Source: YouGov, June 23-24, 2016.

For those who think the British vote to leave the European Union was a mistake, there are plenty of villains to blame: from the Tory leaders jockeying to better their political positions and Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn’s half-hearted push to remain to UK Independence Party leader Nigel Farage’s constant stream of vitriol. But there is one narrative emerging that distributes responsibility much more broadly: that the Brexit referendum was one pitting generations against one another, with older Britons wanting the United Kingdom out of the EU and younger Britons voting to stay.

According to polling by YouGov, the best predictors of voting behavior were age and education level. And while the overall result was close, the gaps between the young and the old, the more and less educated, were dramatic. Seven in 10 voters between 18 and 24 voted to stay in the European Union, compared to 54 percent among voters 25-49 years old, 40 percent among voters aged 50-64, and only 36 percent among voters older than 65. Among voters with a secondary school education at most, seven in 10 voted to leave the EU; among those with a university degree, seven in 10 voted to stay.

In fact, this is not a pattern unique to the UK. According to the Pew Research Center’s spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, younger Europeans are more likely to have a favorable opinion of the EU in nearly every member state. Adults between 18 and 34 have an opinion of the EU that is 25 percentage points more favorable than adults over 50 in France (56 percent vs. 31 percent), with differences of 16 percentage points in the Netherlands (62 percent vs. 46 percent), 14 percentage points in Poland (79 percent vs. 65 percent), and 14 percentage points in Germany (60 percent vs. 46 percent).

Mind the Age Gap

The autumn 2015 Eurobarometer survey reflected a similar gap: Half of the Europeans surveyed between 15 and 24 had a favorable opinion of the EU, compared to 39 percent between 25 and 39, 37 percent between 40 and 54, and only 33 percent 55 or older. Nearly half of respondents between 15-24 trusted the EU, compared to only a quarter of those over 55. This discrepancy extends to Britain, where significantly more respondents between 15 and 24 said they trusted the EU compared to older Britons.

Part of this has to do with what kind of associations Europeans make with the EU: More than half of Europeans aged 15-24 said the EU means freedom to travel, work, and study anywhere within the EU. Among Europeans over 55, that numbers drops to 42 percent. Meanwhile, significantly more Europeans over 55 say it means a “waste of money,” “bureaucracy,” or “not enough control at external borders.”

Opposition to the EU is about more than regulations and taxes: it is increasingly about older generations, feeling left behind by the forces of globalization, who are cut off from the benefits of a digital, mobile economy while exposed to its negative effects.

Holger Geissler, head of research at YouGovʼs German office, sees this pattern just as much in Germany. “The younger the people, the more open they are to internationalism. They are much more open to immigrants, and much more open to Europe.”

No “Gerxit” on the Cards

A fifth of Germans between 18-24 say that the country could take many more refugees, compared to 12 percent among Germans 55 and older. Meanwhile, 36 percent of Germans 55 and older say the number is already much too high, compared to 16 percent among Germans aged 18-24. Thirty-two percent of Germans 55 and older say they would support Germany leaving the EU, compared to only 15 percent of Germans 18-24. The differences are even starker when one compares regions in Germany, with those in the former East feeling “left behind” by the global marketplace – and resentful of how they believe it has changed their country.

Would Germany ever actually leave the union? Is there any reason to fear a Gerxit? Geissler says no: “Germany is much more positive on the EU.” Nevertheless, the forces that led the UK to leave do not stop at the English Channel. For many older Europeans, the EU represents a new and frightening world, one they would just as soon not be bothered with.

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There are no quick fixes to the challenges Brexit poses. Berlin 
and Brussels would do well to take their time and think through the implications, as the task ahead is nothing less than Herculean.

© dpa/Maurizio Gambarini

The British 52-48 vote to leave the European Union has come as a huge psychological shock for Germany’s political elite. Despite tight polls and extensive debates about possible outcomes, Berlin’s foreign policy circles were convinced before the vote that British pragmatism and economic interests would prevail, if narrowly.

Now, even though Germany and the EU are far from having fully digested this news, both will now have to face at least six significant challenges:

First, the EU is faced with a long period of political and economic uncertainty despite Brussels’ desire for a “quick divorce.” The immediate reaction of several EU leaders, including Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and European Parliament President Martin Schulz, was to call for quick activation of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, setting in motion a two-year exit procedure.

Political and legal constraints, however, first and foremost in the UK, point in a different direction. Legally, Article 50 allows any EU member state to leave the union by formally notifying the European Council of its wish. But not right away – the state does not formally leave until either an exit agreement comes into force (with consent from the European Parliament and qualified majority of the remaining member states in the Council) or two years have passed with no such agreement being reached. The time limit can only be extended by unanimous agreement.

Translated into political calculations, the EU has to be prepared for a long standoff with the UK. In the short to medium term, this will determine when, or even if, the UK will actually trigger the exit clause. Legally, starting the process is absolutely a sovereign decision of the UK; contrary to the hard line from Brussels immediately after the vote, the EU has no legal power – and few political means – to force the UK to take this step. With the political chaos in Westminster following the Brexit vote, the current UK caretaker government would be highly irresponsible to trigger the two-year limit, especially now that it has become obvious that no one in the leave campaign had concrete plans for exit.

But even after a new prime minister is in place in Downing Street, triggering Article 50 could be a long way off. On the one hand, new general elections have not been ruled out, while prominent UK legal scholars argue that triggering Article 50 would require an act of parliament – meaning both the House of Commons, where pro-Remain MPs enjoy a majority, and the even more pro-EU House of Lords – which would take at least another six months, if not more. On the other hand, the activation of Article 50 would signal that the UK will almost definitely leave the EU and worsen the economic outlook. Even with the support of parliament, a new prime minister will therefore think very carefully about when to trigger Article 50, and try to press the EU – especially the German government – for informal negotiations beforehand.

To prevent this, the EU and the German government have now stressed that while they accept that triggering Article 50 is a sovereign decision of the UK, they demand it do so at the latest by this autumn, and have declined to engage in any kind of informal negotiations beforehand. Expect both declarations to be tested severely, as a new UK government will try to press as hard as possible to engage in informal negotiations and postpone the activation of the exit clause until the best strategic moment.

Second, even after the exit clause is eventually triggered, a delicate balancing act looms for Germany. Politically, the UK-EU negotiations need to solve two problems. For one, both sides need to agree on the transition phase, resolving questions like the status of EU citizens in the UK and vice versa, payments into the EU budget, etc. More importantly strategically is the future relationship between the UK and the rest of the EU, including access to the single market and cooperation in foreign and security policy. Legally, however, the exit, in accordance with Article 50, covers only the first part; a separate agreement is needed defining the more general future relationship.

Berlin and Brussels have to make two further strategic choices here. The first is whether to negotiate the two agreements together – so that the UK and the EU enter the new arrangements on the day the UK formally exits the EU – or whether to separate them so that the exit agreement can be negotiated and put into place more quickly. This would mean that the UK would spend at least some time with the same status as any other WTO country, implying very severe economic consequences for it, and to a lesser extent for the rest of the EU. London will therefore press for a joint approach, while EU politicians, including current Trade Commissioner Margot Wallström, have already ruled out detailed negotiations on the future trade relationship with the UK before its exit is completed. Germany’s interest will be in the middle – the UK is its third largest export market, and thus the absence of a trade agreement would hit Germanyʼs export-oriented industries severely. However, separating the two agreements and taking a tough negotiating stance would emphasize the real costs of EU exit to others and help complete the exit negotiations within the two-year window in order to keep the EU together.

