© REUTERS/Pawel Kopczynksi

Outside of France, the French presidential election has been widely portrayed as a decisive moment for the future of Europe and the liberal order in general. And nowhere was the final contest between Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen followed more closely than in Germany, where both the political elite and the public felt that the outcome would directly impact their own national destiny.

A few weeks on the nail-biting has already been forgotten, and Macron’s likely huge parliamentary majority is being treated as something not terribly newsworthy. Now Berlin is ready to get things going with the new French president: When Macron visited Berlin one day after his inauguration, Chancellor Angela Merkel showed she has taken into account the concerns that have dominated the French domestic debate, including the need to better “protect” European (and French) workers from globalization, and is willing to help Macron enact domestic reforms by bending the growth and investment agendas. For his part, Macron is aware that Europe could become a campaign issue in Germany, and has rejected the idea of eurobonds – at least for now – which had become a red line in Berlin.

If Germany wants to move forward with France, it will however have to be willing to compromise, especially where its eurozone policy is concerned. To that end, Merkel’s strong-willed finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, has already said that Berlin was ready to be flexible in working to address France’s economic challenges. And in fact, Macron’s agenda is hardly radical: the foundation can actually be found in the 2014 Pisani-Ferry-Enderlein report, which Macron helped draft with Germany’s then-Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel.So while Macron’s victory does not change the underlying balance of power in Europe, or the magnitude of the task ahead, there are several reasons to think that the Franco-German relationship may be on surer – and more equal – footing than many think.

First, as Merkel said during their joint press conference: “Only if Europe is doing well will Germany be doing well. And Europe needs a strong France to be doing well.” The German government knows that the success of Macron’s presidency will directly impact the future of the whole of Europe, and therefore Berlin. Germany, whose economy is naturally dependent on the economic prosperity of the continent, cannot remain blind to the difficulties of its biggest neighbor. This situation was utilized by far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon during the presidential campaign, who pointed out that Germany will have to compromise with France in order to avoid the economic and political collapse of the continent.

Second, the framing of the French election in the German political conversation gives extra leverage to the new French president. From the Germans’ perspective, Macron was the only one able to prevent the disaster of a Le Pen presidency, and the coming five years may be the last chance for Germany to work a sustainable deal with Paris. The risk of seeing an anti-European candidate become president after the 2022 elections is taken very seriously in Berlin, and the clock is ticking to find solutions before then. The official support for Macron among German leaders like Schäuble reveals this sense of urgency. The fear of seeing the European project end in five years will clearly strengthen Macron’s position in the coming negotiations.

Third, France represents more than its own weight in Europe. Although the continental balance of power clearly favors Germany, the leadership capacity of Paris, especially among Mediterranean countries, should not be underestimated. Germany’s economic hegemony in Europe is insufficient to impose total political leadership. France’s strategic and cultural closeness with some key European actors will play into Macron’s hand; indeed, Macron, who has publicly expressed “sympathy” for Southern European countries, has raised hopes in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece that he may work to soften what they regard as German-imposed austerity. A more nuanced stance from the EU on austerity may even erode the support of the populist parties that have gained ground on the back of the perceived unfairness of current agreements. As the 2018 elections in Italy will be yet another major test for the future of the EU, this cannot be ignored in Berlin.

Finally, there is a certain harmony between what Macron wants to accomplish at home and what he needs to do to strengthen France’s position with Germany. The new president will first and foremost focus on domestic affairs in the coming months, and the reforms he intends to implement – especially regarding labor laws and economic bureaucracy – satisfy German expectations. France’s need to “do its homework” to be taken seriously in Berlin should not be too difficult for Macron given his promises during the campaign. This marks a clear difference from Hollande, who had to strike a difficult balance between his campaign’s domestic promises and its European commitments.

For all these reasons, France will have a window of opportunity to advocate for a new foundation of the European project, even if it meets with some resistance in Berlin. In the more immediate future, Macron will focus on short term reforms that are expected to have a direct and positive impact on France, such as the directive on “posted workers,” tighter trade rules, and tougher anti-dumping regulations, as well as a common asylum policy. In the long run, France and Germany share a common desire to overcome institutional paralysis and make the EU more efficient and effective when coping with new crises. The discussions will be centered on the so-called multi-speed Europe, and on the need to cooperate on defense and security issues. Engaging with Africa as both a security and migration challenge and an economic opportunity will be at the heart of the French-German foreign policy agenda.

In fact, the new French president may face less resistance from Berlin than from other European capitals. His plan to review the directive on posted workers is a sensitive issue for Central and Eastern European countries, while his positions on trade – symbolized by the idea of a “Buy European Act” – could be difficult to sell to traditionally pro-free trade countries like Sweden and the Netherlands. Close cooperation between France and Germany will therefore be absolutely essential to create a consensus, and the wave of optimism following Macron’s victory will have to be translated into political momentum in Europe.

In an acknowledgment of Germany’s strained relationship with the United States, as well as with the United Kingdom post-Brexit, Merkel described Europe’s destiny as in “our own hands,” and signaled that Germany had no choice but to forge a closer alliance with France, despite policy divergences. To achieve greater unity, both Germany and France will have to show flexibility in the fields they dominate – that is, the economy and defense, respectively: Germany will have to be less stubborn when it comes to reforms and burden-sharing in the eurozone, while France will have to accept that its European partners, Germany included, do not share all aspects of its outward-looking strategic culture and vision for European defense cooperation. Only then will a French-German – and European – “new deal” be possible.

