Artwork © Katinka Reinke

Brussels, on a spring day in April 2040. Marie Épinard is fretful. A few months ago, the woman who started her career as a member of the young team advising the then French President Emmanuel Macron, moved into the Berlaymont at Schuman roundabout. As President of the European Commission, she sees herself as following in the footsteps of her compatriot Jacques Delors, committed to ensuring the dynamism of the single market. She sees it as the centerpiece of the joint project that is the European Union because this project now encompasses many different things. The common legal entity, the Union of “Equals,” has not really existed since the 1990s—with the euro and Schengen two major fields of differentiation have since developed. Nevertheless, the EU still holds on to its narrative as being about “unity.”

But in recent years, this kind of differentiation has evolved from being an instrument for overcoming blockages into becoming an active organizational principle in the EU. This has had a number of institutional consequences that have changed the way cooperation happens in Brussels. And Paris has been one of the driving forces behind this development.

The principle of unanimity in many of those areas that so urgently required joint action had caused constant blockages due to the primacy of national interests. As a result, groups of member states had finally taken the bull by the horns and started moving ahead in fields as diverse as cooperation on police and intelligence matters, defense policy, technology policy, and taxation policy.

One of Épinard’s most important tasks is to ensure that all of this continues to be done within the framework of the EU Treaties with commonly agreed rights and obligations—and that it remains open to all who want to join later. There is now something like a “common sense” approach among the EU member states as to how such forms of cooperation can be conducted in a way that is compatible with the common good. And this, after all, is a remarkable development, following the many years in which the mental maps in the member states regarding the EU had moved further and further apart. The realization of the extent of their own weakness in the face of an increasingly aggressive global environment certainly had an impact.

Too Complex for a Beer Mat

In the meantime, there is something like a truce in the EU: everyone is committed to the most ambitious single market possible—and some are doing even more. Yet the many different strands, which exist alongside each other without any connection, carry a risk of unravelling. Differentiation comes at the expense of transparency. In the meantime, as a result of the different speeds, the rights and advantages enjoyed by EU citizens are anything but equal, which increases political volatility.

As a consequence, the President of the European Commission spends a lot of her time digesting the opinions of her various legal advisers on the somewhat abstract question of exactly how much asynchronicity a union can tolerate and still go by that name. This morning, there is once again a great deal of differing opinions as to when the point will have been reached when competing systems gathered under one roof will no longer make sense. Épinard herself would like to have a model for the EU that could be written on the back of a beer mat. But that’s just not possible these days.

Most importantly, there is the single market, which is open to all EU member states that have committed themselves to democracy and the rule of law. “Big is beautiful” has been the motto here since the 2020s. Then there is the increasingly aggressive competition between the US and China and the rise of other powers and regions which have ultimately brought Europeans closer together and even allowed for progress on all four fundamental freedoms. After leaving the EU, the British, too, have gradually formed closer ties again with the single market and have strengthened the circle of friends in non-EU Europe. The Western Balkans states, meanwhile, have now become part of the single market, following a deliberate effort by the EU to support them.

Europe’s integration-skeptical governments have finally accepted that the single market cannot function without strong supranational institutions. And the prospect of no longer fulfilling the criteria for membership of the single market is also disciplining those political forces in Europe that had started turning their backs on democracy and the rule of law in their countries. All this has served to strengthen the EU institutions, above all the European Commission. It can now also use its regained strength within the single market to give the EU clout in international trade policy, which offers the potential for both conflicts and opportunities.

It was a long journey to get to this point. For many years, Europeans struggled to overcome the deep rifts that had opened up between sovereignists and advocates of “more Europe” over fundamental issues of democracy and the rule of law. It was only after 2019 and Brexit, which took place at the last minute in an orderly fashion but still hit the economic interests of London and the EU capitals hard, that EU citizens realized just how much internal cohesion they had lost: economically, socially and culturally.

A Hanseatic Alliance

This was also demonstrated by the European elections of that year, which significantly boosted nationalist forces in the European Parliament. Their power to shape policy remained limited, as they still had less than a third of the seats and few overlapping policies. But their repeated tactical alliances considerably increased the potential for disruption of the EU system.

In addition, there was the cooling of the global economy, the effects of which were clearly felt in the EU, particularly in Germany. The euro zone, with its still incomplete architecture, once again revealed its inner weakness. In Rome, Prime Minister Matteo Salvini played with fire: leaving the monetary union was out of the question, instead Italy wanted to change its rules from within.

For the Élysée, the loss of Italy as an ally was a real problem, particularly as successive governments in Madrid had been stymied for years due to unresolved internal divisions over the question of Catalonia’s independence. A new force field had developed in the EU in the form of the Netherlands and its new “Hanseatic alliance” of EU countries with conservative approaches to fiscal policy, a stance that Germany was also sympathetic to. This made it impossible for France to tip the scales to ensure a genuine reform of economic and monetary union.

Paris soon gave up believing in the Franco-German motor for reforming the euro zone. With enormous political effort, President Macron had managed to halt the protest movements in his own country, to moderately push forward his reform path, and to anchor his ideas for the future of the economy, politics and society in Europe in a coalition with the Liberals in the European Parliament, while also keeping Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National in check. Berlin under Chancellor Angela Merkel, however, was not prepared to compromise despite all the lofty commitments to strengthening the European Union with regard to an economic union.