This balance of interests also concerns the second question: on what terms and conditions to cooperate with the UK in the future. With just short of fifty percent of UK exports still going to the EU, any future UK government will have a strong interest in keeping access to the single market. The heads of state and government of the EU-27, however, have already reiterated that full access to the single market is only possible with all four freedoms, including freedom of movement, upheld. Norway, for instance, accepts and implements all EU single market regulations and pays into the EU budget. The leading candidates to succeed David Cameron as prime minister, such as Theresa May, Michael Gove, and Andrea Leadsom, have all already promised to reject free movement as a condition for the single market. Here, the EU-27 need to agree and more importantly stick to a joint negotiation position despite their differing interests vis-à-vis Britain.

Third, the UK will remain an awkward partner in the EU for the foreseeable future. In the week immediately following the Brexit vote, the EU-27 heads of state and government met for the first time at the European Council. This will remain an informal format; until the exit is formally concluded, the UK will legally remain a part of the EU, with all its rights and duties, including its votes and vetoes in the Council of Ministers, the right to participate in formal Council meetings, and the right to appoint a commissioner as well as vote on members of the European Parliament.

Germany and the other member states will therefore need to compel the UK into a gentlemen’s agreement to avoid two risks. On the one hand, the UK could be tempted to use its veto powers in order to press its interests in the exit negotiations. While many policy areas for the EU now allow for qualified majority voting, a general policy of blockade could even further hamper the EU’s ability to act, especially in areas requiring unanimity such as decisions on sanctions against Russia or the long-term financial framework of the EU. On the other hand, the risk exists that due to the very long exit negotiations and the promises made by the Leave campaign to the British people, the UK government may willingly hold back on implementing – or even actively undermine – EU rules and regulations, most notably concerning the free movement of EU citizens.

Fourth, the Scottish question will further complicate negotiations for the British – but also for the Europeans. Although the Scottish voted in their independence referendum in 2014 in favor of staying within the United Kingdom, the EU referendum has significantly changed the debate – in contrast to the UK as a whole, the Scottish people voted by 62 percent in favor of remaining in the EU, and now fear being taken out of the European Union against their will. Equally significant, this outcome has underlined the main argument of the Scottish National Party (SNP), namely that in the UK the democratic choices of Scotland are regularly ignored and overruled by the English majority.

Scotland’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon (SNP) has therefore already declared that she will do everything in her power to ensure Scotland’s continued place in the European Union. In the short term, this will include direct talks with the EU and other member states to gauge sentiment on a solution wherein Scotland remains fully integrated in the EU while still a part of the UK. If that fails, the SNP has already announced that it will push for a second independence referendum.

For the UK, this means that, in addition to the negotiations with the EU, the new government will have to carefully negotiate to ensure the survival of the United Kingdom. A second independence referendum would require the consent of the UK parliament; but as tensions grow, the United Kingdom may be hard to sustain if Scotland does not at least get more autonomy to negotiate a special deal with the EU.

For the EU and its member states, though, this is also difficult for other reasons. On the one hand, Brussels will now be tempted to support Scottish interests to remain in the EU to underline the continued interest in the European project. On the other, the independence referendum is not only a matter for the internal politics of the UK – it touches upon regional secessionist movements in other EU countries, in particular Spain’s Catalonia.

Fifth, the overriding challenge will be to address the question of democratic legitimacy and EU reform. The British vote to leave the EU was not an isolated vote of no confidence. Quite the contrary: euroskeptic parties have been on the rise in almost all EU member states in recent years. Although not all of them necessary call for an end to the EU – some, like the True Finns in Finland and the Danish People’s Party, are merely against further integration – the arguments employed by the Leave campaign on migration, mistrust in political and economic elites, and national identity and sovereignty resonate in all of these parties. Unsurprisingly, in the hours and days after the Brexit vote, Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, and Norbert Hofer in Austria, among others, called for their own EU exit referendums in their respective countries. In the former two countries there are also national elections next year, while the Austrian presidential elections in which Hofer very narrowly lost have to be repeated, presumably later in 2016. In short, in core EU member states, political elites will have to explain why their countries should remain in the EU.

At the same time, deficits in the eurozone and the Schengen system remain problematic. In the more than seven years since the start of the eurozone debt crisis, the EU has not yet been able to repair the fundamental structural flaws within the economic and monetary union. Unsurprisingly, the Brexit vote has therefore been used by politicians across Europe to claim that their unique vision of EU reform has been made paramount – the German finance ministry calls for stricter budgetary control, the Greek prime minister for the end of austerity, the French and German foreign ministers for closer cooperation in security and defense, and the Polish and Hungarian prime ministers for a return to a more intergovernmental EU. In short, while almost all EU leaders agree on the need to reform the EU, interests and visions on the future direction are more divided than before the Brexit vote.

Sixth and last but not least, a UK exit puts the German question back on the table with renewed force. As the third largest member state with the second largest economy and distinct political interests, the UK was and is a major balancing factor in the power relations between EU member states. Just like in the eurozone, an EU without Britain foists greater responsibility on France and Germany.

However, as long as France remains in a politically and economically weakened position, Berlin will be called upon to provide leadership for the EU. Structurally, Germany is closer than France in economic and foreign policy to the UK, so most of London’s close partners in the EU will likely shift toward Berlin rather than Paris. The one exception to this is the area of foreign, security, and defense policy, where France is already carrying the greatest burden in the EU and has repeatedly called for greater German involvement. Here as well the German government will be called upon to do more to strengthen the EU after – and even during – a British exit. In both cases, the other member states will call for more German leadership and be wary of it at the same time.

With the UK vote to leave, it is clear that the debate on the future of the EU – including Britain’s place in it – has just started. Looking at the political and legal tasks ahead, the German government should indeed prepare for a process that takes years rather than months. Instead of pushing for a quick Brexit or calling for integration for the sake of showing that the EU still works, the imperative should now be to provide leadership with strategic patience. This patience will be crucial in bringing together all these different negotiations, political as well as legal, and keeping unity among the now-27 member states – a necessary, if Herculean task.

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While “Breversal” – a reversal of Britain’s June 23 referendum – is not impossible, the likeliest outcome is that the United Kingdom will exit the EU one way or other. What does this mean for Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw?

© Artwork: Katinka Reinke

The Servant Leader

A European Union without Britain demands a new kind of balancing act from Germany.

The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union has catapulted Germany to the next stage of its post-World War II existence: that of the neo-Bismarckian balancer. With the departure of Britain, the traditional outside balancer of continental affairs, much of the balancing within the EU will be left to the big country in the middle: balancing between northern and southern mentalities in economics; balancing between free traders and protectionists; balancing between East and West; and balancing between those who are tough on security and those who don’t feel threatened.

Germany is roughly in the middle on all of these issues, but balancing means more than just finding reasonable middle ground. It means building alliances and accommodating those whose worldview does not prevail in the compromises of the day. The balancing act Berlin will have to perform without the help of the open-market, free-trade, militarily robust, naturally globalist Anglo-Saxons will be a daunting task. It will be more than the country has had to face since it became fully sovereign in 1990 – or since the beginning of the European integration process, for that matter. What does this mean in concrete terms?

Over the next five to ten years, the EU will need at least three decisive reforms. First, and most crucially, it needs to create some sort of fiscal (read: political) union in the eurozone if the common currency is to survive. Secondly, as this will almost inevitably lead to two-speed (read: two-class) Europe, a politically acceptable and practically workable arrangement for an EU divided into euro countries and non-euro countries needs to be found. Thirdly, the EU, or at least the refurbished eurozone, will need to democratize so that citizens feel that they have a say in decision-making at the most integrated level. All of these are long-term reforms, but clear signals need to be sent soon. In addition, an urgent short-term issue looms large on the horizon: finding a workable compromise on refugees that includes improved EU border controls, a shared asylum system among Schengen countries, a system that allows unwilling countries to buy themselves out of their quota, and beefed-up relations with the countries of origin.

Unfortunately, Chancellor Angela Merkel has been wavering on the eurozone. Shortly before the British referendum she said it was “unavoidable” that the eurozone would develop into some sort of political union. Shortly after the Brexit vote she announced that it was not the right time to deepen the eurozone. While this is not exactly contradictory, it is confused messaging – the opposite of the finely tuned EU diplomacy that will now be in demand.