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Germany’s white paper has added significance in a future EU without the UK. There are a number of issues which still need clarification before the Franco-German couple works hand-in-glove on defense.

© REUTERS/Damir Sagolj

Published a few weeks after the Brexit vote, the German security white paper has acquired a broader meaning than intended. Faced with multiple crises and rising euroskepticism across Europe, Europeans are under great pressure to show credible leadership and action. The EU Global Strategy and the mini-summits taking place in preparation for the Bratislava EU summit in September have all expressed support for enhanced defense cooperation, improved intelligence-sharing, and beefed-up border defenses, following the terrorist attacks in France that shook Europeans’ sense of security. In a recent Weimar Triangle meeting, France, Germany, and Poland committed to “reinforce the European Union and the foundations of European integration by demonstrating that the EU is able to act.”

Major crises are driving this push for a revitalized European project and a strategically responsible Europe. However, defense and security cooperation has been hampered for years by the Big Three’s diverging strategic mindsets, with the United Kingdom’s historical rejection of an independent EU military force outside NATO, France’s tradition of strategic autonomy, and post-World War II Germany’s posture as a European economic power reluctant to use military force in global conflicts. With the UK – which has the largest military budget in Europe – heading for the exit, Germany and France are now relaunching closer European military cooperation. The challenge will be to define a project that combines France’s historical role in developing the EU’s defense with Germany’s new active role in shaping it.

In the 2016 security white paper, Germany sees itself gradually assuming a larger defense role within the frameworks of NATO and the EU: “Germany is increasingly seen as a key player in Europe,” and is ready to “assume responsibility” and “help meet current and future security and humanitarian challenges,” the white paper notes. In summary, it states: “The country has a responsibility to actively help shape the world order.” This is a major shift for Germany, signaling a necessary normalization of the German strategic mindset to better match a changing international security environment. The combination of Russia’s resurgence, the spillover effects of the crises of the Middle East and North Africa into Europe (refugee flows, terrorism, Islamist radicalization, etc.), and the Brexit vote are eroding the EU’s – and also the United States’ – capability to project soft and hard power, and changing the way Germans think about the challenges of the world around them.

At the same time, the 2016 white paper can be read as a response to the concerns of Germany’s allies (notably the US and France, but also Poland), who have been nudging Germany to take on more political and military responsibilities. In fact, the white paper aims at showing that Germany has taken their concerns into account. Since the Libyan fiasco of 2011, when Germany abstained in the UN Security Council vote establishing a no-fly zone over Libya rather than voting with its allies, France has been seeking a change in the German position regarding deployment in multilateral formats.

Berlin now recognizes that coalitions of the willing like the one fighting the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq will only grow more numerous in the future. Germany also wishes to be considered a more attractive and reliable military partner – a partner capable of achieving objectives across the entire spectrum of military operations. Paris will closely follow the implementation of these advancements, keeping pressure on Berlin to significantly improve its force projection capabilities and deliver on the idea that the Bundeswehr should broaden its spectrum of capabilities and actions.

The white paper also envisions a future European Security and Defense Union and the establishment of a permanent civil-military operational headquarters in the medium term. Shortcomings in the French- and UK-led 2011 Libyan air campaign and aging equipment used in African missions have convinced French officials of that necessity. France still sees strategic autonomy as critical, but wants to move ahead with ideas long blocked by Britain – for example a joint EU command headquarters and shared military assets. Germany is emerging as a clear leader in this field, and is showing that it means business when it comes to building up a more integrated European force with initiatives including Dutch-German defense cooperation, preparations for similar arrangements with Poland, and a proposal that, in the future, foreign EU nationals will be able to serve in the German armed forces. In the post-Brexit context, Germany is shaping up as the top nation France will turn to on defense matters.

Rebalancing Defense Leadership

This new French-German configuration will most probably benefit Germany and partially weaken French leadership on defense matters. The French are of course reluctant to give Germany too much power when it comes to defense; historically, EU defense was a French concept which benefited from German support and British cooperation (which is quite wide-ranging, as the agreements of Saint-Malo and Lancaster House testify). These days Paris is more interested in a stronger EU defense policy than in the integrationist project per se, seeing the EU as a way to share the burden of counterterrorism and diminish dependence on the US.

A European army could potentially jeopardize French strategic autonomy, though. Hard questions, like who will pay for an EU military headquarters, how it will be structured, who will be in command, and what the European army would be used for, still need to be addressed. The German project for European defense needs to be clarified and based on a French-German plan, with an inclusive approach vis-à-vis other EU member states like Italy, Poland, and other Central European countries. The idea put forward by the Weimar Triangle of an annual European Security Council where strategic issues relating to internal and external security would be addressed by EU leaders is a first, important, and easily-implementable step.

In the short run, however, Germany will not be able to replace the UK as France’s closest military partner. The Franco-German couple combines a budgetarily weakened but internationally active France with an economically strong but strategically restrained Germany, and this can only change slowly, one step at a time. In addition, Paris and Berlin have different strategic cultures and priorities. France has a special sense of responsibility for global security and does not hesitate to act unilaterally if necessary.

From a French perspective, it would be desirable for Germany to take over more responsibilities in areas where France is engaged, in particular in Africa and the Middle East. The French defense minister recently proposed that the EU should send military ships to ensure open waterways in the territorially disputed South China Sea, but Germany is not willing to initiate military operations yet, let alone in East Asia. These differences may be an obstacle to French-German efforts to develop stronger EU defenses. Paradoxically, it currently seems easier for Berlin and Paris to agree on the central strategic importance of NATO for their defense.

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