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Any Western policymaker working in the field of national security over the past decade has had to grapple with the same disheartening reality: the structures and processes that governments created decades ago to analyze threats and coordinate policy responses are ill-equipped to cope with today’s fast changing geostrategic landscape. These days governments must play what international relations scholar Joe Nye calls “three-dimensional chess,” requiring policymakers to address military, economic, and transnational challenges simultaneously. Whether it is Chinese anti-access/area-denial strategies and capabilities in the South China Sea or the Russian use of energy and cyber-attacks as instruments of coercion, asymmetric warfare is presenting unique challenges not only to national security professionals but also to government ministries, which were designed for a different era.

National governments have responded to these changes by developing new strategies, policies, and tools. The homepages of Western foreign offices and ministries of defense are awash in white papers and national security strategies that outline how the world of foreign policy is evolving and why a pan-governmental approach that draws from the respective strengths of multiple government agencies is needed. Less has been done, however, in regards to statecraft. National security professionals know full well that even the best, most innovative strategies and policies will fail if they aren’t accompanied by a process that enables them to be realized. Yet statecraft—the machinery that ensures that national governments can efficiently and effectively execute policy—rarely garners as much attention.

Statecraft often takes a back seat to strategy for a simple reason. Reforming existing national security structures while governing is daunting to say the least. The only real opportunity for change comes at the start of an incoming administration when a new leader has a brief window to reshape how his or her national security team operates.

What’s Wrong With the Current System

With Chancellor Angela Merkel’s recent announcement that she is leaving the world of politics by 2021, Germany will soon be granted a rare opportunity to update its aging national security structures. Among the many changes a new chancellor might consider is the question of whether Germany needs a National Security Council (NSC). That’s an idea that German think tanks and policymakers have been debating for decades, with strong views on all sides. But as one high-ranking German official told me, “the fact that we have yet to create one also underscores the substantial obstacles we face in doing so.”

Due to a constitutional mandate that explicitly calls for and protects the autonomy of federal ministers, German foreign policy is almost exclusively left in the hands of the foreign minister and the Auswärtiges Amt, or Foreign Office. However, in today’s complex world where threats lurch between domestic and foreign policies, many across Berlin’s national security community feel that system has become inadequate or insufficient and lacks the agility to craft innovative and swift policy responses across multiple agencies.

The most common critique of the current national security architecture is the lack of coordination. Germany’s 2006 White Paper from the Ministry of Defense already put a heavy emphasis on the need for a networked approach that would allow ministries to share situational awareness and jointly shape policy options. The 2016 White Paper made the same argument, swapping “networked approach” for a “whole-of-government approach.” In an effort to create such an approach, German policymakers have made some important changes in recent years, including the creation of a Crisis Response Center in the Foreign Office. But policy coordination remains an issue.

Critics of the current system also complain about the inefficiency of ad hoc task forces, difficulties in translating lofty rhetoric into policy, the lack of transparency among agencies, the failure to develop grand strategy, and the gaps between strategic and operational goals. The struggle to pair policy decisions with actual resources has also been a recurring theme.

A More Holistic Approach

Such arguments have led at least some experts to conclude that Germany needs a centralized National Security Council inside the Bundeskanzleramt, or Chancellery. At a minimum, the NSC could possess the authority to chair regular meetings among principals (minister level) with the goal of coordinating policy responses across the government. In more ambitious forms, the NSC could house a larger staff of foreign policy advisors, include the appointment of a National Security Advisor, conduct strategic planning and reviews, set broad policy priorities, or play a more operational role more generally.

There are barriers to change, of course: first, the aforementioned legal issues with the constitution leaving the chancellor with little executive control over foreign policy; second, in Germany’s multi-party system, the junior coalition partner is often granted control of the Foreign Office and has every reason not to cede power to the chancellor; third, government ministries are often vying for attention and power, and the idea of creating an NSC bumps up against strategic turf battles. But those hurdles can be assessed and overcome, particularly by drawing lessons from abroad.

Germany isn’t the only country that has spent the last two decades debating the idea of a National Security Council. The United Kingdom and Japan were home to similar debates, eventually reaching the decision to create a National Security Council in 2010 and 2013 respectively. The two governments saw the need for a more holistic approach to policymaking, particularly in the areas of foreign policy, defense, development, energy, and homeland security.

Britain’s Mixed Record

In the UK, the creation of a National Security Council (which meets weekly) was paired with two other developments: a new Secretariat with a staff of roughly 200 people and the appointment of a National Security Advisor (usually a career civil servant). This new post combines the roles of the prime minister’s adviser on foreign policy and intelligence coordinator, among others.