Just as important as action on the euro will be an urgently needed shift in German mentality. Germany will need to become the EU’s “servant leader”, creating acceptance for its outsize influence by visibly defending the common good of the EU, sacrificing some of its own immediate diplomatic gains if necessary. Germany needs to become Europe’s integrationist reserve power again, willing to compromise just a little earlier and pay just a little more than everyone else so that the whole thing can thrive.

Since the late Kohl era, and increasingly so under Chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Merkel herself, Germany had abandoned this position. This needs to be reversed. Naturally, there is no way back to the good old days. Being Europe’s reserve power today means something different from thirty years ago; it is far more demanding. But being the servant leader of Europe is a natural outflow of Germany’s size, geography, history – and own national interest. Bismarck would have understood.
– BY JAN TECHAU

Putting Down a Marker

France will push Britain for a quick exit, hoping to regain greater parity with Germany.

French President François Hollande’s reaction to the news that the British had opted for Brexit was swift: Immediately after the official result was known, Hollande declared that now was the time to act – and act fast. The view from Paris is clear: A quick departure from the European Union is meant to create a warning – pour encourager les autres, as they say in England.

This message is addressed not only to EU member states eyeing an exit themselves or those mulling the idea of threating to leave in order to secure preferential treatment. It is also – and in particular – aimed at Hollande’s domestic audience: there will be presidential elections in France in less than ten months. The election campaign will start right after the summer break, and the Socialist, who is likely to run for a second term, knows how dangerous “Europe” can become as a topic. His Socialist Party (PS) is deeply divided on the issue, still reeling from the trauma of the lost referendum of 2005. In the run-up to that vote, the French political parties tore into each other and themselves; the PS has since been unable to agree on a European line. Hollande will do everything to keep this Pandora’s box tightly shut this time.

One way or another, however, European policy will pop up in the election campaign – directly and through issues like the economy, security, counter-terrorism, identity, and migration. And Brexit will hang over all the debates. Politicians from the right are already demanding a referendum on the future of the EU, among them former President Nicolas Sarkozy, who wants to rebuild the European project and hold a EU-wide referendum to validate this.

Then there are radical parties of the left and right which denounce the “German Europe” of today and demand and “end to austerity.” The leader of the Front National (FN), Marine Le Pen, is wellplaced to enter the final round of elections and has been dreaming of a referendum along the lines of the UK vote. According to several polls, about a third of the French – and three quarters of FN voters – agree with her. Those numbers are too low to lead to “Frexit”, but they are also too high to be ignored. This will likely mean that criticism of the EU will grow, even among politicians in “mainstream” parties.

To win over some of the malcontents, Hollande is trying to use Brexit to put the EU on a different course. His promise of “a different Europe,” on which he campaigned in 2012, was left unrealized. Now he senses another chance – and he is already demanding closer cooperation in security and defense policy, and, as in 2012, increased investment to promote growth and job creation, along with a harmonization of Europe’s fiscal policy regime. This is not least to strengthen France’s role in Europe – and regain greater parity in the German-French tandem power relationship. And Berlin might not mind: Brexit has weakened the traditional “motor” of European integration, removing London as an impetus for greater German-French cooperation. With London out, it is hard to see how the Franco-German axis could facilitate a change of course for the EU without at least some realignment given the differences in their interests and priorities. – BY CLAIRE DEMESMAY

Loss of an Ally

Poland sees its position strengthened in that the European Union needs “adaptation”.

With the United Kingdom gone, Poland and its Law and Justice (PiS) government will lose its favorite ally within the EU. After all, the UK is a country that shares the PiS’ opposition toward further integration, wants to defend its national sovereignty, and rejects the EU common currency.

When the UK leaves, Poland will become the largest country of the non-euro bloc in the EU – though the entire bloc combined will make up just 14 percent of the EU’s economic output, something that will further weaken Warsaw’s bargaining position when it comes to relations between eurozone outs and ins.

But as far as Warsaw is concerned, the most immediate issue to be addressed in the upcoming exit negotiations with the UK will be the status of around 700,000 Polish citizens living and working in the UK. According to current regulations, around half of them would lose their right to stay in the UK once Brexit becomes a reality. Large numbers of Polish migrants returning to Poland would aggravate the domestic labor market and become a source of social and political tension. When the referendum results were announced, Polish officials maintained that securing the rights of these Polish citizens would be the Polish governmentʼs most important goal.

Given the political capital and emotion that have been invested into the Polish-British relationship in recent months, Poland will belong to the group of countries striving for a compromise-oriented approach to the exit negotiations as it seeks to “restore an as-close-as-possible relationship” with the UK, as the government put it. It remains unclear whether this indicates an openness towards a “special deal” with the UK (outside of the obvious options of EEA or WTO membership, or an European Free Trade Association), but Warsaw would be unlikely to make the UK’s Brexit wounds any more painful than necessary and would seek to be flexible in the negotiations on all issues but migration.

Most importantly, however, Brexit serves as a confirmation of the Polish government’s assessment of the EU as a project in need of a substantial “adaptation”. Speaking after the referendum, Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, stressed the necessity of a “reform of the EU, which would be also an offer for the UK.”

Such a reform – based on treaty change – should include, according to Kaczyński, a clarification of EU competencies, a strengthening of the subsidiarity principle, and the “widening of unanimity voting.” After the results were announced, Polish President Andrzej Duda wondered aloud whether “the EU does not impose too much on the member states.” In other words: the vote for Brexit is seen as one against the idea of a federalist Europe and an “ever closer union,” rather than an outcome brought about by domestic developments in the UK. This narrative reinforces the Polish government’s approach to the EU.

In the past weeks and months, Warsaw promoted its reform ideas on the back of David Cameron’s February 2016 “deal” – Deputy Foreign Minister Konrad Szymański, in charge of European affairs, called it a “pilot project” that might push the EU “in the right direction and to the right issues.” Cameron’s deal is no longer valid, but its philosophy corresponds with mainstream thinking in Warsaw. In Warsaw’s opinion, a new political contract for Europe would be based on the ideas of flexibility, differentiation, and equal treatment of all EU member states, regardless of their individual levels of integration. Each EU member state should be allowed to define its own integration path – it would be a “multipolar union,” as opposed to a Kerneuropa or European federation.

It remains to be seen how much energy and political capital Warsaw will be ready to invest into translating these ideas into a political initiative. But however much Brexit poses a strategic challenge for the Polish government, it may also create momentum for the Europe á la carte favored today by Warsaw. – BY PIOTR BURAS

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© picture alliance/empics/PA Wire/Chris Ison

Foreign policy received little play in the run-up to the Brexit vote. The final televised pre-referendum debate between three leading representatives from the Remain and Leave campaigns was supposed to discuss “Britain’s place in the world” as one of three main topics. Yet this was barely touched upon. There was no substantive discussion on the EU as a potential force for influence and power projection, whether in the face of the challenge from Russia, the tragedy of Syria, the arrival of China as a key strategic actor, or even the importance of pan-European cooperation on issues of cybersecurity and counter-terrorism. When foreign policy did manage to creep into the debate, it was mostly to discuss the fantastical – the establishment of a European Army or a forthcoming Turkish accession to the EU.

But given that the issues surrounding the constitutional, political, and economic makeup of the United Kingdom will likely take several years to play out, the one area where Britain will be able to “keep calm and carry on” in the short- to medium-term will be on issues of foreign and security policy.

While some Leave campaign supporters might see the world otherwise, the intellectual architects of Brexit who are likely to dominate in the next government, are open, outward-looking, liberal free-traders, who will seek a common cause with their European and transatlantic partners in the protection of a stable, liberal, international world order. Indeed, in his first article published following the Brexit decision, Boris Johnson, the leading face of the Leave campaign who then withdrew his bid to become the next prime minister, reminded readers, “I cannot stress too much that Britain is part of Europe and always will be.”