In this context, and against the backdrop of a weak global economy, the battles over distribution within the EU increased. The negotiations over the multi-annual financial framework for 2021-2027 were fiercely contested, with the different interests clashing as never seen before. During this period, the forces of the center were also significantly weakened in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. This was partly due to the ongoing electoral successes of nationalist parties and movements that then formed governments, and partly due to their own internal weaknesses and the lack of a common vision from Germany and France for the future of the EU. Had the Maastricht Treaty therefore finally failed, were the states and societies of Europe unready for a genuine political union, for deeper cooperation on issues of migration, internal security and defense?

Looking back, it’s clear that this disillusionment was actually helpful as it led to a new consensus among the member states. In this phase of fundamental differences, the decision was made to focus on the single market as the EU’s “main raison d’être,” something the Commission had already envisaged in 2017 as a possible scenario for the development of the EU.

Security and Migration

“Nobody falls in love with a common market,” Delors had once warned. Yet EU countries had gone through too many emotions in recent decades—negative emotions. So why not a new soberness? After all, without the single market, the EU would be nothing. A number of initiatives were launched to further enhance the single market. In addition to this, real progress in securing the EU’s external borders drew attention to the explosive issue of migration in the short term. However, without any agreement on a common asylum and migration policy, internal border controls tightened over time. In turn, it quickly became clear that the single market could not develop its full potential without being embedded in a more ambitious policy framework.

In retrospect, two developments were decisive for the start of a new phase of differentiation: Firstly, the shift of US security interests towards China and away  from Europe—something that happened gradually rather than with a bang. Secondly, the agreement on a genuine common asylum and migration policy by a group of EU member states in the face of continuing migration pressure, which threatened to trigger domestic political upheavals.

When it came to defense policy, Britain increasingly signaled its interest in genuine cooperation with the EU. The UK’s own position outside the EU structures proved to be advantageous, as the country’s public opinion was still divided about the EU. For France, which had early on made intensive efforts to involve the UK, this was a welcome development as it helped compensate for Berlin’s weakness. During his first term in office, President Macron had convinced the new German Chancellor, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, to join London, Madrid, Rome and Warsaw in making a genuine offer of cooperation on defense policy to any other EU member states that were willing and able.

The focus here were less on institutional issues than on a few examples of rapid, flexible and, above all, successful cooperation. Needless to say: since the British needed to be on board, the whole thing had to take place (at least initially) outside the treaties. This was hard to swallow for the officials in the chancellery in Berlin, but the EU had long been accused of relying on initiatives within the EU framework to allow it to hide its own lack of ambition. In view of the concrete security-related challenges, it was indeed necessary to demonstrate the ability to act. The European Intervention Initiative, molded on the French model, finally saw the light of day.

Germany’s Conversion

Overall, a clear willingness to change could be seen in Germany’s European policy with regard to a greater level of differentiation. While Berlin had previously placed great emphasis on the cohesion of the EU as a whole and was above all concerned about losing countries in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of closer cooperation with others, it now became convinced that cooperation with like-minded partners in promising core areas of its own interest could be attractive—and can also help demonstrate the value of Europe to the German people.

For although Germany had long been one of the countries that profited most from EU membership, the image of “Germany as paymaster for the crises of the others” had persisted in the country. Organizing the reform of European asylum and migration policy, which had long failed in the EU-27, into a group of EU countries was far more attractive for Berlin than the prospect of closer economic and social cooperation within the euro zone, which France had long demanded. On the issue of migration, differentiation could also be more easily organized on the basis of existing EU treaties by using the instrument of “enhanced cooperation.”

Paris, however, insisted that new forms of cooperation beyond the single market should still be linked to the EU institutions. At the same time, there should be a clear difference made between the member states that participated in these projects and those that did not. For example, only countries involved in a particular issue should take part in votes on those issues in the European Parliament. This should also apply to the Eurogroup.

Primacy of the Ballot Box

While the Commission should have some responsibility for defense, migration and the euro, its rights would vary according to the format. Berlin agreed to the premise that the strong role of the EU institutions in the single market of all EU members should be preserved. And so, the way was cleared for a new experimental field of flexible cooperation between groups of member states—vive l’Europe différenciée! The “New Hanseatic League,” for example, claimed the right to set its own priorities and developed a differentiation project in the field of new technologies. And in this way, new forms of cooperation began to emerge.

So now Marie Épinard is pondering the question of finding the right balance between everyone acting together and the Europe of differentiation—and she finally comes to the conclusion that only the next European elections can reveal what that balance should be. It will be up to the citizens of the EU to decide whether or not the first female European Commission president, together with the governments of the member states, has indeed managed through differentiation to bring the EU closer to its citizens’ expectations of security and prosperity. In 2040, it is now a matter of course in the EU for achievements to be measured not by the yardstick of history—but rather by what Europeans decide at the ballot box.

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© REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke

When it comes to European affairs, Berlin has traditionally had a great deal of confidence in its own role. Since the European Union’s founding, it has been part of Germany’s political identity to regard itself as one of the chief architects and advocates of European integration. Nonetheless, Berlin seems to have been punching below its weight in Brussels lately. Though it would be too simplistic to blame Berlin for the lack of progress on major issues such as eurozone governance, migration policy, and European security, German policymakers would be well-advised to ask themselves where their approach has failed them.