Reviews of the new National Security Council in the UK have been mixed. On the positive side, the external Institute for Government and the Libra Advisory Group concluded that the NSC has improved coordination across the government, strengthened collective decision-making, and enhanced transparency.

On the negative side, however, UK policymakers continue to lament the lack of strategic thinking and worry that the NSC focuses too heavily on operational decisions. But every leader gets the NSC he or she wants. For former Prime Minister David Cameron, it was an NSC that would execute policy. “Of course in the NSC we discuss strategy,” Cameron said, “But I want us to determine policy, I want us to agree action, and I want us to check that we have done what we said we were going to do.” Nevertheless critics point to the NSC’s failure to discuss President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” or the national security implications of the eurozone crisis as two examples where the UK’s NSC could have played a more constructive role.

Perhaps most interesting for Germany is the feedback from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Like its German counterpart in Berlin, the FCO was initially skeptical of or outright opposed to the idea of creating an NSC for fear of diluting its preeminent role in crafting policy. Surprisingly, though, some policymakers at the FCO now claim that the new process has actually enhanced the role of their ministry. It is the FCO that prepares the briefing memos for NSC meetings and helps set the agenda, and it also gets tasked more than any other agency.

Three Lessons from Japan

Japan’s experience with a National Security Council has been shorter but here, too, one finds some interesting lessons. In 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe worked to pass legislation (similar to America’s National Security Act of 1947) that led to the permanent establishment of a National Security Council. And external and internal assessments of Japan’s NSC have been extraordinarily positive. Japanese officials feel that the National Security Council has provided much-needed centralization and coordination of Japan’s foreign policy. But Japan has three additional lessons that are particularly relevant for Germany.

First, as its strategic culture has evolved, Japan has found it preferable to allow its new National Security Council to handle the country’s most sensitive political issues when it comes to Japan’s role in the world. For example, Abe decided to revise Article 9, the war-renouncing clause in Japan’s constitution and asked the new National Security Advisor to take the lead on this particular issue. Abe believes that the relatively smooth global reaction to this constitutional change was a direct result of the National Security Advisor’s close coordination with his counterparts in many other countries.

Second, like Germany, the Japanese Ministry of Defense used to issue a five-year defense plan that only agitated the all-too-familiar turf battles between the foreign and defense ministries. Once Japan established a National Security Council in 2013, it was able to issue its first National Security Strategy from the top that helped frame defense planning guidance coming out of the Ministry of Defense.

Lastly, the development of an NSC has also led to the centralization of Japan’s intelligence system. Like the United States, Japan created a Director for National Intelligence (DNI), and intelligence officials have been integrated into NSC meetings, regularly providing intelligence briefings at the top. An added benefit of these new arrangements has been stronger US-Japanese intelligence sharing, partly due to the fact that Japan has gotten better at protecting US information.

Washington‘s Need for Reform

As for the US, German policymakers tend to be less interested in America’s experience with its exceedingly large and powerful National Security Council. No German I’ve met could imagine replicating the US model, nor would they want to. That doesn’t mean Germans can’t learn from it, though. Over the past decade, American scholars and practitioners have undertaken a series of in-depth reviews of the NSC. Understanding how the NSC went from a small group of foreign service officers and military officers in the late 1950s to just under 400 people in the Obama administration is instructive. As Americans continue to debate how they might reform this aging structure, Germans may want to tune in.

The biggest lesson from the US is the danger of excess. America’s National Security Advisor and the NSC Directors simply wear too many hats. The legally mandated meetings that the president chairs are now but one small part of the NSC daily rhythm, along with a long list of coordinating and operational tasks. The NSC needs to return power to other agencies and focus on two core missions: managing the process of presidential decision-making on national security and ensuring implementation of those decisions.

The NSC also has too many staff members in too many directorates. Each time a new challenge arises, administrations like to add a new directorate without ever removing any of the former ones. Of course, the United States plays a global role and maintains a global presence, which requires simultaneously tracking multiple continents and issues. But Germany would be wise to follow’s Japan’s example; it only created NSC directorates for its top priority areas.

Despite the weaknesses of America’s NSC, it would be tough to find a former or current policymaker that could imagine eliminating that body altogether. The “DCs” (deputies committees) I attended when I worked in the Vice President’s office were some of the most informative and consequential meetings I attended in government. Yes, I often wished there were fewer meetings, and my colleagues and I often lamented the lack of connective tissue with the budget process. But the level of interagency coordination, especially during a crisis, was critical in shaping US policy responses.