To put it another way, and in the Latin language of which Johnson is famously so fond of, “Omnia mutantur, nihil interit” – “Everything changes, nothing perishes” (Ovid, Metamorphoses).

The UK in Europe

So what does this mean in practice for a post-Brexit UK foreign and security policy? Starting with France and what The Economist once labeled the UK’s “impossible, indispensable relationship,” the British government is likely to re-emphasize its commitments to Anglo-French defense cooperation under the 2010 Lancaster House treaties, although it will have to recognize the inevitable imperative for France to increase its defense cooperation with Germany in particular.

The UK is also likely to push itself, once more, to find concrete opportunities for cooperation with a Germany whose influence has long been growing inside the EU and whose appetite for engagement in issues of defense and security policy appears to be increasing steadily. Meanwhile, defense industrial cooperation and the cross-border complexities of supply chains will continue to help bind the UK to its partners on the continent. For example, while the wings of most Airbus aircraft are designed and produced in Wales, the British, French, and German governments will have common cause in ensuring that work on Airbus’s order backlog of €1 trillion continues uninterrupted and its 136,000-strong workforce protected. The same logic applies to the partnerships that have been developed around the multinational venture that is Eurofighter and the search for fresh export sales of its Typhoon.

While the UK will continue to view NATO as the bedrock of European security, it will also likely look to underline the importance of working with its European partners through continued, albeit re-fashioned, engagement in the EU’s Common and Security Policy. After all, the list of non-EU partner countries on CSDP missions includes not just aspirant member states but many others who are clearly not, from Norway to Canada to South Korea. However, with Brexit completed the UK will no longer sit on the EU Council of Ministers, but will rather be allowed access only to the “decision-shaping” Committee of Contributors. There are then, perhaps, some issues with the existing parameters for participation against which the UK might feel obliged to push back in return for the added credibility and operational utility it would perceive its participation as contributing. Yet even as it makes these proactive and positive approaches, the UK will continue to fret about the perils of any duplication of NATO efforts and worry (too late) about its lack of a voice to influence future developments.

The UK in NATO

Paris has been developing a more activist foreign policy toward the crises of the day recently, while London’s engagement on these issues has often been less than impressive. However, British enthusiasm for NATO is likely to remain ingrained in the thinking of any post-Brexit UK. Indeed, the political pressures for the UK to protect and project continued strategic relevance are likely to be such that, even allowing for the economic pressures expected to result from Brexit, the UK should signal its continued serious intent by maintaining defense spending at two percent of its GDP.

The UK can be expected to make much of its service as the lead nation in the alliance’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force next year. More immediately, it appears set to take a key role within NATO’s new Enhanced Forward Presence, if, as appears likely, the UK is announced at the forthcoming NATO summit in Warsaw as the lead nation of one of the four battalions set to be deployed on NATO’s eastern frontline. The ongoing work to try once again to find ways to promote greater cooperation between the EU and NATO now becomes of even more fundamental importance. Meanwhile, though, the tone of the summit will inevitably need to be adjusted in the wake of Brexit, with more emphasis given to unity within NATO than would previously have been necessary.

The World Beyond

A UK untethered from the EU will still remain supportive of EU efforts to manage troublemakers in their shared neighborhoods. For example, the UK has consistently argued in favor of a rollover of Russian sanctions while Russia’s obligations under the Minsk II agreement remain unfulfilled. If compromises are to be made in the future on this or other questions pertaining to support for a rules-based international order, it is unlikely that the momentum for this will come from the UK, whether it is in or out of the EU.

Indeed, if Vladimir Putin is rubbing his hands with glee at Brexit, as many commentators are imagining, then it is more to do with the potential consequences of Brexit for the EU’s positioning on this issue than it is to do with the UK’s. Similarly, an “E3” (rather than “EU3”) that ultimately proved to have significant impact in its negotiations with Iran does not necessarily have to depend on British EU membership when it comes to the management of future challenges.

Moving further, it would be reasonable to expect the UK to pay even more attention in the coming years to its relationships in Asia. Despite some criticism from its European and transatlantic partners, the UK has been investing heavily in a significant commercial partnership with China. To UK thinking, this is supposedly balanced by an increasingly substantive defense partnership with Japan that includes cooperation on equipment design, such as the Joint New Air-to-Air Missile (JNAAM), as well as negotiations on reciprocal access. Since 2014, a UK liaison officer has been colocated with the US Seventh Fleet to work closely with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, helping to propel some of the cooperation now unfolding, including the likely deployment of Typhoon fighter jets to exercise with Japan later this year. As UK Defense Secretary Michael Fallon noted at this year’s IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, by the 2020s the UK is set to have two aircraft carriers ready to sail the seas of the Asia-Pacific region. Brexit will change the financing and even the timings, but it is unlikely to change the ambition and could conceivably even bolster it.

Although all European member states arguably are guilty, to greater or lesser degrees, of having an Asia policy that has often amounted to little more than a China policy, the UK’s so-called “all of Asia policy” has progressed further than many. This already includes renewed interest in the Five Powers Defense Arrangement that the UK enjoys with Commonwealth members Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore, and the placement of ambassadors or high commissioners in all ten ASEAN capitals as well as to ASEAN itself. It also covers relationships developed through the “2+2” mechanism with Japan that combines foreign and defense Ministers, as well as the corresponding mechanism with Australia known as AUKMIN. In as much as the political bandwidth of a government preoccupied by Brexit talks allows, all of this is likely to rise up the UK’s strategic agenda in the years ahead.

One criticism of the EU made by the Leave campaign focused on the EU’s ineptitude in concluding free trade agreements. There is likely therefore to be considerable economic and strategic interest, once Brexit takes effect, in the relatively speedy negotiation of free trade agreements with countries such as South Korea and Singapore – and more tricky, but of course of tremendous potential significance – some sort of deal with India and even China. While some reasonably note that the terms for the UK may not be so favorable as those achievable as part of a market of 500 million, Brexiteers will be quick to point out that the chances of actually reaching any such deals have increased considerably, with responsibility for any failures here reverting back into sovereign hands.

A Weakened Home Environment

There should be no hiding from the scale of the difficulties and dangers that lie ahead. It is well established that all successful foreign policies begin at home, yet the home environment for the UK in the coming years will be dangerously distracted as well as worryingly weakened.

Nevertheless, through these turbulent times, the UK will seek to remind its partners in Europe and elsewhere of all of the available avenues through which it can continue to engage in the promotion of shared liberal values. These include not just its permanent seat on the UN Security Council but also, for example, its membership in the G7, now liberated from the limitations of Russian membership. Ultimately the choice for the new UK government will not be whether to partner closely with Europe, including the EU, but how.

More than fifty years have passed since Dean Acheson, then already a former US secretary of state, suggested that “Britain has lost an empire and not yet found a role.” With its vote for Brexit, it appears that the search continues. Yet, the price for this search is paid not just by the UK. Indeed, the strategic consequences of Brexit are arguably less severe for the UK than they are for the EU.

Europe now has to grapple with the challenge of keeping its unprecedented union together, whilst working out what sort of union it wants to deliver and its peoples to see. Simultaneously, Europe should aspire to find ways to harness the UK as a productive, close partner in support of the common values and interests which the EU and the UK will undoubtedly continue to share, with the intention that the whole remains greater than the sum of its parts, even when those parts reside outside of the union. This will be demanding but doable. The pitfalls ahead will be plentiful though, and all parties will need to tread carefully in the emotions and frustrations of the weeks, months, and likely years ahead.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2016 issue.

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In the wake of Brexit, all eyes are on the President of 
the European Council. There is speculation that 
he – rather than European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker – will be the one to lead negotiations 
in Britain’s “divorce” with the EU. He would be a 
trusted ally for German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose weariness of hasty steps toward further European integration he shares.