A recalibration of Berlin’s role in the EU seems overdue considering the upheaval in the past decade – the global financial crisis, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the failure by EU members to forge a joint response to the refugee crisis. An already embattled EU now faces additional pressure from nationalist movements across Europe, a majority of British voters deciding to leave the EU, and the election of Donald Trump to the US presidency.

The Brexit vote in June 2016 meant that the disintegration of the union was no longer unthinkable. Britain’s departure worried Berlin less than the prospect of a domino effect within Europe. Rubbing salt in the wound just days before his inauguration, Trump told German tabloid Bild that the British decision to leave was “smart“ and predicted that other member states would follow suit. (FN1) The reality that the United States – Europe’s most important ally – was calling into question the value of the EU suggested a fundamental shift in transatlantic relations, and came at a time of unprecedented weakness for the union, making it even more dangerous.

All Talk, No Action

At this early stage, it was not quite clear to what extent Trump’s remarks would actually translate into policy. But the comments nonetheless shook the foundations of German foreign policy. Berlin suddenly understood with threatening clarity how much was at stake for Germany if both the EU and the transatlantic alliance could no longer be taken for granted.

“I believe we Europeans have our destiny in our own hands,” said Angela Merkel in a January 2017 press conference when quizzed about president-elect’s comments. “I will continue to do my part to ensure that the 27 member states cooperate intensively and above all in a forward-looking manner.“ (FN2) In its simplicity, this phrase reflected a strategic choice. Its latest interactions with London and Washington had conveyed to Berlin a large degree of unpredictability. Berlin came to the conclusion that improving the cohesion and performance of the EU and its member states could amplify its leverage. Berlin would not shy away from dealing with the UK and the US on core issues, but would invest more energy in re-engaging its EU partners and strengthening the cohesion of the EU 27.

Role Reversal

It may seem as though these aims are no different from what has been promised over the past decade, with Berlin reiterating time and again its commitment to EU integration. But the German government is becoming increasingly aware of the pressure to deliver. The past decade has demonstrated that paying lip service to one’s commitment to the EU while failing to deliver reform is not enough to avert a crisis.

It could be considered ironic that – after years of German dominance – France is the country pushing Germany out of its comfort zone. President Emmanuel Macron has invested significant political capital in favor of domestic and EU reforms and is thereby forcing Berlin’s hand. As campaigning heats up ahead of German federal elections in September, this is not an easy game for Berlin to play. In the days after the French election, both Bild and Der Spiegel warned readers that the young and ambitious Macron would plunder their bank accounts to pursue his vision for the EU. (FN3)

Indeed, the current policy controversies at the EU level are less than suitable in making a case for EU unity and collective strength. This is particularly true for eurozone reform, where French and German views continue to diverge. However, there has been a renewal of the debate regarding a more “flexible EU.” (FN4) The old concept of a multi-speed union as a remedy against centrifugal forces regained some prominence with a declaration adopted in March in which EU leaders referred to “different levels of integration,” saying, “Some countries will go faster than others.”

Out in the Cold?

What Germany and other like-minded countries – in particular France, Italy, and Spain – intend to do is to build on the new momentum for cooperation in the EU. Recent ECFR research showed that there is a readiness to explore new ways of working together in order to achieve better results. Flexibility is no longer seen as propelling disintegration. Instead, after years of division over the euro, migration, and security, flexibility is viewed as something that can actually help overcome divisions and rebuild much-needed trust among EU citizens.

One should not underestimate the impact such an initiative can have among reluctant partners like Warsaw and Budapest. Neither have an interest in a position as outsiders, particularly at a time when flexible cooperation projects are being launched in areas of core interest to them (external border security in the case of Hungary, and European defense in the case of Poland, for example). This is why there is a calculated threat in recent initiatives put forward by Germany and other like-minded countries that implies to reluctant partners that they may be left out in the cold if they fail to adhere to EU rules. This kind of implicit pressure has been a feature of previous rounds of flexibility debates in the 1990s and early 2000s. What has changed is that being an outsider has become a much more threatening prospect. The UK currently serves as an unglamorous example of what it means for a member – even one of its size and economic strength – to be left out in the cold.

Germany’s Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, a member of Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) and a veteran of EU politics, recently published an article in conservative newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FN5) in which he argued that the EU needed to strengthen its capacity to act in areas where even nationalists acknowledge that going it alone is not enough, for example the protection and management of the EU’s external borders, European security and defense, and eurozone governance.

Appealing to Voters

Berlin is trying to get a sense of public opinion as the German electorate gets ready to head to the polls in September. What almost a decade of crises has failed to bring out in voters has been prompted by the prospect of Brexit and a Trump presidency: According to a recent Eurobarometer poll, Germans’ trust in the EU has risen by 20 percent since November 2016. (FN6) Since the end of 2016, a growing number of citizens across the country is joining the weekly “Pulse of Europe” marches. A non-partisan movement, “Pulse of Europe” brings together people who oppose nationalism, advocate unity, democracy, and human rights, and believe in the EU’s ability to reform.