Start Planning Now

Germany is approaching a unique opportunity to change its strategic culture and develop new structures that will help it respond to today’s transformative security environment. Well before a new chancellor arrives in office, Germany should commission a small, outside team of experts to undertake a rigorous review of the experiences of other countries and examine the following questions: are there existing structures in the German government that could be expanded or altered to serve as a National Security Council of sorts? How might Germany make structural changes without adding unnecessary bureaucracy? What kind of constitutional changes would the creation of an NSC body require? Who might lead such an effort in the next administration (a technocrat or senior statesman)? And are there consequences for Germany in not having an NSC, which so many other regional powers have recently created?

The short list of candidates that stand the best chance at becoming the next chancellor of Germany are no doubt already thinking through a variety of new policy ideas. But those good ideas must be matched with good governance. Taking the time now to return to the question of a National Security Council would be a good place to start the conversation about German statecraft.

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I’ll admit it. I did not expect to be writing a piece with this title. Like so many on both sides of the Atlantic, I did not expect Donald Trump to win on November 8. But he did. So now committed Atlanticists need to get to work and start sketching out a common transatlantic agenda for the Trump administration. That will not be easy, especially since the term “transatlantic agenda for Trump” sometimes feels like an oxymoron. Can there be a transatlantic agenda for a US president who, during the election campaign, called into question the utility of the NATO alliance, expressed an admiration for President Vladimir Putin’s leadership style, promised to get rid of trade deals like TPP and TTIP, and said he would dismantle the Iran nuclear deal – one of the shining achievements of the transatlantic partners in recent years? Yes, but it probably will not resemble the one we would have pursued had the election gone the other way.

Had Hillary Clinton won, we would have started with the big substantive questions facing the transatlantic partners. What to do with Russia? Do we add more sanctions? Do we replace the Minsk Protocol with something else? How might we collectively save the European project? How do we make the next NATO Summit a roaring success? What do we do with TTIP during 2017 when a number of European countries will be having their own elections? What about Turkey, an increasingly important strategic ally but one that is moving away from the core principles and values the transatlantic partners hold dear?

Those questions remain on the table of course. But – depending on who will be advising Trump on foreign policy – they are likely to be paired with a different set of questions that cast the fundamentals of both US foreign policy and the transatlantic alliance in a new light. Trump and those around him are likely to ask why the United States has invested seventy years in a set of institutions and alliances like NATO. Are those institutions still relevant and do they serve America’s core interests? What is the value of free trade? Why does the US station troops overseas in places like Germany and Italy? Why should the US promote and work to uphold the values it shares with its European allies? Why should the US and its allies support a country like Ukraine?

In addition to answering questions about the overarching value of the transatlantic relationship, Atlanticists also need to prepare to work with a US administration whose day-to-day operations are unlikely to resemble that of past administrations. As many European capitals have already learned during the transition period, current protocol has been tossed out the window. The president-elect has not been issuing statements on foreign calls, not taking daily intelligence briefings. He has not relied on the State Department to help prepare him for foreign calls. He regularly tweets false statements and news. He has included his family in foreign engagements. What this means for Trump’s future engagement with European allies is unclear. But Europeans should at the very least expect the unexpected. Perhaps Trump will not attend the next NATO summit. Maybe he will not do much international travel at all. (Rumors have been swirling about his dislike of traveling overseas). Perhaps he will leave high-level foreign engagements to his vice president or another member of his cabinet. And maybe the entire nature of foreign engagements – even with our closest allies – will change in ways we cannot even imagine.

Preparing for a New Era

How should Atlanticists on both sides of the pond prepare themselves for this new era? They should start by going back to basics. Those that treasure the transatlantic relationship and want to see it thrive will have to convey to Trump himself, members of his administration, and an increasing number of European leaders who are losing faith in the relationship that it still matters. Yes, it is an imperfect relationship, one that regularly fuels frustration on both sides of the Atlantic. Sometimes we disagree with and disappoint one another. But when a crisis erupts such as the Ebola outbreak or the rise of the so-called Islamic State, the first thing Europe and the US do is call their partners on the other side of the Atlantic. Why? Because they know there is no better place in the world to find real capacity, political will, innovation, and economic leverage.

Atlanticists will also need to enlist new allies in the years ahead. That means developing and deepening relationships across the US Congress with members new and old. If, for example, the Trump administration starts to weaken or discredit the NATO alliance, Atlanticists on both sides of the Atlantic will need to work with Republicans and Democrats in Congress to push back. But developing new sets of relationships should not stop at Congress. That list should include the private sector, NGOs, and the media as well. And both sides of the Atlantic need to do a far better job of engaging their publics on broad questions of foreign policy and national security.