© Artwork: Dominik Herrmann

Known for his pragmatism, Donald Tusk nevertheless responded to the result of the British referendum with emotion. “The day after Brexit, I felt as if someone very close to me had left our home, and in the same second I felt also how dear and precious this home was to me,” the president of the European Council, the group of the EU’s heads of state or government, told reporters in Brussels, pointing out that the decision involved feelings – not just procedures. His language echoes the idea of Poland’s EU membership as a “return to Europe,” or homecoming from behind the Iron Curtain.

Still, in the run-up to the referendum, Tusk’s view was more sober than that of others in Brussels. Speaking almost a month before the vote, he criticized EU leaders for their “utopian” illusions of a united Europe. “Obsessed with the idea of instant and total integration, we failed to notice that ordinary people, the citizens of Europe, do not share our euro-enthusiasm,” he said.

Tusk’s pro-European pragmatism has its roots in his career in Polish politics, which reaches back to the fall of communism in 1989 and beyond. He was born in Gdansk, on Poland’s Baltic coast, in 1957. While studying history at the university there, he become involved in the Solidarity movement. After a decade of political activity in the 1990s, he co-founded the center-right, pro-European Civic Platform (PO) party in 2001. In 2007 PO won the parliamentary elections, forming a coalition with the agrarian People’s Party (PSL) that would govern for eight years. This win marked the start of a string of electoral victories for PO, brought to an end by the election of Andrzej Duda of the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS) as president in May 2015.

“Warm Water in the Tap”

As prime minister from 2007 to 2014, Tusk became known for his practical approach to governing, embodied in what he called the policy of “warm water in the tap.” This involved focusing on gradually raising living standards for Poles, with the help of EU funds, rather than pursuing grand ideological projects. After two years of unpredictable rule by PiS in 2005-07, Tusk’s party offered the promise of stability. In foreign policy, this involved pursuing a more pragmatic, less confrontational policy towards Berlin and Moscow, led by Radosław Sikorski, Tusk’s foreign minister.

The appeal of “warm water in the tap” had its limits, though. The PO-led coalition was re-elected in 2011, with Tusk staying on as prime minister. Yet as the years went by, critics accused PO of increasingly scaring voters with the prospect of PiS’s return, rather than attracting them on its own merits. PO’s vagueness, originally an asset, came to be seen by observers as more of a weakness. Its ratings slid, and in October 2015 the party, led by Tusk’s successor Ewa Kopacz, was ousted by PiS, which won enough seats to become the first party in Poland since 1989 to govern alone.

By then, Tusk was in Brussels, where he moved in late 2014 to take up his current job as president of the European Council, tasked with forging consensus between the leaders of the 28 member states. The second person to hold the job, he succeeded former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy. The race narrowed down to Tusk and Helle Thorning-Schmidt, the center-left prime minister of Denmark at the time. Though Thorning-Schmidt was viewed favorably by both British Prime Minister David Cameron and Angela Merkel, the German chancellor ended up voicing her support for Tusk, with whom she had developed a good relationship during his years as prime minister.

Steep Learning Curve

In Brussels, Tusk was something of a novelty: an outsider from beyond the EU bubble, from a country that had joined the EU in 2004 and was not a member of the eurozone. It was a steep learning curve, with his first year on the job dominated by crises, in particular Greek debt and migration. Amid these challenges, Tusk has shown himself to be a pro-European realist. This can be seen in a speech he gave at the Bruegel think tank in Brussels a year ago, when he said that “we should defend Europe here and now, the Europe that exists in reality, and not as an ideal appearing in the dreams and visions of ultra-European ideologists.” European leaders should improve the system that exists, rather than fall back on “revolutionary thinking and sudden system changes,” he explained.

This year Tusk has also faced the dispute between Poland and the European Commission, which in January launched a formal review into whether PiS’s changes to the Constitutional Tribunal violate the rule of law. Tusk has kept his distance, warning early on that a heavy-handed response by Brussels could further damage relations with Poland’s right-wing government. Meanwhile, Warsaw is speculating about Tusk’s political future, namely whether PiS will back Tusk for a second term starting in mid-2017. The dilemma boils down to whether it is better for PiS to sabotage Tusk’s career in Brussels or have him conveniently out of Poland until after the next parliamentary elections, due in October 2019. A second term would still give him time to run for president of Poland in 2020 – as some in his old party, PO, hope he will.

For PiS, Brexit has been the latest opportunity to lash out against Tusk, whom its leadership also blames for the Smolensk plane crash in 2010, which killed then-president Lech Kaczyński and 95 others. The party’s leader Jarosław Kaczyński (Lech’s twin brother) has said that Tusk is “directly responsible” for the result and ought to “disappear from European politics.” While Kaczyński affirmed that Poland’s place is in the EU, he added that the referendum shows the need for deep reform of the EU, perhaps including a new treaty.

Looking Ahead to Brexit

The result of the British referendum is a regrettable setback for Tusk – for whom keeping Britain in the EU was a priority when taking over as president of the European Council. Yet his reaction has been marked by humility and a willingness to learn. For the EU, this should be an occasion to reflect on its future, he has said. Meanwhile, he has not adopted the abrasive approach of some European leaders, aware that – like in the conflict between the Polish government and Brussels – that could be counterproductive. In this way, his approach is closer to Merkel’s, who warned that the EU should not rush to conclusions from the British referendum that could deepen divisions.

Choppy waters are ahead. It is still unclear when Britain will invoke Article 50 to leave the EU. In the intervening months, Tusk will continue to play the role of crisis manager, dealing with both London and the 27 other member states. In the face of these daunting challenges, he has put on a stoic face. “I always remember what my father used to tell me: what doesn’t kill you, makes you stronger,” he said as the results came in on the morning of June 24. And in these times of unprecedented uncertainty for the EU, Tusk’s old policy of “warm water in the tap” may yet hold considerable appeal.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2016 issue.

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Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier caused consternation 
when he criticized a NATO exercise long in the making. His party, the SPD, seems to be testing out whether foreign policy could be an election winner.

© REUTERS/Wolfgang Rattay

German Chancellor Angela Merkel is used to surprises. But on the weekend before the Brexit vote, she read a headline that even she did not see coming: her foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, complained in a newspaper interview about NATO’s “saber-rattling” and “war cries” on Russia’s border.

The word choice might not have been out of place in a Kremlin press release. But this was Merkel’s top diplomat criticizing a set of long-planned, multilateral military exercises in Poland and the Baltics in which Germany played a leading role. In Berlin, the corridors of power erupted in chatter over Steinmeier’s unexpected remarks just three weeks before a crucial NATO summit.

Colleagues from Steinmeier’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) sprang to his defense, repeating peace mantras from the days of party legend Willy Brandt, who as West German chancellor pushed detente with the Soviet Union through his Ostpolitik. Words of support echoed from the opposition Greens and Left Party. To top things off, news trickled out that Sigmar Gabriel, who wears the hats of vice chancellor, economy minister, and SPD chief, was planning his second trip to see Russian President Vladimir Putin in less than a year.

Merkel, a Christian Democrat (CDU), and Steinmeier, have a curious division of labor in their coalition government: the chancellor sets foreign policy while her foreign minister busies himself with daily diplomacy. Merkel, not Steinmeier, owns the Minsk peace process in eastern Ukraine, and she was the mastermind behind a controversial deal with Turkey on sending back boat people washing up onto Greece’s shores. Steinmeier seems more interested in analyzing how his own ministry works than making bold initiatives.

That is what made Steinmeier’s criticism of NATO so unusual — and indicated that it had more to do with party politicking than a new direction in German foreign policy. The CDU’s junior partner in the second “grand coalition” since 2005, Social Democrats have struggled to be seen as anything more than Merkel’s little helpers. Voters punished the SPD in recent regional elections, and Germany’s storied workersʼ party is now hovering just above the twenty percent-mark in national polls.