Trump’s election has demonstrated to many Europeans in a clear-cut way what might happen if the commitment to fundamental values – often taken for granted in Western democracies – comes under attack. This example has given depth to public debate across Europe and has made European citizens stand up for the values that unite them.

Ten years of crises have not created an EU fatigue among Germans – on the contrary, the European narrative seems to have a renewed sense of purpose. It now seems as if the public is encouraging the political establishment to regain its confidence in the EU and to implement reforms.

Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel recently put this theory to the test. In a March op-ed also for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, he argued that Germans needed to stop obsessing over their contributions to the EU budget. (FN7) “The truth is that Germany is not a European net payer, but a net winner … Each euro that we pay into the EU budget multiplies and flows back to us.” He went on to suggest that Germany do something “outrageous” in the next debate about Europe’s budget: “Instead of fighting for a reduction of our financial contribution to the EU, we should signal our willingness to pay even more.”

A Franco-German Compromise

2016 marked a watershed moment for Germany and for the EU as a whole. The prospect of disintegration after the Brexit vote and the election of an unpredictable US president placed almost a decade of EU infighting over prosperity, security, and migration in a completely different light. The EU 27 found themselves suddenly out in the open, with their vulnerabilities laid bare. Berlin reacted in an impressively sober and strategic way to signs of EU disintegration and the new transatlantic constellation.

In this moment of unprecedented uncertainty, Germany has started “taking the bull by the horns” by moving more decisively to contain the threat of disintegration and continuing to invest in the EU as the preferred model of regional order. Germany has also started to forge coalitions of like-minded partners on core policy issues through flexible forms of cooperation.

Both the presidential and parliamentary elections in France have triggered a new sense of dynamism in Berlin’s political establishment. But both Paris and Berlin are aware of the hard work that lies ahead. The fact that Macron put eurozone reform on the public agenda in Germany initially highlighted differences between the two countries, but this is not necessarily a hurdle for a Franco-German compromise. It is about time Berlin get used to the idea that the EU is more than a sporting field that the Germans always leave victorious. The ability to compromise is deeply enshrined in Germany’s political identity, and this part of its culture has also served the EU in the past. The next government in Berlin should learn from the current administration’s underestimating the readiness of a majority of Germans for greater EU cooperation, and, indeed, integration.

1    “Was an mir Deutsch ist?,” interview with Donald Trump, Bild, January 16, 2017.
2    “Ich denke, wir Europäer haben unser Schicksal selber in der Hand. Ich werde mich weiter dafür einsetzen, dass die 27 Mitgliedstaaten intensiv und vor allen Dingen auch zukunftsgerichtet zusammenarbeiten.”, press conference by Angela Merkel and the prime minister of New Zealand, Berlin, January 16, 2017.
3    See, for example, the Bild headline “How Much Will Macron Cost Us?” (“Neue Zeiten in Frankreich: Wie teuer wird Macron für uns?”, May 8, 2017) and the cover headline of the weekly magazine Der Spiegel – “Macron Saves Europe … And Germany Is Supposed to Pay” (“Teurer Freund: Emmanuel Macron rettet Europa … und Deutschland soll zahlen,” 20/2017, May 13, 2017).
4    See Almut Möller and Dina Pardijs, “The Future Shape of Europe. How the EU can bend without breaking,” ECFR Flash Scorecard, March 2017.
5    Wolfgang Schäuble, “Beste Vorsorge für das 21. Jahrhundert,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 20, 2017.
6    European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 461: Designing Europe’s future, 2017.
7    Sigmar Gabriel, “Deutschland: kein europäisches Nettozahler-, sondern ein Nettogewinner-Land,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 22, 2017.

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Taking the Reins

Europe will need to pick up where the United States leaves off.

European leaders and policy makers were confounded, like so many Americans, by Donald Trump’s election as the 45th president of the United States. As so many others, they are now scrambling to make sense of the consequences. So what will it likely mean?

A Trump presidency will lead to profound changes in America’s engagement with the world. At its base, it will represent a transition back from the highly internationalized and engaged America that we have known since the beginning of the 20th century.

This should, in fact, come as no great surprise to Europe. This transition is exactly what America has been speaking of for decades now – the desire to step back from being the world’s policeman. The translation of this sentiment into fact has also been an underlying trend during the Obama administration.

However, it will without question be different than it was under President Barack Obama. It is likely to take a different hue and accelerate at a far quicker pace.

Trump has said bluntly that America’s allies are not pulling their weight and that under his leadership they will have to start doing so if they want American support. That differs little from the position (stated rather more politely) of the last four

US defense secretaries – Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, Chuck Hegel, and Ashton Carter. But unlike them, Trump expects quick action from allies in response.

So this may not be news. But there is another, more profound consequence that will now underlie this trend, one that is far more damaging. This election has fundamentally and perhaps irreparably damaged America’s soft power. The appeal of American (and Western) democracy has been greatly weakened. The Western ideal no longer holds the same glow.

Brexit Distraction

With Europe distracted by Brexit and its own internal concerns, and the US led by Trump, Western leadership is now absent. The consequences of this will be grave for Europe and the US. The institutions that have provided the basis for the current global architecture will be diminished, and the norms that many have relied upon have been cast in doubt. Others, notably China and Russia, will take advantage of this (as they have already been doing).

