strategy worked so well against its own opposition that Moscow started to employ it further afield for geopolitical gains. The emails won from the US Democratic National Committee hack were handed over to WikiLeaks; after the election, US intelligence agencies made public their conclusion that the attacks were carried out at the behest of Russian leadership, with direct orders from Putin.

Of course, Russia’s secret service was not entirely responsible for the outcome of the US election. Donald Trump’s shock victory was rooted in the intrinsic ills roiling American society. In fact, Putin probably did not expect that Trump would actually win. There is, however, no doubt that the Kremlin attempted to interfere in the campaign.

Putin is pursuing a type of hybrid warfare with the West. Attacks are carried out under the cloak of secrecy and encryption so the Kremlin can officially distance itself from illicit activities. Putin believes that by demonstrating his power to the West, their governments will become more accommodating.

The US has maintained its sanctions on Russia and stepped up rhetoric, but that has done little to bring an end to the Kremlin’s manipulation. In France, Russia’s secret service supported Marine Le Pen and used strategies learned from the US election campaign to target pro-European centrist Emmanuel Macron. He has been critical of Russia, and in February 2017 Macron’s aides accused Russia of repeatedly attempting to hack their candidate and his En Marche! movement’s website.

Humpty Dumpty

For the Kremlin, hacker attacks are one of the most efficient ways to undercut opponents; Western countries are still struggling to identify the best way to counter attack. The Obama administration expelled 35 Russian diplomats before leaving the White House, imposing sanctions on high-ranking Russian intelligence agents and their private IT companies as well.

But this Kremlin strategy has backfired. Factions within the government have employed hackers to win the upper hand in internal power struggles. In 2014 the prominent Humpty Dumpty group leaked information to the public about Russian officials and state ministries. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, his deputy Arkady Dvorkovich, Putin adviser Vladislav Surkov, and Timur Prokopenko, a high-ranking official in the Kremlin’s interior administration, were all targeted.

The leaked information blew the cover off the government’s corruption and rampant abuse of power, and Humpty Dumpty was promptly branded as opposition. Yet in 2016 it emerged that the hackers were connected to the FSB intelligence service, which acted, according to the hacking group, as a “handler.” Nearly every member of the group was arrested during the investigation, including Sergei Mikhailov, the deputy head of the agency, and Dmitry Dokuchaev, another FSB officer.

Humpty Dumpty aside, there has been much hand-wringing in the West over how to counter Russian cyber attacks. It is important to accept that almost every message sent online can be made public. The Russian opposition has long since come to the conclusion that the only effective way to protect itself is maximum transparency – in other words, do not send anything in an email you would not be willing to repeat in public. It is a strategy that only goes so far, however. If the Kremlin no longer has access to incriminating material to ruin opponents, it will simply fabricate news.

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