Looming Elections

With the next general elections due in September 2017, the most likely way the SPD could break out of the CDU’s embrace is by heading a “red-red-green” coalition with the Left Party and Greens. Cue the SPD’s most popular politician to use Cold War language the party faithful will recognize. According to a recent poll, 58 percent of Germans think Steinmeier would make a good SPD candidate for chancellor next year, while only 31 percent believe the same about party chief Gabriel.

On the surface, Steinmeier’s jab at NATO looks like the handiwork of Gabriel, who is under increasing pressure within the party to start working miracles. But on closer examination, the renewed calls for rapprochement with the Kremlin two years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine bear the fingerprints of former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who still pulls considerable weight inside the SPD. Steinmeier started his political career as an aide to Schröder, then premier of Lower Saxony, and followed him into the Federal Chancellery as chief of staff. Gabriel filled the premier’s seat in Lower Saxony before moving into national politics.

Schröder has largely vanished from public life after reaping scorn for his undying friendship with Putin and his job at Nord Stream, a Russian pipeline project he had advocated as chancellor. But on the same weekend that German tabloid Bild printed Steinmeier’s “saber-rattling” comments, the Munich daily Süddeutsche Zeitung ran a rare interview with Schröder. Seventy-five years after the Nazis’ attack on the Soviet Union, Schröder said, it was a mistake to station additional NATO troops in Eastern Europe. “We Germans have a special responsibility toward Russia,” he said. Willy Brandt’s success in bringing redemption to Germany via Ostpolitik shouldn’t be “gambled away.”

Schröder’s comments are not really surprising; they reflect SPD orthodoxy since 1989. Germany’s Social Democrats have largely attributed the fall of the Berlin Wall to Ostpolitik, which established the economic ties that made the later political transformation of the Soviet bloc possible. Brandt’s contribution was undeniably outsized. But the fact that today’s SPD can only recycle a forty-year-old policy in response to the new challenges posed by Putin’s Russia shows that the party leadership is stuck in the past.

Willful Misreading

Brandt’s legacy is preventing his political heirs from thinking big and new. In a speech delivered in late June, Steinmeier lauded Germany’s ability to understand other nations and questioned why the term Russland-Versteher — someone who understands Russia — had become an insult. It is hard to say whether the foreign minister was being disingenuous or naive. Schröder’s defense of the Kremlin does not stem from any profound knowledge of Russia as much as a willful misreading of the nasty nature of Putin’s regime.

In the speech, Steinmeier called Germany an “honest broker,” basking in a Swiss-style neutrality that was appropriate in the decades after World War II. Russia and Syria have become so difficult to deal with not because other Western powers are unwilling to sit down and talk, but because Moscow and Damascus make no bones about putting military solutions before political ones.

In an article in Foreign Affairs, Steinmeier had the opportunity to tell the world what to expect from Berlin after spending more than a year on an internal review of German foreign policy. Instead, he soberly described the sad state of the world and explained why Germany sees itself as a “reflective power” focused on “restraint, deliberation, and peaceful negotiation.” There’s nothing wrong with Steinmeier’s analysis, it’s just that a German foreign minister should be proposing a plan of action – or, at the very least, a list of priorities.

“Germans do not believe that talking at roundtables solves every problem, but neither do they think that shooting does,” Steinmeier wrote. This kind of binary worldview inevitably forces him to choose “dialogue.” Even more wishy-washy was his conclusion: “Germany will be a responsible, restrained, and reflective leader, guided in chief by its European instincts.”

Steinmeier is wrong: Germany should be guided by human beings of sound mind. The Brexit vote showed that instincts are an unreliable guide, and that the commitment to European ideals is a conscious decision grounded in history and rationality.

Lessons of Brexit

Ironically, Brexit will also make Berlin even more important in determining Europe’s direction as London’s influence evaporates. At the same time, Germany needs the EU more than ever, because without the clout of the 27-member union, it becomes just another middling power.

On Brexit, as on Russia, Steinmeier went his own way without consulting Merkel. The day after the referendum, he invited his colleagues from the five other founding EU member states to Berlin — in line with Schröder’s concept of a “two-speed” Europe. Ignoring the SPD’s calls for a swift British departure from the EU to prevent the Brexit contagion from spreading to other countries, Merkel voiced support for a measured response so as not to hurt one of Germany’s most important trading partners.

The SPD could well take a lesson from British politicians, who by trying to play domestic politics on the back of foreign policy turned a storm in a teacup into an international crisis.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2016 issue.

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Brexit aside, Europe faces crises to the south and east, with instability threatening to spill over into all EU member states. Addressing these trouble spots will require long-term planning and sustained commitment.

© REUTERS/Edmund Blair

Stabilizing the southern neighborhood is imperative for the EU. The Arab Spring, a regional power vacuum, and international intervention – particularly in Iraq and Libya – have all contributed to the emergence of a ring of instability, a zone of failed states reaching from Libya to Iraq and from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. Now this instability is fueling crises within Europe: the arrival of massive waves of refugees, the horrors of domestic terrorism, and growing radicalization within Europe’s population are all putting Europe’s unity and ability to shape its environment to the test.

What can we do about it? Long-term, durable solutions can only be found if we address the problems at their roots and build local capacities that are sustainable. This requires us first and foremost to tackle the region’s key security and economic problems comprehensively. Here there are no easy fixes: progress will require clarity of purpose, the concentration of resources, and, clearly, time. And any steps taken must be taken with full political buy-in from the regional states; we cannot simply impose change.

First, we have to revisit our approach to economic development. Last year the EU spent €80 billion on development assistance. For that assistance to be truly effective, it is essential to continue monitoring how it is spent, making sure it is used in a way that builds sustainable local capacities in critical areas, reinforces governance, creates knowledge and jobs, and helps align our development objectives more closely with our security needs, including those related to migration control.

Second, we need to concentrate more on how to make countries and their societies more resilient to threats posed by terrorist groups and radical ideologies. The EU is unlikely to wage war against the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria or Iraq itself; it is not the right instrument for that. But it has a wide toolbox to help contain the spread of the plague that ISIS represents by stabilizing the adjoining neighborhood and helping countries like Lebanon and Jordan become more resilient. And when territory is liberated from ISIS in countries like Iraq, we need to provide assistance and help build local capacities so that the local population can take care of its own security and improve its own economic situation. Instability and bad governance create fertile ground for radical groups and terrorism.

Third, we need to support regional initiatives aimed at addressing key security concerns. This is what we are trying to do, for instance, in the Sahel. The Sahel-G5 countries’ initiative, which creates a framework for Mauritius, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad to start working together more on common threats – including terrorism, radicalization, and organized crime – is something we need to support.

And fourth, we have to make sure that we are using all the tools available within the EU toolbox, which among other things include development assistance, humanitarian assistance, trade, and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The EU’s unique strength lies in what we call the “comprehensive approach” – a great concept, but one yet to be fully implemented. Working collaboratively to minimize the presence of “silos” and remove the walls that separate these instruments requires a true change of mindset, which, as experience shows, is no easy task.

Security and Development

A concrete case in point is the nexus between security and development. It is a bond that everybody agrees exists: a state cannot function properly if it cannot provide security to its citizens. A lack of core capacities in defense may also put our investments in other sectors in jeopardy, including education, health care, and infrastructure, as the state itself may collapse. Despite this obvious link, defense capacity-building projects are currently not eligible to receive support from the European budget – even if they are limited in scope to civilian or dual-use equipment, such as boots, tents, radios, and generators. Keeping our security and development goals entirely independent of one another as if they belonged to completely different universes is hardly sustainable and does not help us achieve our overall objectives. To implement the nexus between security and development and to make real headway in what the German government used to call “enable and enhance” requires a change not merely on the European level, but on the national level as well.