It is in this highly uncertain and unstable environment that Trump will insert his foreign policy objectives.

It is worth noting that his foreign policy positions are very unclear. Few candidates for president actually speak honestly and candidly about their foreign (and domestic) policy objectives; they swing to the extremes in the primaries, move more toward the middle during the election itself, and then, upon gaining office, discover that the facts are not what they had thought: Governing is far more difficult, and compromises must be made.

Thus, some of Trump’s more extreme positions, such as pulling out of NATO, can likely be put aside.

There are, however, some positions we can take seriously. TTIP will not progress during his tenure (although a trade agreement with the UK could), and Trump could presage a global move toward greater protectionism, with significant global consequences. US-Russia relations could well undergo the long anticipated “reset”, where Trump could well sacrifice things for which he has little interest (Crimea, for example) for the chance to announce he’s “made a great deal.” And Obama’s positive environmental agenda will be quickly reversed.

Still, the greatest fears of many around the world are unlikely to become reality. Trump will be constrained by his bureaucracy, by the judiciary, by Congress (there is little consensus today among Republicans, and the current conciliatory tone is unlikely to last), and finally by his cabinet (who will have far more experience governing than he does).

The world today is a more dangerous place. Trump’s enthusiasm for unpredictability will make it worse. But the steps required to mitigate the worst are clear (albeit difficult): Europe will need to step forward, to take more leadership, and to bear more burdens.  – BY XENIA WICKETT

Make Him Look Good!

Europeans should play to Donald Trump’s penchant for power – against their own instincts.

How should Europe deal with Donald Trump? According to the flood of initial reactions, Europe is now facing a massive challenge and a great deal of unpredictability.

Not necessarily. Dealing and even working cooperatively with Trump might be easier than anticipated if Europeans get the basics right from the start. Here’s an example of how to get it wrong, how to get it right, and a few ideas for Europeans trying to wrap their minds around the challenge the election poses to transatlantic relations.

The presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, addressed the newly elected president in a joint letter on November 9. “We would take this opportunity to invite you to visit Europe for an EU-US Summit at your earliest convenience. This conversation would allow for us to chart the course of our relations for the next four years.”

There was nothing wrong in writing that letter, but I doubt it was the best way to woo Trump to Europe. To begin with, his instincts certainly don’t lead him to embrace the European Union as an institution or as a partner. Trump is interested in power, and the EU has given him ample opportunity to associate it with powerlessness, and, perhaps worse, with the impression of a “rigged system” that he so fervently attacked in his own country during the campaign.

Trump’s attitude suggests that he believes power lies in the hands of strong men rather than with institutions, and the course of history has been shaped by deals from strong leaders, as Jeremy Shapiro argued in a recent ECFR paper. There is no reason to believe that Trump will have an interest in or even understand the post-World War II logic of various nations sharing power under the EU umbrella.

Early Mistakes

So the first mistake Tusk and Juncker made was to suggest the initial contact point should take the form of an EU-US summit. For us Europeans, this is the way we operate. We believe in having everyone around the table, regardless of size and prowess. But this certainly won’t impress Trump. The second mistake the presidents made was to leave the timing to President Trump: “at your earliest convenience.” It gives the impression that Europeans are fawning and needy, keen for the US president to give them a bit of his precious time.

So how can Europe do better in piquing Trump’s interest and making his cooperation more likely? Fundamentally, Europeans should play to his penchant for power, even if it goes against their own instincts, and they should clearly be the ones to set the agenda and timing. Furthermore, Trump is a newcomer in the world of international politics, and being the narcissist he is, he wants to succeed.

So Europeans should help introduce him to the international arena and make him look good in the club, as long as it doesn’t hurt them. The most important thing is for Europeans to impress President Trump with how they work and cooperate as Europeans, and with others, around one table. Europeans should therefore orchestrate the best opportunities to show their own strengths. They should utilize the various resources they have in playing old-fashioned power politics, which has seen a resurgence in Europe and the world. We can play this game of power by putting our strongest leaders out front, but we must also show the added value of the union’s institutional machinery.

A prime example is the EU3+3 in negotiations with Iran: The High Representative and the EU’s most influential countries played a pivotal role in shaping those talks. President-elect Trump will push Europeans to perform better in other areas where they can marry the strength of member states and EU institutions.

Two events will be important benchmarks in that process. As of December 1, Germany will take over the G20 presidency from China. In the run-up to the summit in Hamburg in July 2017, there will be a host of meetings between officials on various levels. European members of the G20, including EU representatives, should use these talks as an opportunity to coordinate and liaise with their US counterparts in the new Trump administration so they can build alliances at working levels. At the summit itself, Europeans should make an extra effort to show unity, and the German presidency can help a great deal in portraying a Europe in motion.

Italy will hold the G7 presidency in 2017, and this will present another important opportunity. The next meeting will be held in Sicily next May (though it’s a bit ironic to imagine President Trump in this setting). The overall subject is migration, a topic that has been hugely divisive in Europe (this will also be Theresa May’s first G7 appearance), and will likely also be a major point of discord with Trump, going by his campaign rhetoric. However, this is not necessarily an impediment to a successful display of European unity and strength, precisely because we have got to know so well each other’s domestic limitations. There is a strong interest in the EU to internationalize the challenge of migration, and Europeans should naturally be looking for points of convergence. This might be the chance.