Furthermore, if Trump’s governing style will be firmly rooted in the “art of the deal” as his book title suggests, Europeans should start thinking about the parameters of their own deal. In other words, where exactly are Europe’s collective and individual red lines? Europeans will no doubt find some of Trump’s policies to be troubling yet tolerable. But which ones will not be tolerable? A Muslim registry? The end of the Paris agreement? A return to waterboarding? And more importantly, what would Europe put on the table either as a concession or threat to prevent such lines from being crossed?

In terms of actual substance, the Trump administration will no doubt want to engage Europeans early on Russia. Europeans would be wise to start sketching out where they would be willing to compromise. If Trump proposes lifting sanctions against Russia, for example, Europeans will want to help shape what the West gets in return. Trump has already indicated that he is seeking more Russian help in Syria. Europe should craft its own list, one that could include Russian cuts in nuclear weapons, no more snap exercises on the edge of NATO territory, no Russian interference in European elections, and a smaller Russian presence in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea. Europe should also state unequivocally (to Russia and the US) where it will not compromise: on support for Ukraine. Leaving President Putin with the impression that the West is turning its back on its friends in Ukraine would set a very dangerous precedent, one we would all surely live to regret.

Atlanticists on both sides of the Atlantic face a daunting task in the months and years ahead. As populism rolls across political landscapes in Europe and the United States, fewer people believe in the transatlantic relationship and its indispensable role in the wider liberal order. Saving and strengthening that relationship now rests with a smaller group of Atlanticists who now must become more vocal, more creative, and more responsive to the very forces challenging it.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – January/February 2017 issue.

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Many, myself included, find these speeches reassuring. They ease the minds of policymakers that feel overwhelmed by world events and breed transatlantic confidence at a time of considerable uncertainty. But are they right? Even if one assumes that the West has the ability to shape today’s complex security environment (which is by no means a foregone conclusion), one has to ask if it possesses the will, innovation, and resources to actually do so. In truth, what Europe and the US are actually doing in response to the changing face of geopolitics makes what they are saying far less inspiring.

Unimaginative “Reforms”

There is no question that the West deserves high praise for the creation of a global network of international institutions, laws, treaties, and norms. From the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank to the OECD, the West has invested decades in building, maintaining, and reforming the bedrock of the international order. With emerging powers, revisionist powers, and non-state actors actively challenging that system, though, how much is the West doing to either counter or adapt to those challenges?

The heads of major international institutions will tell you “a lot,” rattling off a long list of internal reforms over the better part of the last two decades. But such reforms have done little to halt Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Bashar al-Assad’s barrel bomb attacks against the Syrian people, the rise of Islamic State (IS), or China’s aggression in the East and South China Seas. Why? Many of the oft cited “reforms” are simply too unimaginative and timid. By tinkering on the margins, these reforms do little to get at the heart of the challenge. Bold structural reforms on the scale of revisiting the consensus rule in NATO or the veto on the UN Security Council are considered impossible, counter to our interests, or too high risk.

The West seems to have forgotten, though, that it did not come to be the architect of the global system in the 1940s and 1950s by avoiding risk and relying on conventional approaches. Quite the contrary, the individuals that built that foundation often took considerable political, professional, and strategic risks both at home and abroad. In fact, several of the obstacles that policymakers faced at the time – a disinterested public, resource constraints, and high stakes negotiations with friends and foes alike – resemble some of those we face today.

Take popular support: Similar to the retrenchment instincts present on both sides of the Atlantic today, American and European publics in the late 1940s were skeptical about the value of creating new international institutions that would require making long-term commitments to the economic prosperity and security of Europe. Those that worked to build a new liberal order, therefore, often put their political careers on the line and fought tirelessly to counter the skeptics, who were sometimes inside their own administration. This was particularly true for President Truman who had to persuade members of his own inner circle, the US Congress, and the American public about the value of creating the Marshall Plan in 1947.

Of course, today’s era differs quite significantly from the post-World War II era. In the span of the last two decades, the world has experienced a dramatic diffusion of power, which means that the US and its Western allies can no longer produce and shape the outcomes they once did. Furthermore, the West is living in an era characterized by unprecedented interconnectedness in the shadow of globalization. As a result, both the international system and individual nation states are straining to respond to rising expectations, an array of domestic and economic pressures, and broader questions about the value of international cooperation.