There are a number of things still to be thought through. If we do not want to put boots on the ground to combat ISIS, we have to work through partners in the region. But how can this be done effectively? Or take migration and the need to work with countries of origin and transit: For them, stemming migration flows is not a priority – but it is for us. How can we convince the governments concerned to tackle this problem?

An example of the first dilemma is Jordan, which is willing to play a bigger role in the war against ISIS but has quite serious problems of its own – sheltering 1.8 million refugees, servicing a considerable foreign debt, and so on. One way the EU could help is through infrastructural investments and debt relief to enable the Jordanian government to redirect its resources to mobilize moderate groups and step up its efforts to fight ISIS more aggressively – which would serve both regional and EU interests.

This will require substantial funds (though it is worth mentioning that the Valletta Fund, the EU’s emergency trust fund to tackle the root causes of irregular migration in Africa set up last November, is worth €1.8 billion by itself), yet we lack the capacity to spend that money in a way that really changes the reality on the ground. That feeds into a general problem of European politics: How can we move away from our reactive mindset, which is geared more toward putting out fires after they have started rather than getting rid of kindling beforehand? How can we plan ahead more, and thus shape the environment proactively before crises develop?

As for migration, let us take the example of Niger, a major transit country for migrants making their way to Europe. We know that migrants are coming in large numbers from western Sahara and that there is a major trafficking group at work. Human smuggling generated a revenue of €4 billion last year. Why would Niger be willing to tighten controls on migrants crossing its territory and heading north when the migrant stream has become part of the nation’s business model? And why would the authorities stop the flow, which would entail keeping more migrants in the country instead of simply letting them pass through as quickly as possible? The question is how to change the business model, how to come up with offers that are more attractive – and at the same time ensure tighter control of the flow.

First, we need to listen to what the needs of the countries in question are, then put together packages that include both robust incentives in areas that are important for them and measures that are important for us. Such packages, with clear conditions for support, would have a better chance of producing the desired effects.

Broad Strategies

We need broad regional strategies, coupled with country-specific implementation. If we treat the region as a monolith, we will not arrive at the right solutions; implementation should always be tailored to the specifics of each country. But it is just as important to have strategies that take into account the larger regional context – the Middle East and North Africa cannot be understood without taking into account the complex network of interests, various proxy wars, and the roles played by key regional leaders, like Iran and Saudi Arabia. Unless we look at the wider region and understand its dynamics, we cannot get the answers right.

Diagnosis is one step, and treatment is another. A core question is: How can the EU help establish better governance at the local level? The EU is probably best placed among international actors to build democratically accountable institutions and ensure that there are proper mechanisms in place linking these institutions with the wider public – this is, after all, the EU’s bread and butter.

Of course, this is easier said than done. Take Somalia, which splintered into entities that have acted more or less autonomously. There is a federal structure and a federal government that the international community supports, but it lacks real power. So the big question is: How do we help build proper government structures that will function at the local level and cooperate at the federal level? How do we incentivize the traditional Somali clan structures and clan-based militias to work toward empowering federal structures? How do we ensure that the development of the Somali National Army and Police reinforces multi-clan arrangements and not a clan-based separation? The key is to understand what the local capacities and needs are and provide assistance in a way that builds on local ownership, promotes the strengthening of federal structures, and takes into account a multitude of other bilateral and multilateral support programs. This presents a daunting challenge.

However, we should avoid raising the bar too high when we discuss governance. Any improvement will be incremental, requiring patience and the acceptance that deeply rooted traditions may not change overnight. This does not mean abandoning European values, but it does mean calibrating our expectations.

We need patience, a resource in short supply after so many missed opportunities. During the Arab Spring, many thought that democratic change would unfold quickly across the entire region, comparing it to the wave of revolutions that swept across Eastern Europe. Today, the picture is different. However, though our high hopes have not been fulfilled, we should not turn away – we simply need to adjust our strategies.

And we should not forget: We in Europe have also committed mistakes in the south, from which we should learn. Iraq and Libya are cases in point. There are and there will be situations when, after all other options having been exhausted, the use of military force against hostile regimes becomes inevitable. But if we go down that road, we must stay the course, investing in rebuilding societies and states that can properly function afterwards. It is not enough to use force to remove a regime that we find threatening and then turn around and leave without giving much thought to what is left behind. It is not enough to achieve military victory, disband local security forces – and only then consider the repercussions of failing states, large ungoverned spaces, and the emergence of radical, armed groups. The brunt of the job comes after the military intervention.

Long-Term Commitment

Engagement in security and defense almost always requires long-term commitment. Take the example of the security sector reform the EU is increasingly engaged in, both on the civilian and the military side. Such reforms cannot be completed within two or three years. Once we make a decision to commit, we cannot simply turn away; we must stay and ensure that the reforms indeed get implemented. The often-heard argument that, despite advice given and heavy investment made, actual implementation does not follow and there is no proper local ownership in the process is simply not convincing. Local ownership is something that in most places we have to work for and not take as a given. Ukraine is one example.

There is a great deal of talk of the EU being under heavy pressure today, with some speaking of an existential crisis for the union itself. I prefer to look at the current situation optimistically: this pressure may also be seen as an opportunity, an opportunity to lean in and, after a great deal of hesitation, finally commit to doing the right thing, as in so many other instances in the history of the European integration process. If we wait much longer, we may soon be overwhelmed with our present and future problems. We need clear leadership in Europe, and the countries that have acted as the engines of European integration have a special responsibility to take the European process forward.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2016 issue.

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The Islamic Ennahda party has 69 members in Tunisia’s 217 seat parliament, among them SAYIDA OUNISSI and NAFOUEL EJAMMALI. After spending decades underground, their party helped contribute to the democratic transition.

© REUTERS/Zoubeir Souissi

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European migration policy has been roundly criticized lately 
for being too illiberal. While this is unfair, there is room for improve-
ment in the EUʼs dealing with refugees and migrants.

© picture alliance/empics/Steve Parsons

This March, the EU agreed to a deal with Turkey under which Ankara takes back refugees from the Greek islands and better regulates their onward movement to Europe. Commentators wrote it off as pointless, saying Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans would simply be pushed to a far more dangerous path to the EU via Libya. There has indeed been a rise in the numbers coming through Libya, but the reality is more complex. Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans are just a trace element there, while the biggest numbers come from across Africa.

The sheer range of nationalities passing though Libya is just the latest sign that something systemic is wrong in the world. Only half of all asylum seekers to the EU last year came from Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan. Nigeria was the number one source country for Italy; Sudan for France; Eritrea for the UK; and Russia for Poland. One analyst counted more than a hundred nationalities registered in Lesbos last year.

This exodus constitutes a souring of globalization and poses a challenge to the liberal Western order. In 1991, when barriers and buffers collapsed, mass migration threatened to overwhelm fragile state-building processes from Eastern Europe to Africa. Western states took a gamble, using trade and capital flows to give people reasons to stay home. This promise of equitable global development has now seemingly run its course.

The West’s attempt to create a massive crossborder economy was always going to be hard to combine with national state-building. Many liberals were naive to believe that international trade and investment would automatically spread democracy and its institutions. With their plans now in tatters, it is time for a rethink on European migration policy.

The Need to Intervene

In the refugee debate, Europe’s voters and politicians are putting their fears before reason. In the case of liberals, they see all border measures as unjust and EU overseas interventions as “burden-shifting.” Europe as “the lone beacon of liberalism” is just the other side of the coin of “Fortress Europe.” Both ideas reflect pessimism about the EU’s ability to positively influence the chaos beyond its borders.

What drives liberals to test the EU’s moral credentials by making it stand as a beacon in a collapsing international order? It comes down to a reluctance to tackle the root causes of migration: the West has a poor recent track record of state-building, and interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya seem nothing short of hubris in hindsight. These interventions have certainly contributed to the refugee crisis.