Yes, Europeans are facing a great deal of unpredictability with President Trump. But if they manage to get the fundamentals right, they might be able to turn it into an opportunity for Europe itself. – BY ALMUT MÖLLER

Honor Your Commitments

A staunch ally like Poland shouldn’t be left in the cold.

Poland has been a staunch ally of the United States, both within NATO as well as bilaterally. It is participating in the US-led anti-ISIL Operation Inherent Resolve, spends the requested two percent of GDP on defense, and has joined the US and other allies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fate of both countries is deeply intertwined, and the policies of the next US president will have profound implication on the security and prosperity of Poland.

These are uncertain times in Poland. Brexit only added to the sense of fragility of the European project and anxiety over the future of the West, both of which have been the guiding stars of Poland’s foreign policy over the past 25 years. During this time of instability, the US has become Poland’s predominant security partner. Together we face the main challenger to a stable, values-based European security order, Russia. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and covert invasion of eastern Ukraine set off alarms in every NATO capital, but particularly in Warsaw.

Russia’s determination to undermine the European security order based on the principles of the Helsinki Accords of 1975 means the region has entered a new era of dangerous competition. Russia’s aggression was met with NATO’s move from reassurance to deterrence, codified by the Warsaw NATO summit declaration in July. Security will remain the key concern for Warsaw, and security policy will remain the key pillar of Polish-American relations.

America is committed to placing 5000 soldiers on Polish soil over the coming months. An armored brigade (ABCT) is scheduled to arrive in February 2017. This is a clear commitment to NATO and European security that the next president should embrace. The troops deployments already in the pipeline are a message of resolve, and there is no need to modify military planning. The next administration should focus early on providing resources for the beefed-up US presence on NATO’s eastern flank by quickly working with the new Congress on the next cycle of the European Reassurance Initiative. Any delay or change in the pace of implementing NATO summit commitments would send the wrong signal to both the allies as well as Russia.

No Quick Deal with Moscow

In the past, every new president since the end of the Cold War made the mistake of trying to fix relations with Russia in one quick move. Under President Barack Obama this led to the infamous “reset” that many in Warsaw saw as sacrificing the interests of Central Europe on the altar of closer (but in the end unsuccessful) cooperation with Russia.

Even if an exact repeat of this situation is unlikely, there is certainly a worry in Warsaw about the next administration attempting to fix America’s relations with Russia without addressing the issues that led to the breakdown of ties in the first place. It would be a mistake to go back to business as usual without resolving the conflict in Ukraine. This would be seen by Moscow as confirmation that it can trample on Western values and interests whenever it chooses. Such a step would further embolden Moscow in its aggressive policies, which would eventually lead to a renewed clash with the US. Russia’s behavior will change only if Kremlin elites understand that Western pressure transcends US administrations.

Whenever the US disengaged from Europe in the 20th century, it always led to conflicts that required American reengagement with great loss of blood and wealth. The 21st century is no different. Poland, as well as many other front line US allies, needs an America that is engaged in the world and focused on the maintenance of an alliance system that has benefited the US so much over the past seventy years. The US remains a key European power. Post-Brexit Europe should be one of the key focal points for the next administration.

European allies need to contribute more, sharing the burden more equally – especially when it comes to spending on security and defense. Much of the work should be done behind the scenes, but the next president needs to make it clear that the US wants a strong, united EU both as a global partner and a key player in its own neighborhood. – BY MICHAL BARANOWSKI

A New Order?

The US will be a less stable and reliable partner for Europe.

President Donald Trump will be leading a country that is more preoccupied with itself and its domestic divisions than usual. He enters the White House as the most divisive first-term president since Abraham Lincoln. This bruising election campaign has cast a shadow over his judgment and suitability for office.  He will, however, have Republican majorities in both houses of Congress and an energized base of voters behind him. The Democrats will be demoralized and leaderless for some time to come.

Presidents matter on foreign policy; that is where they have the most independence from Congress. And the world is not going to allow Trump to focus solely on domestic priorities.
A Trump presidency will be a complicated one for Europe. President Trump stands for almost everything both European and German leaders have opposed: denial of climate change; an America First version of unilateral nationalism; an open admiration for illiberal regimes and leaders, most importantly Russia and Putin.

Just as President Obama came in as a correction to the nationalistic policies of the George W. Bush administration, Trump sees himself as a correction to the multilateralism and soft power approach of Obama. He will inherit the mantle from a president who many in both parties believe has been too reactive and passive, especially regarding Putin and Russia. He is likely to take a much softer line on Russia than Obama. He knows that Putin tried to influence the election in his favor and will be open to another reset in Russia policy. He views Russia and Putin as an ally in the war against Islamic extremism. He will be much more open to recognizing a Russian sphere of influence and will see Ukraine as a needless drain on American attention and resources. He will be open to lifting the sanctions regime on Russia in return for a bigger deal with Putin.

Not Merkel’s Preferred Partner

Hillary Clinton was clearly Angela Merkel’s preferred partner, but with Clinton there was a real danger of division over Russia policy given Clinton’s harder line on Moscow. Now, Merkel faces the opposite problem of Trump accommodating Russia. That would undermine Western unity built upon close ties between Washington and Berlin. Trump is also more open to giving Putin free rein in Syria as part of the larger fight against Islamist extremists.