Strengths to Build On

Despite these challenges, the West still benefits from a number of comparative advantages. It can build and run international coalitions like no other; its collective economic strength remains a powerful force in the global economy; its education system continues to attract students from around the globe; its economies have shown a remarkable capacity to repair themselves; and its values, while by no means admired by everyone, still serve as a beacon to many around the world. And for better or worse, the world still relies on the West to solve global problems and underwrite international security.

In order to adequately address today’s complex security environment, though, Europe and the US need to envision and promote change on the scale of what we witnessed at the end of World War II. Small-scale tactical shifts that avoid taking risks and fail to challenge the status quo simply will not suffice. We need leaders willing to buck the system, to get their hands dirty, and not only to think but to do the unthinkable. A bold, ambitious agenda that matches the enormity of today’s complex security challenges should include the following goals:

Launch and lead a global effort to redesign the international system so that it reflects today’s balance of power and is positioned to address today’s challenges, from the rise of non-state actors to asymmetric warfare to the diffusion of technology. If the UN refuses to alter the composition of the Security Council, it is time to consider a more inclusive architecture. In establishing the rules and distribution of power of any new model, however, the founders should consider countries’ past behavior. In other words, countries that act primarily as spoilers or have repeatedly violated global norms should not be rewarded with a leadership role in the creation of future structures.

Lead the world in the establishment of global norms in a number of new areas, including cybersecurity, unmanned and autonomous systems, genome editing, and disruptive technology like 3D printing. The West, particularly the US, prides itself on its ability to innovate, which has brought tremendous economic and technological benefit. Occasionally, though, countries like the US fail to foresee (or prefer to deny) the challenges that such innovation may someday bring to the global system and instead take advantage of the fact that few rules exist around a particular technology’s use. This is shortsighted. While establishing global norms is no small task and inevitably involves trade-offs and often years of tense negotiations, the West needs to reassert its leadership role in this area.

Break down the barriers that prevent international organizations from working together. The EU and NATO, for example, have struggled for years to find ways to establish institutional links. But age-old objections tied to the situation in Cyprus have prevented anything of real substance from taking root. With global challenges such as cyber- and energy security straddling the mandates of both institutions, the West can no longer afford to keep these two institutions on separate planes. The only way to develop innovative policies and tools to cope with a range of cross-cutting issues is to abolish longstanding barriers to cooperation. That should also include the barriers that exist between the public and private sectors, especially in the area of cybersecurity.

Double down on efforts to promote and finalize the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic clearly see value in establishing a new trade agreement that would provide much needed growth, position the two sides of the Atlantic to set global standards in a number of sectors, and send a clear message about the US and EU’s willingness to open markets. But their approach to date has been far too risk-averse and rooted in the hope that the merit of their arguments will ultimately win the day. Just as Truman launched an ambitious campaign to educate the American public about the Marshall Plan, Washington and Brussels need to launch their own engagement plan that would answer tough questions, directly engage stakeholders, and counter the anti-TTIP narrative dominating the debate. This project’s value stretches far beyond creating jobs and boosting exports but one would never know that from the way the two sides are promoting it.

Develop an international home for global forecasting and risk assessment. In 2014 the West was caught completely off guard by not one but three separate international crises – Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the rapid spread of Ebola, and the rise of IS. While it is impossible to predict with certainty where the next crisis might erupt, the West should find or create an international forum for global forecasting where groups of countries can prepare for the unexpected. The West should also dedicate resources to collective risk assessment. One possible starting point would be an examination of the risks involved in the gradual collapse of the international arms control regime. Russia is in direct violation of the INF Treaty and yet the West is still spending most of its time wordsmithing the documents for the next NPT Review conference. What the West should be doing is discussing tectonic shifts that could lead to additional noncompliance, a complete withdrawal, or decreased prospects for future agreements and how the West might prevent such shifts from actually occurring.

Europe and the United States share a truly breathtaking record of achievement, one that remains unmatched by any other two regions of the world. But admirable past achievements simply aren’t enough to lead us into the future. This era of compounding complexity demands leadership, bold ideas, new models of doing business, and unbridled ambition on a scale we haven’t seen in several decades. There are countless reasons, though, why today’s leaders may not rise to the occasion. Our publics are weary, resources are scarce, and the relentless pace of social media makes it difficult to maintain strategic attention. The West has also experienced some sobering lessons in recent years about the limits of US and European power. But one of the lessons of the last seventy years is that when the West marshals the right mix of will and leadership, it does indeed have the ability shape the world order in unimaginable ways, even in less than perfect conditions. The real tragedy, therefore, would be not if the West tried and failed to take on such an ambitious agenda but if it did not try at all.

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