Policies to address the causes of irregular migration – interventions, trade, aid – may have been flawed and messy, but they were also necessary. Moreover, the EU’s approach of managing migration from its neighbors was essentially constructive. The EU has tried to build up neighboring countries and regions, then gradually reduce barriers with them. That is what the EU was doing when it enlarged eastwards or removed visa restrictions for the Western Balkans.

Starting from the Bottom Up

Happily, the overseas interventions required to address migration do not involve classic state-building. Certainly saving Libya or Syria feature on the EU’s agenda. But what is required to manage migration is an effort at the micro-level. Take the people-smuggling networks across the EU’s neighborhood. We talk about “king pins” and “crime bosses.” But the networks are in fact mostly run by individuals making a quick buck. If only it were a case of eliminating “Mr. Big.”

Syrians and Afghans often speak highly of the people who smuggle them across borders – except when being interviewed by European border guards. This is because the smuggling networks are increasingly controlled from diaspora groups in the EU and family members outside. By contrast, the refugees speak badly of the Istanbul taxi drivers who know the safe houses and are notorious for overcharging Syrians.

Migrants are using the networks designed to escape development failures. Syrians flee in no small part because of poor urbanization. They coordinate themselves via smartphone. If they move on from Turkey, it is in search of education for their children. As for those arriving in the EU, sixty percent rely on classic travel agents and just two percent on the EU’s attempts to engage on social media.

Why are we not looking for bottom-up solutions across the Middle East? Aid workers on the front line in northern Syria complain that large humanitarian organizations are “withdrawing from the world.” Big organizations, says one aid worker, subcontract the spadework to smaller ones like his, meaning he is the one teaching the law of war in rebel-held zones or deciding whether to help refugees cross borders. As they divorce themselves from reality, the big organizations take the moral high ground in Brussels and Berlin, but they can no longer convey information from the ground up.

Four Observations

If liberals are to rediscover their sense of reality, they may well have to confront some unpalatable political ideas. When Bob Smith and Bob Wilson created their famous 12-step plan to sobriety, they were drawing from their own experience as reformed alcoholics. Consider what follows as talking points of a political rehabilitation drawn from bitter experience.

Europe must externalize the solution. Today, just as in the 1990s, the main locus of the refugee crisis is beyond the EU’s borders. The real global crisis is not one of mobility but immobility: the vast majority of people displaced by violence are internally displaced, unable to cross borders. The majority of those who do leave their country are sitting close to the border. The UK Government Science Office acknowledged this predicament in 2011 when trying to predict numbers of climate refugees: the real problem, it came to realize, would not be mass migration but “trapped populations.”

Refugees are not helpless. OECD data suggest that the people who flee to Europe are often resilient, educated, and trained. But as they enter the EU, they are suddenly made to fit the European conception of what a refugee ought to be. Why do European societies require asylum seekers to be helpless? Today, migrants daily prove the reverse is true: those who move are often safest, have the best job opportunities, and can “vote with their feet.” A liberal Europe that is unable to make a sedentary lifestyle sustainable finds itself trying to make the mobile helpless.

Let’s be more ambitious. Many cling to the belief that all EU migration policy is illiberal, but they cannot offer a clear alternative to it. That is not to deny that some reform proposals do mark a clear liberal alternative – for example giving Frontex a search-and-rescue mandate or creating so-called Nansen passports for people to come to Europe to make a claim for refuge. When these ideas fail to gain traction, their supporters grumble it is because they are too ambitious. The reverse is true: Europe’s politicians have lost a whole liberal toolbox for dealing with migration, one which allowed them to affect the root causes abroad. As a result, the EU is left at the mercy of external forces.

Liberals are fueling populism. Liberals, like populists, are using refugees as metaphors in an emotional debate of their own about the need for a progressive Europe. When liberals cite Europe’s “demographic crisis” as grounds to welcome refugees, they are siding with heavily globalized urban hubs and adopting arguments that reduce people to mere economic or breeding units. This is exactly what populists fear.

Lessons of History

In the early 1990s, the EU experienced the last major shift in global power. At the time, there were fears of a massive, permanent flow of migration. Populists called on the EU to tear up its plans for a passport-free travel area (“Schengen”) and roll back refugee law. Despite the panic, the flows never materialized.

The historical lesson is not that such fears are always unfounded. Rather, it showed how necessary emergency border controls were to reestablish the rule of law and liberal institutions and to usher in a shift in liberal policy.

Those emergency restrictions have been the first priority in this crisis, too. But liberals must see that just as in 1991, European migration policy is a vacuum waiting to be filled – and that they have the scope to propose ambitious long-term reforms. After all, the old European policy of trade liberalization and state-building rested on the pledge that goods, capital, jobs, and democracy would come to the developing world, so people there did not have to move in search of them. It has not worked out that way, and people are on the move. That means the world needs new ways of matching up people and things across borders. Imagine the globalization of the sharing economy!

Away from the emotive debates about the Turkey deal, EU policy is quietly cohering around four principles: helping displaced people help themselves; giving people opportunities as close to home as possible; engaging with the more progressive of the West’s “rivals”; and, creating genuine political partnerships with poorer states.

There is plenty of potential there for a truly liberal approach.

NB. The author’s recent study “People on the Move. The New Global (Dis)Order” can be found here.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2016 issue.

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Taking to the pages of Foreign Affairs to explain Germany’s “new 
global role”, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier came up with a rather puzzling – yet sadly evocative – adjective to describe his thinking.

© Artwork: Dominik Herrmann

Germany’s Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has invented a new term to describe his country’s “new global role”: Germany, Steinmeier writes in the July-August issue of Foreign Affairs, is “a reflective power.” The word “reflective” is so important to him that he repeats it no less than three times in the course of the article.

One wonders what goes on in the head of a leading politician who either honestly believes or thinks he can make people believe that the distinctive trait of his country’s policies is that the Germans “reflect” before they act. Whereas the Americans, Brits, and French presumably act upon impulse? Don’t use their heads? Shoot first and ask questions afterwards? This at least is what Steinmeier implies when he writes, “Germans do not believe that talking at roundtables solves every problem, but neither do they think that shooting does.” Unlike whom?

The idea that Germans are “reflective” rather than active is not exactly new. It was a common trope with German writers of the 19th century. In a famous phrase, Friedrich Hölderlin said that his countrymen were “tatenarm und gedankenvoll” – lacking in deeds but full of thoughts. And Heinrich Heine, speaking of Shakespeare’s Hamlet and his notorious incapacity for action, wrote, “We know this Hamlet as we know our own face that we see so often in the mirror.” Echoing this thought, the revolutionary Ferdinand Freiligrath exclaimed in 1844, “Germany is Hamlet!”

These writers were decrying Germany’s missing democratic fervor. All over Europe, revolutionaries toppled thrones and united their countries in the name of freedom. In Germany, a reactionary made his king emperor of a Germany united by war. The German Social Democrats applauded. They had lost their appetite for democracy after Bismarck had promised them social security. To this day, what drives Germany’s allies to despair is not the fact that Germany thinks before it acts (always a good idea, as Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler found out too late), but that it always seems to develop the thinking habit when action is necessary in the interest of freedom.

Recently Steinmeier criticized NATO maneuvers designed to reassure its Eastern members of the alliance’s readiness in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine and provocations in the Baltic, in European airspace, and on the borders of the Baltic states. “Saber-rattling and war cries”, said Germany’s foreign minister, were not helpful in the circumstances. Had the Social Democrat Steinmeier “reflected” just a minute longer, he might have realized that open discord within the alliance was the worst possible message to send to Russia. But on reflection: maybe he wanted to send the message to Vladimir Putin that freedom and democracy were – now as in the 19th century – not a priority for Germans of his ilk.

The worrying thing about Hamlet, you see, isn’t that he thinks too much, but that at the end of the play the man who has returned from the German University of Wittenberg gets tired of thinking, goes berserk, and kills everybody, including himself, thus opening the door to a foreign invader. Sound familiar?

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – July/August 2016 issue.

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