As Robert Zoellick put it recently in the Financial Times, “Europe’s problems will probably be left to the Europeans.” Given the challenges and choices any American administration faces in the Middle East and Asia, Europe will be expected to offer more leadership and partnership. Both Clinton and Trump agreed that European allies have to boost defense spending to shoulder a growing burden with the United States, but Trump went much further and linked American security guarantees to levels of European burden sharing.

Chancellor Merkel’s commitment to expand defense spending significantly and move toward the NATO target of two percent of GDP is an important step in meeting these expectations, but it will have to be followed up with substantial improvements in German and European defense capabilities. What’s more, expectations of stronger German-American partnership in leadership in the wake of Brexit are now on life support. Hopes for a reliable European partner were already in doubt given the current disarray in the EU – not to mention next year’s elections in a number of key countries, including France and Germany.  The American election has now accelerated this fragmentation.

Trade and the future of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will be another important policy challenge. Trump ran on a clear anti-free trade platform and has rejected both NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). His views reflect the substantial domestic opposition to more free trade agreements among American voters. It seems highly probable that not only TPP but also TTIP are now dead.  The transatlantic partners may need to find another way to enhance economic cooperation.

Great Discontinuity

A Clinton presidency would have come as a relief to Europe. It would have signaled continuity with Obama on the Iran nuclear deal, better ties to Cuba, and the close relationship with Germany. Instead Europe faces the greatest discontinuity it has faced since at least 1989.  Something significant is going on in the West that would seem to auger an unstable and dangerous period, both at home and internationally.  America will be a less stable and reliable partner for Europe, as it will be consumed with its “civil war” at home. As Charles Lane put it recently, “Today’s Republicans and Democrats are so divided that they no longer seem like citizens of the same nation or acknowledge even the same factual reality.”

And as Zoellick points out, “The next president will need to start by deciding if the US should perpetuate the seventy-year-old order.” The American election has now put that order into serious question. – BY STEPHEN S. SZABO

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Moscow is challenging the Europeans with breathtaking audacity. And we are taking our sweet time to consider which weapons to reach for. Militarily, we have nothing left anyway. Now, it seems, we do not even have faith in our soft weaponry anymore. EU neighbors are no longer on the way to democracy; instead they are embroiled in war and chaos and many of their people are on their way to us. Schengen – borderless movement within the union – is at an end, EU governments divided, joint institutions unable to cope; public threats abound and mistrust is spreading. Now even the German chancellor looks wobbly.

For years it has been fashionable to worry about the state of the European Union. Yet the absolute bottom line moves a couple of centimeters each year. Did the Greek euro-tragedy not ring in the end of the EU, and even Europe? Now there is the refugee crisis – and that is much more explosive because it reaches deep into the identities of Europeans. It seems to expose what divides us and bury what unites us. How can the EU hang on?

The Moral Maze

It is a truism that the best recipe to combat diminishing faith in European policies is one that weakens the centrifugal forces in the EU. That includes a solution for the acute refugee crisis and a long-term strategy to deal with migration streams, a unified, strong presence in foreign and security policy, and a sustainable structure for the economic and currency union – all so difficult to achieve exactly because of those centrifugal forces.

Take upholding the values that EU countries promise to honor when they join the union: Democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and minorities. The EU has always seen itself as the driver of transformation within countries wishing to join, leading them to respect these values as best they can. But the realization that this process can be reversed has provoked significant insecurity in Brussels and other European capitals. The fact that EU structures themselves do not always fulfill the expected democratic conditions does not make anything simpler. The gap between demands and reality has grown markedly.

Although the EU places a great deal of emphasis on values, it currently seems unprepared, even non-responsive, when dealing with this topic. This, however, is not about demanding a new debate on values. Rather, we have to realize that our posturing on values has practical consequences: it is on these that we are judged  and we must accept the fact that this applies not only to our own countries, but also to what happens within the EU. We cannot allow membership for those who continuously abuse basic values all union members committed themselves to respect. This is not a question of patronization or of interfering in the domestic matters of member states,. It is a natural part of a clear, albeit carefully conducted, European debate. We all have a great deal to lose if some of us begin attacking the values and rights we have achieved and upon which we have built the union.

The question of values is also valid in relation to European integration itself. Until now the current level of integration has pretty much held steady. Questioning the distribution of powers between European and national levels was practically unacceptable for those committed to building the union, something that was seen as an attack on the greater idea. But how can we, within the EU framework, deal with competing values? Is the value of the Schengen agreement, of passport-free travel within most of the EU to be regarded as greater than the value of security and order in EU member states? The refugee crisis clearly pushes this difficult question onto the agenda. Under what circumstances is the value of the level of integration that has already been reached secondary – and who should decide that? The general tendency to discuss “Europe” as an almost moral imperative has hampered the EU to take on this debate in a differentiated manner. But that is exactly what is urgently needed.

The Return of Nations

The political forces that have deepened and broadened European integration over the past few decades have been losing ground. But this has little to do with their Europe policies; rather, it is a function of the drift in the political party landscape within member states in general. New movements have emerged criticizing the fundamental direction and substance of European politics, and the state of democracy in many EU countries. Many of their supporters are asking valid questions.

These movements and parties, however, are different from the growing forces that question the basic idea of any peaceful integration of Europeans. These are the actual enemies of European thought and of peace within and between the peoples of Europe. They present themselves as Europeanized alternatives, but their touchstones remain national.

Established parties have in many places adapted their discussions to keep up with voters. Not only does that affect what is possible to be achieved now in daily EU politics. It also illustrates that the EU system’s many and high ratification hurdles make it very difficult to adapt. “Old” European political forces seem powerless. The best way to tackle these centrifugal forces would be a convincing political approach that prevents people from drifting toward the extremes. In the refugee crisis, though, the mood within the EU is making it much more difficult to find joint policy approaches.

The State We’re In

How can this vicious cycle be broken? The old political forces must credibly establish a conversation that demonstrates that they do not see the EU as a sacred cow, but rather as a tool with which to take on the challenges of the 21st century. If they talk of dramatic global changes, but are only ready and able to take on gradual changes within the EU system, the EU will lose ever more credibility.

Perhaps it would be helpful to indeed reconsider the balance of national and European approaches – as we are currently seeing with the refugee crisis. However, the return of state borders causes deep discomfort within the European debate. Did we adopt the post-national integration project with too much enthusiasm, and forget that, for most people, the state remains a significant point of reference? Even though the EU concept is still popular, it also prompts an uneasy feeling among many of its citizens that they no longer count in this new world without borders. Those who are committed to further build the European project must acknowledge that this feeling exists.

Centrifugal forces have also become stronger from a legal perspective. EU law has always been complex. But lately this tendency has been accelerated, first and foremost by attempts to fix the common currency. EU primary law has become a patchwork of international agreements, tied to the primary law of the EU but still making up a complicated web, with many loose ends. Further differentiations such as a “mini-Schengen” are already under debate.

In addition, a British exit from the EU would mean that a new legal basis for the relationship between the EU and UK would have to be found – one which would allow for close economic and trade relations stretching into the future. That is possible, but would only increase the complexity of the legal relationships between European states further. Legally it would probably be tolerable, but the element connecting all the pieces would become less and less visible.

Which Europe Do We Want?

Is the answer to all this to move toward a “core Europe” – an idea that is again winning supporters? The idea would be to counter centrifugal forces with a consolidation of the core in order to maintain the stability of the whole; yet there are a great deal of arguments to suggest the opposite would happen: Disintegration at the periphery could accelerate rather quickly, with fatal consequences for the EU as a model of order for the entire continent.

What then holds the European states together? To answer this question, we should discard the legal community as a frame of reference. Being European is not measured by depth of integration and the application of legal arrangements, but rather by joint values. Concentrating on this theme is not an empty phrase.  It is intimately linked to the lives of many people in Europe, even more so thanks to the dispute with Vladimir Putin’s Russia over the past few years.

It is no accident that Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, is busy with this question right now. The UK is set this June to hold a referendum on Britain’s continued membership based on a package of reforms David Cameron’s Conservative government recently negotiated with the EU. The negotiating position of the European Council included a re-interpretation of the aim of an “ever closer union” from the preamble of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. That has remained a thorn in the side of the British government, as it seems to stand for runaway continental integration – but the European Council president’s advisers offer another way to look at it. The phrase “ever closer union of the people,” they suggested recently, explicitly addresses the people of Europe. The union serves to “promote the trust and understanding between the people of Europe who are linked by living in open and democratic societies which are based on the same universal values.” This, the argument goes, is not the equivalent of aiming for political integration the British so fear; thus the formulation does not necessitate automatic integration in the sense of sovereignty transfer, and London should not worry.

Yet this interpretation provokes resistance. Former long-term MEP Andrew Duff of the British Liberal Democrats warned, with good reason, against a redefinition of the principle of “ever closer union,” which could lead in the end to the disintegration of the union. Clearly, there is a battle of ideas going on that at its core addresses the notion of “EUropeanness.”

What Unites Us?

When considered soberly, it looks like Tusk has his finger on the EU’s pulse. He knows that this interpretation could not only win over British referendum voters;it could also work elsewhere in the EU. The really decisive question is indeed one of common values. It is smart to reach now for the shared experience of universal values in democratic and open societies, which is far greater than the lowest common denominator. It is equally clever to focus initially on people and not states.
The challenge now is to form the debate about what unites us so that it does not push the people and countries of the EU further away from each other. Europe has become a continent of despondency. We are experiencing how thin the layer of Europeanization is, even after many decades. We are witnessing deep cracks within and between our societies, some of which are homemade, but which are also exacerbated from outside the union’s borders.

We must actively direct our focus to repairing these cracks, ask what caused them, listen to each other and acknowledge that we see things differently, and that we have experienced the crises of the past few years differently. We must ask ourselves how the European level has contributed to these developments, and how we are going to deal with that in the future. We must therefore create more places where Europeans can negotiate these difficult questions with each other. If we do this, we can ultimately return to a recognition of what unites us and what makes us confident again about the powerful story that European unity holds.

Read more in the Berlin Policy Journal App – March/April 2016 issue.

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